Survey and Critique of
First Intelligible and Secondary Philosophical Intelligible in
Transcendental Philosophy

Sayed Ahmad Ghaffari Qarabagh *

Abstract
Investigation about status of concepts and circumstance of
interaction of mind with objective world is regarded important
in the realm of epistemological and ontological issues.
The common approach on separation between the First and
Secondary intelligible is that the First intelligible unlike logical
and philosophical intelligible - applies to instances (masadiq) of
the objective world.
Author in his study, Considers criteria of "independent
instance" - applied for distinction between the first and
secondary intelligibles- inadequate. In this article, the role of
theory of "the essentiality of Existence" is regarded important
and effective.
Keywords: first intelligible, secondary philosophical
intelligible, occurrence, attribution, Essentiality of Existence,
independent instance.

Introduction
It seems that the recognizing the principle in reality, can brings
surprising results in philosophy and even cause to establishing the new
philosophical school.
This option which is considered fundamental in philosophy is
present clearly in all of arguments and relative subjects, and causes the
new structure for the sciece because using different principles and

* Independent scholar of Islamic philosophy. Email: arazegh@yahoo.com
Receipt date: 15/2/2012
Acceptance date: 30/6/2012
different origins is only factor which can separate between heresies within science.

In peripatetic and illumination (Ishraq) philosophy, the ontological Priority of quiddity to existence, rule on the philosophical conclusions. We understand truth of this speech when we understand the role of quiddity (mahiyyah) in these schools.

In peripatetic and illumination philosophy, the existence is accident and quiddity (mahiyyah) is subject for existence (IbnSina, 1375, V.3: p.2).

In peripatetic and illumination philosophy, there is tendency to the theory of naturally identity between mental idea and external object – as staple of theory of "Mental Existence "- for caterof correspondence between idea and external object. (See: Tabatabai,1382,V.1: p.91).

Divine knowledge to the foreign objects, is obtained by cognition of forms outside of Divine Essence and naturally, it is knowledge of quiddity not of existence (Ibid, V4: p.1133).

These views cannot be true without acceptance the theory of essentiality of quiddity (mahiyyah).

I do not deny there are statements against the above mentioned, But it is required for the scholar of a school that refer to Indexes and original formats And it should be ignored the vague or illusive statements as genuinely opposed to the sadraean theory of essentiality of existence (asalat al wujud) - may also be found expressions that person can never doubt in assignment the essentiality of existence to MullaSada.

As regards, this article seeks to review position of first and secondary philosophical intelligible in the transcendental philosophy, thus it is necessary to analysis the theory of essentiality of existence (asalat al wujud) and to choose the correct view.

**Essentiality of existence interpretations:**

**First interpretation:**

In objective world, what is realized is existence and quiddity, but what is prior in the realization and does not need to conditional mode of predication is the existence and since, the quiddity is existent by existence (bi tab'a).

In this exposition, in fact, existence and quiddity, both are existent and they are united, there is something greater to be considered include nature and existence i.e. "Reality".
The principle of realization is the "existence" and consequently the nature is "the real" in fact. "Essentiality" in this exposition means "to proceed "and" Sativity of conditional mode of predication" (See: MullaSadra, 1383, V.1: p.65-p.68, p.78, p.79, p.81, p.85).

**Second interpretation:**
Existence is what is realized in fact and quiddity- because of being limit of existence - has not external reality. As limitation, something is nil and the nil isn't real thing.

Allameh Tabatabai writes: "The essence of quiddity is its existence's limit which that existence doesn't contravene of its limit."(Tabatabai, 1382, V.1: p.69 also see: Misbah, 1405: p.22)

In this exposition, reality is equal to existence and the quiddity isn't existent really and, essentiality means reality and externality.

**Third interpretation:**
Existence is what is realized in fact and quiddity- because of being Reflection and mirage of existence - hasn't external reality.

In other words, external reality is only "Existence" and the quiddity isn't external existent and so, attribute of reality to quiddity is a Virtual one. Essentiality in this exposition means reality and externality.

Allameh Tabatabaei in some of his works is of those who suppose quiddity, mirage of existence and consider it reflection of existence to mind.

He writes:
"It is obvious here that the reality of quiddity is mirage, and is reflection which established in the aspects of material entities. Such as water in a mirage, and as aspect in Mirror, that is indeed evident, but aren't from mirage and Mirror.

As the mirage, which is a salt, and the mirror, that is a reflector, are manifestation for phases, also the quiddities aren't existence exactly, but they are utterers of other things in which they have emerged (Tabatabai, 1388: p.147).

The Difference between second and third interpretation is that the second interpretation considers the quiddity as a limitation of existence and because of this, the quiddity isn't external being, but in the third interpretation, the quiddity isn't limitation of existence even,
but they are mental manufactures or mental reflections of external world (fayadhi,1387:p.21).

**Selected commentary:**
It seems that the first interpretation is which is correct because:

1. Quiddity occurs on external object and this is a very good evidence for externality of thing.

2. Quiddity is a description of external existence and each description is existent in his noun's world. If the noun were extant in external world then whose attribute would be too.

**The Definition of the Secondary Philosophical Intelligible**
For starting discussion, it is necessary first to define clearly the standard by which we allocate whether or not an intelligible is first or secondary. The Islamic philosophers divide universal concepts into three categories:

One: The first intelligible: These refer to those concepts that have both mental and external existence. Some philosophers say that first intelligible is the same as quiddities in their extensions in the real world (See: MullaSadra, 1383, v.1, p.323-v.2, p.65-Misbah, 1382, v.1: p.178).

Two: The secondary logical intelligible: These refer to those qualities whose external existence is their attribution of a mental being qua mental being such as the fact that the concept 'man', as a concept is a species (Ibid, also see: Mutahhari,1366.v.3:p.301).

Three: The secondary philosophical intelligible: These are those qualities whose presence in a proposition or predication expresses the attribution of an external being [with some quality]. Such qualities, however, do not possess an instance in the external world (MullaSadra, 1383, v.1: p.323;v.2: p.65-Mutahhari, 1360, v.1: p.116).

In some of the expressions of the philosophers, the term that has been used is different from the one mentioned above: If the occurrence and attribution of the intelligible are in the external world then this quality will be a first intelligible. If the occurrence of the intelligible is in the mind but the attribution of the intelligible is in the external world then this will be a secondary philosophical intelligible. If the occurrence and attribution are in the mind then this will be a secondary logical intelligible (Mutahhari, 1360, v.1: p.124-Misbah, 1382, v.1: pp.176-177).
According to the abovementioned definitions, it will become clear that the division of the intelligible into the abovementioned categories stems from the ontological separation between mental or external reality of intelligible. The reason for this is that, as can be seen, in this division sometimes it is mentioned that some of these types of intelligible have an instance in the external world, while at other times it is stated that the instance of other such intelligible is in the mind, whether its attribution is in the mind or the external world. Therefore, if some, while presenting this topic, have stated that it is an epistemological discussion, this would seem to be incorrect (Ismaiili, 1388: p.21).

The Separation of the Place of Occurrence and the Place of Attribution
In the explanation of these categories the thing that most draws our attention to itself is the separation between the attribution of an external being and having an instance in the external world. In other words, it is possible that something may be the attribute of a being in the external world but at the same time not have an instance in the extension in the external world.

However, it seems that if the place of attribution of a proposition is the reality of the subject (and of course the reality of the subject is something that includes the external world, the mind and reality as a whole) then without a doubt the place of occurrence will also be reality exactly. Therefore, to separate the place of occurrence and the place of attribution from one another seems strange.

MullaSadra has explicitly stated that a group of scholars were of the opinion that it is possible that the place of attribution of a quality be different from the place where it exists.

'Some philosophers have said that it is possible for an attribute to be non-existent while something in the external world is attributed with it' (MullaSadra, 1383, v.2: p.336).

After this, he sets out to disprove this matter:

"It hasn't meaning that the noun is in external world but its adjective isn't really in external" (Ibid, p.338).

And he writes:

"This belief that the sky is such that we understand it is above us, necessitates that the quality of being above, is something real that exists" (MullaSadra, 1382: p.150).
In other words, in the opinion of MullaSadra the secondary philosophical concepts exist in the external world. However, they do so as do the copulative beings. In other words, neither do they not exist, nor do they possess an independent existence (See: MullaSadra, 1383, v.1: pp.336-339).

**Martyr Mutahhari's viewpoint about Separation of the Place of Occurrence and the Place of Attribution**

When a predicate occurs for a subject and that subject is attributed with that predicate then two relations possibly exist [between them]. One is the occurrence of the predicate for the subject and the second is the attribution of the subject with the predicate. Here, four states are conceivable:

One: The occurrence of the accident for its subject and the attribution of the subject by the predicate both occur in the external world such as is the case when we say: 'Zayd came.' Here the attribution of Zayd with 'coming' and its occurrence both happen in the external world. Because the 'coming' is an accident that inheres in its subject and this inherence and accidence both happen in the external world.

In the same way, when we say, 'Zayd is standing up' two things exist: The act of standing up and Zayd. It is clear that the quality of standing up has occurred for Zayd. Therefore, this act of standing up is an accident and Zayd is its subject [in which it inheres]. Also, this act [of attributing a predicate such as standing up for a subject such as Zayd] is called accidence or occurrence. Now, it must be determined where the place in which this accidence takes place is. Does it take place in the mind or in the external world? It is clear that the place where the accidence [of Zayd with standing up] takes shape is the external world. Where, however, is the place where Zayd is attributed with standing up? It is also clear that the place of attribution is also the external world. This means that the external existence of Zayd is attributed with standing up.

Two: The accidence of the accident for its subject and the attribution of that subject with the aforementioned accident both happen in the mind such as is the example when we say: '[The concept] man is an universal.' It is abundantly clear that 'universality' has occurred for 'man'. Therefore, 'man' is the subject and 'universality' is the accident that inheres in it. Now, we must see what
the place in which such accidence and attribution take place is. First of all, it is clear that the place where man is attributed with universality is the mind. The man that exists in the external world is particular and an individual. It is in no way a universal. Rather, it is the man that inheres in the mind that, from the point of view of its mental existence, is attributed with universality. Secondly, the place where universality occurs for man is also the mind. Because the universality is a quality, which is only applied to the mental existence of man. In other words, it is a predicate whose subject exists in the mind not in the external world.

Three: The place where the accident occurs for its subject is the mind while the place where the subject is attributed with the accident is the external world. This is like when we say: 'Man is a possible being,' or 'Man is one.' Here of course we mean that man, in the external world, is attributed with possibility and unity. In other words, we mean to express a condition of the man existing in the external world. However, we also know that 'possibility' and 'unity' as such do not possess independent existences such that they might occur for something else. Therefore, even though 'possibility' is a quality for man it has not occurred for man in the external world. It is for this reason that we say: The place where the attribution has occurred is the external world while the place where the occurrence has taken place is the mind.

Four: The place where the accident has occurred for its subject is the external world whereas the place where the subject has been attributed with the accident is the mind. From amongst these four possibilities the fourth possibility is simply theoretical. It is impossible that such a possibility exist in external reality. The first possibility is named 'first intelligible', the second 'secondary logical intelligible' and the third is called 'secondary philosophical intelligible' (Mutahhari, 1360, v.1: p. 125).

Critique:
In this explanation, professor Mutahhari has explained "occurrence" using two concepts. In other words, in the opinion of the Martyr Mutahhari two concepts are included within the concept of 'occurrence':
1. The thing that is occurring antecedent to that for which it occurs.
2. It is having an existence independent of that for which it occurs.
In his opinion, the term "occurrence" in this discussion has no relation to the concept of occurrence that implies predication or the concept of occurrence when used to signify the occurrence of an accident for a substance. Because it is clear that, the place where predication takes place is the mind. Now, if we meant predication by occurrence, then it would be meaningless to say that occurrence was, in some cases, external.

In the same way, if we meant by occurrence "the occurrence of the accident for its substance" then this discussion would in turn be focuses upon those intelligible that are accidents. This is even while it is clear that such is not the case. Rather, we mean by occurrence the unity of the subject and the predicate and the fact that one of them is the instance of the other such as can be fathomed from the usage of the term 'combining ' in this passage from the Martyr Mutahhari.

From another side, in the view of Ayatollah Mutahhari, in occurrence, it is necessary that the accident does not have an independent existence from its subject. Otherwise, the concept 'occurrence' will not take place.

We review this part of Mr. Mutahhari's speech:

However, we also know that 'possibility' and 'unity' as such do not possess independent existences such that they might occur for something else (Ibid, p.126).

It seems that the second choice is un-justifiable. For the unity of the subject and the predicate is the logical necessity of every proposition. It is for this reason that whenever and wherever a proposition takes form it must possess this quality. We cannot find a proposition in which the predicate has not followed and occurred for its subject.

From another angle, it is meaningless to assume that the existence of the subject be external while the unity of the predicate with the subject be in the mind. Therefore, proportionate to the place of the existence of the subject, the predicate will unite with the subject. If the subject is an external being then the predicate will unite with it in the external world. On the other hand, if the subject were a mental being then the predicate would only unite with that subject in the subject wherein it exists, namely, the external world. Hence, the concept of a secondary philosophical intelligible, depicted as it was above, is something that internally contradictory. The reason for this is that it is meaningless to say that a predicate of a proposition is one with its subject and at the same time it not exist in the place where its subject
does. This is because it is the distinction of predication that it expresses the unity of the subject and the predicate in the subject wherein the subject exists.

A proposition is a compound saying in which judgment has been made regarding the fact that the second (i.e. the predicate) is applicable to the same thing that the first (i.e. the subject) is applicable to (Hilly, 1381: p. 125).

Therefore, the same thing that is the instance and extension for the subject must necessarily be the instance and extension for the predicate based upon the logical rule of predication. To say that one being is the instance of different aspects is not negated by the intelligence nor reality and must not be confused with the conjunction of opposite meanings [in one instance].

In other words, in contrast to the opinion of Mr. Mutahhari, who conditions occurrence with the separation of the subject and the predicate, fundamentally it is meaningless to say that these two possess separate existences. The reason for this is that the condition of the occurrence of an accident for a subject is not that the accident possesses an independent existence. Rather, to the contrary, if the accident possesses an independent existence then occurrence will not be true.

The Negation of occurrence in the Secondary Philosophical Intelligible, tantamount of meaning of "Mental Occurrence"

In another passage, the Martyr Mutahhari, more openly states the separation of the place of occurrence and the place of attribution:

...The meaning of a categorical proposition (al qadhiyyah al hamliyyah) is not simply that the two concepts of the subject and the predicate are one in their essence or existence. Rather, in the categorical proposition (al qadhiyyah al hamliyyah) we take the first as the subject and principle and the second as the predicate and that which we base upon the first. Although this unity of the principle and that, which is based upon it, is only one relation it is conceptually ('itiqbar) two relations. From the side of the subject it implies that the subject possesses the predicate and that it is attributed with it. From the side of the predicate it means that the predicate has occurred for the subject and is subsequent (mulhaq) to it. The name of that possession is
'attribution' (ittisaf) while the name of that 'subsequentation' (lulhuq) is occurrence (urudh).

If an attribute, in the external world, has not separate existence from its subject then, rather it should exist with the same existence that its subject possesses, then in this case, it is possible to say that in the external world that subject possesses that attribute yet the attribute has not occurred for the subject. The reason for this matter is either that the attribute under question is something conventional in nature or it is because in the external world the attribute and that which is attribute with it are multiple only conceptually while essentially they are one. It is for this reason that the attribute (sifat) does not possess an existence independent of that, which is attributed with it. Rather, when the attributed comes into being the attribute also comes into being along with it. For example, in the statement, 'Zayd is a possible being,' the attribute of possibility is something conventional ('itiibari) and is an abstract concept ('itiibari) not something real. For if it were a real concept and possessed an independent existence separate from that of Zayd who is its subject then either it would occur for Zayd or Zayd would occur for it...

These concepts that are abstracted from something are sometimes such that one of them are real while the other is conventional and are sometimes such that there is a conceptual multiplicity. In this case our mind, based upon different angles, abstracts different attributes. 'Life,' 'knowledge' and 'power' are attributes for us that occur for our essences. However, the knowledge of God is one with His Holy Essence...The 'power' of God is one with His Essence. In this case, there is no occurrence. Therefore, the secret behind the case where the place where the occurrence of something is the mind, while the place where it is attributed is the external world is that there is no occurrence in fact in such a case. This means that fundamentally nothing has occurred for something else such that we might ask, 'Where is the place of occurrence and where the place of attribution is. Is it the mind or the external world? So, when we say, 'The place where possibility occurs for Zayd is the mind while the place where Zayd is attributed with possibility is the external world,' this does not mean that in the same way that 'universality' has occurred for man in the mind 'possibility' has also occurred for Zayd in the mind. For the universality is a mental quality for [the concept] man while
'possibility' is not a mental quality for Zayd. Therefore, here we mean by 'occurrence' only the predication of one concept for another one and nothing else. Therefore, in the example, 'Zayd is a possible being,' in reality the predicate, possibility, has not occurred for the subject, Zayd. It is true that even in this case the predicate has predicated for the subject, as is the case in all categorical propositions. However, in this case, contrary to those, the predicate does not possess an existence that is independent of its subject. Therefore, since the predicate does not possess an existence that is independent of its subject, neither in the mind nor in the external world, it cannot be said to have occurred for its subject.

Therefore, if in cases such as this, the sages have stated that the predicate has occurred for its subject, they have simply been speaking allegorically and in loose terms. It would have been better for them to express themselves in such a way: A predicate either occurs for its subject or does not (in which case it would not have an existence independent of its subject). If it occurs for its subject then in this case either the place of occurrence and attribution are both the mind. Otherwise, the place of attribution and occurrence will both be the external world. If the place of occurrence and attribution are the external world then in this case we name such a concept 'a primary intelligible' while if the place of occurrence and attribution are the mind then in this case we name the concept a 'secondary logical intelligible'. However, if the concept under consideration does not possess an existence that is independent of its subject, neither in the mind nor in the external world, then in this case it has not occurred for the subject. In this case, we will name such a concept a 'secondary philosophical intelligible' (Mutahhari, 1360, v.1: p.128).

**Critique:**
In this passage, the Martyr Mutahhari has differentiated between those predicates and qualities that do not have an independent existence from their subjects and those qualities that have an existence that is independent from their subjects. He says that the concept of occurrence is only true for those predicates that can have an existence that is independent from their subjects. For in cases such as this the term occurrence is applicable.

However, it must be asked, is it actually possible for us to find a predicate that has an existence that is independent from its subject? Is
it not true that the logical corollary for predication and a categorical proposition is that the subject and the predicate are one? So, how is it possible, if this is true, for us to seek out a predicate that, contrary to the dictates of predication and the categorical proposition, possesses an existence that is independent of its subject? It is for this reason that, if truth be told, this division and separation with the explanation given above, goes in stark contrast to the spirit of the categorical proposition which is unity and the oneness in instance between the subject and predicate. Therefore, we cannot find an example for a predicate that from one side is predicated of its subject and one the other side possesses an existence that is independent of its subject.

In other words, with the standard that the Martyr Mutahhari gives us for occurrence, we will never find a predicate that occurs for its subject. This is because in all categorical propositions we have a unity between the subject and the predicate.

It is amazing too that he has made a difference between the attributes of God and those of man from the point of view of their unity or separation from their subjects. This is while, even though we accept that the attributes of God and those of man are different in that one are limited while the other are unlimited, they are similar in that when we assume that their subjects exist, then they will be one with their subjects existentially. Logically speaking, we cannot call something that has an independent existence from something else to be a quality of the latter.

The following passage from Mr. Mutahhari further clarifies his state of mind:

If 'some thingness' is a first intelligible then the occurrence of some thingness for a book and its attribution with some thingness must both be in the external world such as is the case in statements such as 'Zayd is standing up,' where we predicate the state of standing up for Zayd and where the occurrence and attribution of standing up for Zayd are both in the external world. Now, since occurrence is in the external world it will be necessary that there be two beings in the external world: One the existence of the book and the other the existence of some thingness (Mutahhari, 1366, v.1: p.139).

However, it must be kept in mind that actually since an external occurrence has taken place we must not say that the existence of the book and that of some thingness are two. If this were so then using the term occurrence would be problematic.
Equivocation of the Term Occurrence in the Words of the Martyr Mutahhari
In continuation, he points out the equivocation in the term occurrence:

If it is said, in the third type of concept (i.e. the secondary philosophical concepts) that the place of occurrence is the mind while the place of attribution is the external world then this is not true. For the thing that the subject is attributed with it in the external world is the instance of the predicate while the thing that occurs for the subject in the mind is the concept of the predicate. Aside from this, the term occurrence has been used in two different meanings here: When it is said that the place of occurrence and attribution are both the external world then by occurrence here, it is meant that the predicate has inhered in the subject existentially (the occurrence that is used in the discussion of the categories i.e. predication-). On the other hand, when it is said that the place of occurrence is the mind while the place of attribution is the external world, then by this it is meant that something has been predicated of something that lies outside the essence of the latter (Ibid).

In other words, after having negated occurrence in the preceding passage from the secondary philosophical intelligible, Ayatollah Mutahhari has used this term in another meaning, i.e. predication, concerning secondary philosophical intelligible that of course does not have much difference with the negation of occurrence.

Keeping in mind all of what was stated here, it seems that the term occurrence, in the discussion of the intelligible, cannot mean predication. Because it will not be something that causes these intelligible to differ since predication is always a mental phenomenon. Thus, using this as standard to differentiate them is not reasonable. Also, conditioning occurrence by independent existence is also not accurate.

The Secondary Intelligible and the law of derivativeness
In his book, Copulative and Independent Existence in Islamic Philosophy, Dr. Dinani states:

The question arises, if the place of attribution of the subject with the predicate is the external world then how is it possible the occurrence of the predicate for the subject is only in the mind? In other words, if we consider the law of derivativeness to be sound and that the existence of something for another thing necessitates the
existence of the latter before the former, then how is it possible for the place of occurrence and attribution in a proposition to be two?

In answering this question, (even though we accept the soundness of the law of derivativeness) it is said: The existence of something for something else necessitates the existence of the thing for which the former exists not the actual thing that is attributed to it. For example, when it is said 'Ahmad is the father of Ali,' then the affirmation of the quality of being father for the individual Ahmad necessitates that Ahmad exists in the external world however the affirmation of this quality for the person Ahmad does not necessitate that the reality of being a father also exist in the external world independently and with a predicative being. In the example of, 'Man is a possible being,' the case is the same (Dinani, 1362: p. 199).

Critique:
It is strange that we accept that the existence of something for something else indicates the really existence of the subject and at the same time we believe that it does not indicate the existence of the predicate in the state of the existence of the subject (See: Mutahhari, 1366, v.2: p.114). This is while this principle points out the second matter (the existence of the predicate in the reality of the subject) directly while it points out the first matter (the real existence of the subject) only indirectly. Also, the portion of Mr. Dinani's work where he states that the existence of fatherhood in the external world dictates an independent existence for it gets us thinking.

It seems that, fundamentally speaking, it is logically speaking, contradictory to speak of the predicative existence of something and at the same time to state that its instance is independent of its subject. Of course, it is possible that the Peripatetic Philosopher speaks about the predicative existence as an independent being. However, in the Transcendent Philosophy it is not possible for us to speak about the predicative existence as something that is independent of its subject.

Occurrence and the Separate Instance
We can clearly see in the saying of some of the sages that discussed secondary philosophical intelligible the usage of the term 'separate instance'. One of the experts in the field of epistemology has written the following:
Even though concepts that are quiddities possess an independent instance...philosophical and logical concepts do not possess an independent instance in the external world. Rather, we can simply attribute one existence with numerous concepts. Such as the existence of man that can be attributed with being one, actual, generated, possible, an effect and the likes of these (Husain Zadeh, 1388: p.139).

However, it is fundamentally wrong to use the phrase 'independent existence' or 'separate being'. Because we cannot find a reality that is only instance of one concept and yet is not instance of any other concept. If by 'not possessing an instance' in the definition of secondary intelligible an 'independent instance' is meant then no concept, even primary intelligible and quiddities, do not possess an instance that is independent of all other concepts. All instances, even the Essence of God, are the instances of numerous concepts. For the Essence of God is the instance of different aspects and attributes such as knowledge, power, life and justice. The predication of one of these concepts does not negate the possibility of us predating another one of them for Him.

"There is no instance in the external world that is just the instance of one concept. It is Fundamentally impossible to say that something in the external world is the instance of only one concept. Anything that we point out in the external world will be the instance of numerous concepts. However, we know that there is no concept that shows us what that instance is. There is no concept that has the power to show us all of what its instance is in the external world. For example, an agate stone is both an agate and a being. However, the concept of existence only shows us that it exists. It is also an agate though and if you do not possess this concept of what an agate stone is, in other words, if you do not have its picture in your mind, then you will not fathom the fact that this being is an agate stone although you may clearly understand that it exists.

The concept of existence only shows us that it exists and the concept of an agate stone only shows us that it is an agate stone. Neither of the two can trespass within the epistemological jurisdiction of the other. In other words, the concept of existence can never show us that this being, aside from existing, is also an agate stone (Fayyadhi, 1383).
The important point in explaining the abovementioned passage is to differentiate between "concepts" and "the thing that concepts relate" (mahkîy) and 'the beings of the external world". If we have distinct concepts then they will necessarily depict different realities but it is not necessary that these realities all exist in the external world separately. The concept of 'the existence' of an individual is different from the concept of 'the power' of such an individual. These concepts depict different realities. For the concept of existence cannot show us what power is in the external world. In the same way, the concept of power cannot depict what the external existence of an individual is. Of course, if such realities should happen to possess one existence then they will be existentially united with one another.

The location of Abstraction of Philosophical Intelligible
Concerning the manner in which we comprehend secondary intelligible they have stated something that may have been cause of the distinction between state of occurrence and that of attribution. That is that when we wish to abstract a philosophical intelligible then it is not enough for us to look towards a quiddity. Rather, it is only when it compares two concepts that the mind is able to abstract a philosophical concept.

Ayatollah Misbah states the following:

Another set of concepts (philosophical concepts) are ones whose abstraction needs a certain mental effort and comparison of things with one another, such as the concepts of cause and effect, which is abstracted by attending to the relevant relation after comparing two things such that the existence of one depends upon the other...If there were no comparison and attention, these types of concepts would never be obtained (Misbah, 1382, v.1: p.199).

That which can be stated as an objection to this claim, and which is in fact something that the speaker himself adheres to, is that the concept of existence, which is clearly not a quiddity like concept, is not acquired through a comparison with non-existence. Rather, it is obtained directly through knowledge by presence and intuition. The same goes for the quality of being an effect which is the existentially poverty of some things first comprehended intuitively without
understanding the concept of cause (See: Tabatabai, no date, v.2: p.53, p.67).

Of course, we accept that the understanding of existence by the negation of non-existence and the comprehension of effect by means of the understanding of cause, which is a relational understanding, is also something which is in and of itself possible. However, to state that the only way to understand such philosophical and non-quiddity concepts is through comparison is something objectionable.

The Connection between the Discussion on the Principality of Existence and the Problem of the Secondary Philosophical Intelligible

The reality of the matter is that to distinguish what is principle in reality plays a pivotal role in the discussion at hand. Because if a philosopher that believes in the principality of quiddity wishes to present his view on the subject under discussion then, since he believes that it is quiddity that is real and that existence is conventional then he will necessarily state that it is quiddity that is the first intelligible. It is clear that existence will be a secondary intelligible for him. For in this case there is no instance in the external world for the concept of existence. However, it is even more interesting to express our view regarding this subject based upon the view that existence is principle.

Allameh Tabatabai is of the opinion that the concept that we have of existence in our mind is a secondary philosophical intelligible (Tabatabai, no date, v.2:p.14).

It is possible to use the words of Mr. Misbah in this regards as an explanation for what Allameh Tabatabai has stated. In his footnotes to the Nihayah al Hikmah, he states the following:

Sometimes the concept of existence is used and it is meant by this the copulative meaning that exists between propositions. This is synonymous with the word 'ast' in the Persian language. Sometimes, however the concept of existence is used and it is meant by this the verb, 'to exist'. This is synonymous with the word 'budan' in the Persian language. This concept can only be predicated of something if a derivative predicate is taken from it. Also, sometimes the word existence has the meaning of a verbal noun in which the relation of the verb to the agent is not
taken into consideration. This is synonymous with the Persian words 'hasti' and when this is predicated it depicts a secondary philosophical intelligible. Also, sometimes it is meant by this the actual reality in the external world which is related using the verbal noun. However, the third meaning, i.e. the verbal noun that relates the external reality, is a secondary philosophical intelligible whose occurrence is in the mind and whose attribution is in the external world (Misbah, 1405, p. 20).

According to the principality of existence it is -however - very clear that the concept that can most fundamentally possess an extension, is the concept of existence. Anything other than existence will possess an extension in the external world through it. For-based upon the principality of existence- it is only the concept of existence that principally depicts external reality and no other concept can do the same. If other concepts such as quiddities can depict reality, it is only through the blessings of existence. Of course, it has been mentioned many times that the existence of something in the external world does not entail that it is independent in its being.

In various passages, Sadr al Mutaallihin has stated that the belief in the fact that the concept of existence is a secondary philosophical concept fundamentally is a corollary to the belief that it is quiddity that is principally real. As we have explained:

Existence, as was stated in many places [before this] is something other than the general self-evident concept of existence that is abstract and mentally posited the latter of which you have already learned is a secondary intelligible and a conventional concept. This is something that has remained unclear for most scholars (MullaSadra, 1383, v.2: p.268).

... [He] denied that existence, in the opinion of the sages, is a reality in the external world and he surmised that they believed that existence is a secondary intelligible that does not possess an instance in the external world (Ibid, v.6: p.65).

Existence, in everything, is the basis of its being ... and existence, in contrast to what most of the latter scholars have surmised, is not a secondary intelligible nor is it an abstract concept for which nothing corresponds in the external world (Ibid, v.9: p.161).

Some, rather, most of the latter scholars believe that existence does not possess a reality in the external world. Rather, [in their opinion]
that which really is in the external world is only quiddity. Existence is simply something conventional, mental and one of the secondary intelligible and does not have any reality in the external world. Otherwise, [in the opinion of such scholars] its reality would have to be real and this would lead to an infinite regress (MullaSadra, 1302: p. 117).

As can be seen, MullaSadra, in places of many of his books has placed special emphasis upon this matter. Of course, MullaSadra principally wished to lay emphasis upon the fact that a distinction must be made between the verbal meaning of existence, which is not under question at all in the discussions on the principality of existence, and the reality of existence, which is the verbal noun. It is this very point that has caused some people to be lead astray in some of their articles and writings: “MullaSadra is of the opinion that existence is a secondary intelligible! To substantiate his claim this person has stated that in the Asfär, MullaSadra has a chapter entitled: ‘On the fact that existence is a secondary intelligible’” (Fanai, 1375: p. 78).

This statement is an example of not paying attention to his straightforward expression in the same chapter where he states:

Therefore, existence, in its verbal meaning (mashum masdari), not the reality and essence of existence, and in the same way thingness, possibility and necessity ... are secondary intelligibles (MullaSadra, 1383, v.1: p.321).

That which is the subject of debate is the concept of existence that is a verbal noun or 'hasti' in the Persian language not the concept of existence that is a verb that is synonymous with 'bukan' that needs an agent, because this is a concept which isn't in external world. Even though MullaSadra believes in the essentiality of existence, he also adheres to the fact that the concept of existence that is a verb does not exist in the external world and is not real. The point worthy of taking note of in this matter is that if the verb 'to exist' was to exist in the external world then not only would existence have to be real in the external world, but the relation [that this act of existence has with the agent] would also have to be real therein. Now, for the relation to exist in the external world then, as MullaSadra has himself stated many times, the two sides of their relation would also have to really exist. Therefore, if someone were to state that the meaning of existence that is a verb is real and in the external world, he would also have to
believe that quiddity is real therein and that they are two distinct things. The reason for this is that the condition for the existence of some relation in some place is that the two sides of the relation also be distinct in that very place.

If the meaning of existence that is a verb contains a relation with the agent and if the meaning of 'to be' which is a verb is that there is a verb and a relation at play here and that necessarily the other side of the relation must also exist therefore, if this verbal meaning should happen to exist in the external world then in the external world existence and quiddity must be real and they must be distinct from one another therein. Following this there must be a relation existing between them in the external world.

Therefore, it is impossible for the verbal meaning of the concept existence to be real in the external world. On the other hand, the meaning of existence that is a verbal noun or 'hasti' in Persian can exist therein without entailing any problem. This is the same meaning that we convey with the word 'being'. The proofs of MullaSadra for the fact that existence is really in the external world revolve around the fact that existence is in the external world not the concept 'to be'. In other words, he in no way wishes to convey the fact that the existence of something and its quiddity and the relation between them are three different things in the external world.

Therefore, the subject of discussion is the verbal noun existence and of course, as MullaSadra has explicitly stated, the verbal meaning of this term, like all other verbal meanings for concepts, is secondary intelligible (See: Ibid, v.1:p.268; Dinani, i362:p.249).

**Chosen View Regarding the Division of Intelligible**

According to aforementioned points, it seems that the proper way to divide the intelligible is that the intelligible thing that exists in the mind either possesses a mental instance in which case it will be the attribute of a mental being (here occurrence and attribution is mental) or it possesses an external instance in which case it will be the attribute of an external being.

In this new division the standard my means of which we measure the place of occurrence (urdudh) is the place where instance of the concept inheres, not whether or not the concept possesses an independent instance. The reason for this is that it is impossible for some reality to, fundamentally speaking, possess an independent
existence. Also, the place of attribution (ittisaf) in this new division revolves around the place of occurrence (urudh).

Quiddities are First Intelligible too
Based upon what has just been stated, 'existence' is the concept that is most worthy of being a first intelligible (m'aqlatula). Of course, this does not contradict the fact that concepts that are quiddities can also be first intelligible. For the secret being something's being a first intelligible is that it possesses an instance (misaq) in concrete reality (al 'alam al 'ayn). Now, external reality is not only the instance of existence, it is also the instance of quiddity (mahiyah). This resembles the matter that has been proven in the discussion regarding the unity of the attributes of existence with existence itself. It is also based upon this matter that Mulla Sadra has opened a separate chapter in the Asfar in order to prove the fact that existence and quiddity are one (Mulla Sadra, 1383, v.1: p. 245).

Of course, it should not be left unsaid that external existence is an instance of existence essentially and is only in a secondary way that of quiddity (bi tab'a). This is the very meaning of the principality of existence (asalat al wujud). The fact that one instance can simultaneously be the instance of numerous concepts (albeit not concepts that are opposed to one another) is not only far-fetched, but, quite the contrary it is the basis of the philosophy of Mulla Sadra and all philosophy for that matter. This method is very different from the method of philosophical speculation that removes quiddity altogether from the external world (Tabatabai, 1382, v.1: p. 9-Dinani, 1362, p.201).

Now that it has been demonstrated that the concept 'existence' is a first intelligible (al m'aqil al ulla) it will automatically become clear that the attributes of existence, since they follow existence, have the same quality that existence has. Therefore, qualities such as being a cause or an effect are philosophical ones and are primary intelligible (al m'aqil al ulla). Of course, here we mean by causality the mental concept that indicates the reality of causation in the external world (the concept that is a verbal noun al ims al masdari), not the concept that is mixed with a relation to an agent (fa'il) or object (ma'ul) of an act. In the latter case, it will be a verb and will be a secondary intelligible.
Conclusion:
In this article attention was paid to the necessary relation (istilzam) between the theory of the principality of existence and a new analysis of the secondary philosophical intelligible. The belief in the fact that there are some concepts whose occurrence (urudh) is mental while their attribution (ittisaf) is external is one that is self-contradictory. Because if the attribution of a subject with this concept is in the external world, or in other words the reality (mahkiy) of this concept depicts an external one it cannot be stated that the instance (misdaq) of this concept or the occurrence (urudh) of this concept for this subject is something that takes place in the mind (dhihn).

From another point of view, to limit first intelligible to quiddities is something that is not in line with the principality of existence (asalah al wujud). Therefore, we cannot divide the intelligible in the traditional way and at the same time adhere to the theory of the principality of existence.

References
1. Ibrahimi Dinani, Ghulam Husain, Wujud Rabit va Mustaql dar Falsafeh Islami (Copulative and Independent Existence in Islamic Philosophy), Shirkat Sihami Intishar, Tehran, 1362.
2. IbnSina (Avicenna), Al-isharat va al-tanbihat, Albalaghah, Qum, 1375.
3. Hilly, Hasan ibn Yusuf, Al-jowhar-an-nadhid, Bidar, Qum, 1381.
4. Husain Zadeh, Muhammad, Bonyadha-e ma'rifat-e-bashari (Human Knowledge Foundations), Imam Khomeini's institution, Qum, 1388.
5. Tabatabai, Sayed Muhammad Husain, Nihayah al Hikmah (End of Wisdom), Imam Khomeini's institution, Qum, 1382.
6. ________________________, nodate, Osul-e Falsafeh va Raveshe Realism (the Principles of Philosophy and the Method of Realism), Tehran.
7. ________________________, Barresi-ha-e eslami (Islamic Surveys), Bustan Kitab institute, Qum, 1388.
8. Tusi, Khwajah Nasir, Sharh al-isharat va al-tanbihat, Albalaghah, Qum, 1375.
9. Ismaili, Masoud, Ma'qul-e thani-e falsafi dar falsafe eslami (Secondary philosophical intelligible in Islamic philosophy), Imam Khomeini's institution, Qum, 1388.
10. Fanaii Ishkawari, Muhammad, M'aqul-e Thani (Secondary Intelligible), Imam Khomayni's institute, Qum, 1375.
13. ____________, *vojoud va mahyat dar falsafe sadraei* (Existence and Quiddity in Sadræan philosophy), Hawzah & University's institute, Qum, 1387.
15. ____________, *Ta'ligh ber Nahayah al-hikmah* (Footnotes to the Nihayah al-Hikmah), Alzabrah, Tehran, 1405.
17. ____________, *SharhMabsut alManzumah* (detailed explanation of Manzumah) Hikmah, Tehran, 1366.
18. ____________, *Sharh-e Manzumah* (explanation of Manzumah), Hikmah, Tehran, 1360.
20. ____________, *Majmuahal Rasa'il* (Complex of treatise), no publicist Tehran, 1302.
21. ____________, *al-hashiaha ala al-ilahiyyat al-shifa* (Glosses upon the Metaphysics of Shifa), Sadra institute, Tehran, 1382.
22. ____________, *al-shawahid al-rububiyyah*, edited by Seyyed Jalal ad Din Ashtiyani, BustanKitab' institute, Qum, 1382.