Franz von Baader’s Criticism of Modern Rationalism: 
A Brief Overview

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Abstract
Franz von Baader (1765 - 1841), one of the most important philosophers in 
the age of German idealism and romanticism, has considered it the most 
important task of his life to bring the modern rationalism in philosophy to an 
end. The focus of his criticism lies on the philosophical anthropocentrism 
and egocentricity of Rene Descartes (1596 - 1650), uttered in his famous 
saying 'Cogito ergo sum' ('I think therefore I am'). Baader also criticized 
Immanuel Kant (1724 - 1804) and other philosophers of German idealism, 
who have absorbed at least partially the rationalism of Descartes. 
In this article it will be shown how Baader, who follows the tradition of the 
theosophy of Jacob Boehme (1575 - 1624), the philosophy of Paracelsus 
(1493-1541), the mysticism of Meister Eckhart (1260 - 1328) and to many 
other sources which break the anthropocentrism and egocentricity of modern 
rationalism, opposes the Cogito ergo sum (I think therefore I am) statement 
with his Cogitor ergo sum (I am cognized <by God> therefore I am). Man 
can only recognize God if he is recognized by God. In other words, Baader 
shows that the human ego cannot be the principle of philosophy, but solely 
the participation in God.

Key Terms: Franz von Baader, Descartes, Hegel, Cogito ergo sum, critique 
of rationalism

Introduction
Franz von Baader (born in Munich, 1765; died in the same 
place, 1841), physician, mining engineer, manager of a glass factory 
and, above all, philosopher, is one of the most significant philosophers 
from the era of German idealism and German romanticism¹. No other 
notable philosopher kept himself at such distance from the academic

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constraints of the system. Yet his philosophy in itself forms an integrated whole. "The terms and definitions", he used to say in reassuring those who consider a ready-made system indispensable, "the terms and definitions do not form a line, they constitute a circle, and it doesn't matter at all where one begins, only that each definition needs to lead back into the centre.

Given the seemingly irreconcilable separation of religion and philosophy caused by the rationalistic doctrine of the autonomy of reason, Franz von Baader undertook the great attempt to reconcile religion and philosophy again. In that, he based himself mainly on the metaphysics or theosophy of Jacob Boehme (1575-1624) and older forms of mysticism and theosophy. Baader's effort to reconcile religion with philosophy can all in all be seen as a critique of modern rationalism that teaches the autonomy of reason. Baader did not conduct this critique in a systematic manner; it resulted in the course of elaborating his philosophy. To clearly demonstrate Baader's critique on modern rationalism we have to point out the respective principles in his philosophy.

Baader, in order to accomplish his main task, namely the reconciliation of religion with philosophy, developed his speculative, or religious, philosophy and his speculative dogmatics, or speculative theology. The contents of the speculative philosophy and the speculative theology are identical. This content is the revelation of being, the being of God and the divine revelation, creation, the fall, and the world's redemption. The speculative philosophy and the speculative theology do, however, differ in their methods. While the speculative philosophy attempts to gain the contents of divine revelation from an analysis of self-consciousness and cognition, of society and of nature, the speculative theology begins with God and with the theological premise that man is the image of God.

Regarding the aforementioned three approaches to divine revelation in the speculative philosophy, the analysis of self-consciousness and cognition forms the beginning. Baader here apparently follows the usual procedure since Descartes (1596-1650), where philosophy begins with the theory of cognition. The difference between Baader and Descartes will be dealt with later on.
The Foundation of Being and Thinking

The beginning of philosophy for Baader is to ask the question of what founds the ground of being and thinking. This is the question of the ontological-noetic foundation of being and thinking. For Baader, the basis and the founding principle is that which brings forth, sustains, and assists. That which brings forth beingness is that which founds it, sustains it, and assists it, and this solely as the principle which simultaneously creates, founds and sustains; and this is more than merely the first causation or the first mover as it is, for instance, with Aristotle. When that which brings forth, sustains and assists, is the founding, then the first founding is that which initially brings forth and sustains. That which first brings forth, however, can only be that which brings forth itself and thereby founds itself. The first bringing-forth and founding cannot bring forth and found another without first having brought forth and founded itself. Only in being self-founded, as the self-founded, can it found.

A primary causation that is not founded in itself cannot be the primary causation. A thinking, which is not thinking within itself and self-consciousness, but the thinking and consciousness of others, is not the founding and bringing forth of thinking and consciousness. The primary causation is because the bringing forth is the founding — bringing forth itself, thinking itself, conscious of itself. This bringing-forth-itself and generating itself (generatio sui) by no means takes place in the finite realm but in fact in the beginningless, eternal life of unconditioned divine reality. In this sense, self-begetting and self-founding means to eternally bring forth and having brought forth oneself in a paradox cycle, and to eternally become conscious and be conscious of oneself. Baader here stands quite in the succession of Jacob Boehme when he says that the principle that founds itself as that which brings forth, has to beget itself, as it were, bring itself to consciousness, and bring about its own knowledge itself. It has to be of-itself (a se) ontologically and noetically, that is, it must have generated itself, its self-consciousness and its knowledge itself. Baader emphasizes in this context that being, self-consciousness and knowledge are brought forth from a principle as a unity, and that this principle in its being, its self-consciousness, and in its knowledge is identical with itself because otherwise it is not the self-founding (and
founding of the other), sustaining or assisting principle. The principle of founding must be self-founding in the sense of self-bringing-forth, self-conscious and creative. The truly founding principle is that which generates the knowledge as well as what it will do with it, or: absolute knowledge and absolute creativity are identical in it (the principle). The teaching of the identity of subject and object in the self-conscious mind or the mind's being with itself is the teaching that a perfect realization is a productive one, which realizes as it brings forth.

Where self-consciousness is not the abiding and beginningless identity of subject and object there is no true identity, because an identity of what is brought forth and what brings forth, an identity of the object and subject of self-consciousness that only arises in time, is not identity, but a successive abolishing of differences. Such self-consciousness, coming to an identity in a successive manner, is not primary and pristine but secondary and deduced. Such a non-primordial or secondary knowledge is now, first of all, the self-cognition of every finite mind. Every finite mind, knowing it does not bring itself forth and thereby neither knowing itself, thus knows of its being-known by the absolute spirit, which brings it forth. Every self-knowing and self-thinking of the finite being is also a being-thought and a knowing of its own having-been-thought at the same time. The "I think" (cogito) is always simultaneously a "I am thought, therefore I think (cogito ergo cogito)."3

Baader's Criticism of Descartes

Baader's objection to Descartes4 – and this is a fundamental aspect of his criticism of rationalism – is that Descartes "took the knowing-itself (dieses Sich-Selber-Wissen) of the finite mind (cogito, ergo sum) for a primordial knowing, that is, for the solely indubitable knowledge. With this philosophy, in that it follows him therein up to our present day (whose Alpha and Omega has become the ego), was given a wrong direction and at least a reason for all the later so-called proofs of God from something that is not God; whereby the conviction so close to us, of the coincidence of the knowing-oneself with the knowing-of-being-known by absolute spirit (des Sich-wissens mit dem Sicht-gewusst-wissen vom absoluten Geist), has been obscured."5
Baader's speculative philosophy in its search for the founding principle does lead to self-consciousness, but it is clear that finite self-consciousness is not the sought principle because philosophy has to realize it owes its identity of subject and object and its existence to another. The "cogito" (I think) and the "sum" (I am) are founded in a "cogitor (I am thought)" and a "sum creatus (I am created)".

From what has been said so far it is evident that Baader, unlike Descartes, does not begin with methodological scepticism, but in posing the question of the ground of being and self-consciousness, arrives at the knowledge that finite self-consciousness cannot be the founding principle of philosophy because it does not bring itself forth. Instead, finite consciousness recognizes it is co-thought in the thinking of another self-consciousness, and that the "I think" is always an "I am thought" as well, in other words: "Cogitò, ergo cogitans sum (I am thought, therefore I think)". For Baader it is not the "I think, therefore I am" that stands at the outset of philosophy but rather the "I am thought, therefore I think". Or, also: I (re)cognize because I am already (re)cognized by God. "Indeed the enquiring mind will not rest until his knowing has penetrated to such a level, that he recognizes the knowing of a knower, i.e. he recognizes being known by the absolute, or as Plato says, until the eye meets with an eye that sees its seeing. We therefore uphold that it is man's basic conviction, that he as seeing and knowing recognizes himself in being seen and being known and that he comprehends himself as wanting in being wanted and as acting in being acted." The same holds true for conscience, for, as Baader says it: "I only have a conscience, a sense (of right and wrong) insofar as I know that I myself am sensed."

Descartes understands his "I think, therefore I am" to be a self-generated thought which the subject, having doubted all, cannot doubt itself, because it cannot negate that it thinks even as it doubts. Thus, for Descartes, self-consciousness is also ontologically self-founded. Baader's criticism of Descartes' "Cogito" can be summarized in the following three points:

1. Descartes' "Cogito-principle" leads to an inversion of the ontological founding of finite and infinite consciousness. The corollary of "Cogito, ergo sum - ergo est Deus" places that which is ontologically anterior as something philosophically posterior or
deduced. Baader here sees the danger of atheism when he says of the rationalists: "How then could they know of an ungodly thinking, of a godless thinking, or a thinking devoid of God, and of a God-assisted thinking when, after all, God’s existence (Gottes Dasein) or non-existence (Nichtsein) itself is only determined by their thinking and when they position their knowing-of-oneself prior to their knowing-of-oneself-being-known, since their Deus est is merely a consequence of the Ego sum."³⁹

2. Descartes’ "Cogito" reverses the founding-relation of finite and infinite consciousness in that he performs the inversion of the ontological founding-relation of I-consciousness from absolute consciousness, to an epistemological deduction-relation of the certainty of God’s existence and our world-knowledge from the subject's self-certainty. Even though Descartes introduces this inversion of the ontological relation of finite and absolute consciousness only as a methodical inversion, the epistemological deduction by its effect turns into an ontological deduction as well.

When all certainty and also the certainty of God is deduced from I-consciousness, it will lead to an elevation of human self-consciousness and knowledge, which results in actual non-foundedness of knowledge and of man, because man’s knowledge, and his being, are bereft of their genuine founding principle and man will no longer find a foundedness, not of himself nor of his knowledge. But what the Cartesian doubt as the absolute autonomy of knowledge actually wants to say is nothing less than this: that man, as a creature shall make his own knowledge and have it found itself, without credit, wherefore with such Tantalian effort he only startes the non-foundedness within himself.

The "ergo sum" that follows the "cogito" is the expression of an entity that wants to manifest itself in thinking and in being, without God, and which, incapable of doing this, inhibits its own manifestation, and that of God. The finite being, man, by founding its certainty of being and knowing in I-consciousness, attempts to manifest itself as absolute being, and to make itself into a self-founding God. However, this I-consciousness, because as finite self-consciousness it can only manifest itself within the manifestation of God, merely succeeds in becoming a failed God, "a Dieu manqué, a
somebody arrested in his evolution towards full thinking, a microtheos, stuck at birth.\textsuperscript{10}

3. Descartes' "Cogito" is initially an epistemological turn to the I, which entails an ontological turn and therewith an epistemological-ontological turn of the I back to itself, thus aiding and abetting forgetfulness of the character of solidarity with regards to personality and individual reason. The epistemological egotism and ontological solipsism of the "Cogito ergo sum" in its application to social philosophy and politics leads to a political solipsism of liberalism and its political and economical system of selfishness.\textsuperscript{11} As a practical consequence of these insights Baader made efforts to take care of the poor proletarians. Thirteen years before Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels declared their "Communist Manifesto", Baader had published in 1835 in Munich his treatise, "About the Actual Relationship of the Poor and Proletarians towards the Wealthy Class (\textit{"Uber das demalige Missverhältniss der Vermögenslosen oder Proletairs zu den Vermögen besitzenden Classen})\textsuperscript{12}" wherein he has given his suggestions according the integration of proletarians into society. It was indeed no dictatorship of the proletarians, but a wise integration of them into society.

With his "Cogito", Descartes introduced the philosophy of the Modern Age, which is based on the self-sufficiency of human thinking and being, on being enough unto oneself in the founding of one's being and thinking. Owing to this self-sufficiency man has no need of God's founding and assistance, neither in his existence nor in his knowledge or self-consciousness. For Baader, however, all those theories of knowledge and self-consciousness that emerge from the self-founding and autonomy of finite knowledge are amiss.

Baader's analysis of the Cartesian "Cogito ergo sum" indicates that the I, when it reflects on where it comes from, will realize it does not have its "Cogito", its self-consciousness, of its own accord.

Upon closer reflection on the conditions of consciousness one comes to know that finite consciousness knows itself as the consciousness of a person that does not bring itself forth, and neither does it know itself from itself alone. Finite consciousness knows itself as having been brought forth and sustained by another spirit. Finite consciousness knows its "Cogito (I think)" simultaneously as a
"Cogito (I am thought)". The knowing-of-itself of finite being (das Seiende) is not a primordial and solely unquestioned knowing upon which the foundation of knowledge can be erected, it rather stems from another consciousness. Finite consciousness is founded in an absolute consciousness which is completely independent of finite consciousness.

Baader's "Cogito-principle" depicts a fundamentally different outset of philosophy from Descarte's Cogito-principle. For Baader, insight into the relatedness of finite and absolute consciousness, and into the foundedness of finite consciousness in absolute consciousness, comes first. For Baader, his "Cogito-principle" expresses the tenet of the immanence of all things in God on the level of consciousness, that is, finite consciousness is founded in infinite, absolute consciousness, and participates in it. The "Cogito-principle" further shows that man's knowledge is not made by man himself, but is bestowed on him by God.

Among the philosophers that followed the "Cogito-principle" of Descartes and whom Baader criticised because of it, are Kant (1724-1804), Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814), Schelling (1775-1854) and Hegel (1770-1831), among others. From these ranks. Baader's criticism of Kant, Fichte and Hegel shall be briefly expounded here.

Baader's Criticism of Kant

In Baader's view, Kant's whole enterprise in the Critique of Pure Reason (Kritik der reinen Vernunft) was self-contradictory: how could Kant use reason itself as the tool to demonstrate that reason cannot reach actual knowledge of things as they really are? How could Kant state that one cannot attain knowledge of the thing-in-itself, yet, at the same time, proceed to describe the thing-in-itself-of-the-mind – i.e., its ultimate structure? Clearly, Kant's entire argument in the Critique of Pure Reason has no foundation unless it can describe the mind as it truly is, not only in Kant's case but also in everyone else's. If we only know the appearance of things, how can we know the mind-in-itself? Indeed, if we know the appearance, does it make any sense, in the final analysis, to say that we know anything at all?

The reason for these contradictions according to Baader lies in the fact that critical philosophy excluded the speculative knowledge of
God and speculative religion from the realm of knowledge attained through reason. It is "a philosophy of which it must be claimed, not misconceiving the good it has done, that its main tendency was aimed at making our shallow-mindedness quite thorough (stereotype)."\textsuperscript{14}

The demand for accepting knowledge through reason in speculative philosophy and religion does not imply, for Baader, that reason will (re)cognize God without God. Baader's program of speculative philosophy and religion in fact comprises the goal for knowledge through reason, which sees in God and thinks in God. "What is to be light for me, or give light to me – as the one who sees or the one who senses is a seeing which in respect to me (a priori), and without me, is in existence as a complete and central seeing, into which my seeing (eye) is introduced or inserted and which, thereby, will have me partake of it (as the seeing) by merging in my seeing, wherewith my seeing then is an image of the latter. To see God, therefore, is to see in God, that is, in God's primordial seeing."\textsuperscript{15} Reason is \textit{in} man, but it is not \textit{of} man. "For only the one divine reason (the logos) is the mutual and immediate centre for each creaturely reason, and the latter is merely the continuance of the former, or the divine, reason which may under certain conditions be immanent in the latter [creaturely reason] without however adopting itself to creaturely reason, which is why one has to say of the creature of reason that while there is reason within it, it is neither reasonable of itself nor is it reasonable for itself (as an end in itself)."\textsuperscript{16} Religious knowledge is the knowledge in God's making Himself known, because "the eye through which God sees me is the same eye through which I see God, as it is one and the same, knowing God and being known by God, and His look elicits my look in return."\textsuperscript{17} For, in fact one has to say: "God is reason [actually super-reason], man has it from God or is merely reasonable, participating in that reason, not being part of it, just as God is love and man partakes of it, or can partake of it."\textsuperscript{18} It is thereby clear for Baader that the thought of a self-assertion of reason and the thought of religious knowledge derived from mere reason are amiss. "Kant has (as have all his successors) dealt man a death blow in forbidding him to strive for the supreme."\textsuperscript{19}
Baader's Criticism of Johann Gottlieb Fichte

Baader states: "Because German philosophy (since, and because of, Fichte) has directed its attention principally to the nature and essence of self-consciousness (of the mind), it has made it possible to grasp the concept of knowing more sharply and accurately than previously."\(^{20}\) Everywhere he praises Fichte for his fine work in describing "the mechanics or instinctive operation of the human mind in its struggle for awareness (preservation of consciousness) within the temporal flow of what is transient,"\(^{21}\) but he did not agree with Fichte on everything. Baader's main quarrel with Fichte's metaphysics of the ego centred on the notion of the non-ego. The principal weakness of Fichte, in Baader's view, was that he made no distinction between the healthy and the sickly in the non-ego,\(^{22}\) and likewise no clear discrimination between the individual ego and the absolute ego. Indeed, Baader himself asks: "But what is this mysterious and protean thing or monstrosity, this non-ego, which (as H. Fichte so beautifully and truly expresses himself) exists only when one does not grasp it — by which it shows itself to be in practice (and what is all speculation if not conceptualized practice?) something everywhere and nowhere present, a resistance that is effective only in and through our ineffectiveness?"\(^{23}\) Baader charges Fichte and Kant with glorifying the ego because for each of them, especially for Fichte, man becomes the supreme lawgiver and ultimate source of morality. In effect, this makes man God.

Baader's Criticism of Hegel

Baader's criticism of Hegel passed through various stages. What Baader admired so much in Hegel was his logic and the power of his speculative mind. Baader hailed Hegel's *Phenomenology of Mind* (Phänomenologie des Geistes) and *Science of Logic* (Wissenschaft der Logik) as works of which the German nation could be proud, and he paid his greatest respects to Hegel in the introduction to the first book of *Fermenta Cognitionis*, where he praised Hegel as being responsible for a rebirth of philosophy. Baader wrote: "And in fact, since Hegel has lit the dialectical fire (the Auto da Fé of previous philosophy) once and for all, there is no way to succeed except through it: i.e., a person has to conduct himself and his works through this fire — he cannot
prescind from it or even go so far as to ignore it."²⁴ And Hegel wrote in the second edition of his *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences* (*Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse*, 1827) about Baader: "I must consider it desirable to see both in the content of several recent writings of Herr von Baader, as well as in their explicit mention of many principles, his agreement with the latter. As for the majority of, or indeed, easily all of what he disputes, it would not be difficult to come to an understanding with him: i.e., to show that in fact there is no real departure from his view."²⁵

In the following, we want to point out the last stage of Baader's critique of Hegel from the year of 1830. The basis of Baader's criticism is his emphasis on the absolute as being an unbounded perfect absolute, and his adhering to the difference of revelation and religion, and of the revelation of world-spirit in absolute knowledge.

According to Baader, Hegel derived a pantheistic concept of God from his philosophy of self-consciousness, with far-reaching consequences for the theory of the finite spirit. According to Hegel, God awakens to himself only in the creature. Hegel misjudges similarity and difference of divine and finite self-consciousness because he transforms the ratio of the analogy between the finite and the infinite into that of identity and non-identity of the finite and infinite. But this ratio does not do justice to the similarity and difference between God and man.

With Hegel, the meaning of the world is for false infinity to sublate itself in the bad finitude of man in such a way that the passing away of finite man is the prerequisite to God's self-actualization. Baader is utterly ironical in his objection to Hegel when he states that, taken that finitude is of evil, redemption is not needed: because all finite beings are in any case redeemed from finitude through death.

Redemption from false finitude and mortality cannot mean that man "sublates" himself in the Godhead, and dissolves in the absolute spirit instead of being redeemed by it: God cannot be a Saturn who devours his children. Baader further criticises that Hegel mixes the process of man's permeation by God with that of the expunction of the permeated. But God does not need to put away with finite man in order to manifest himself. Because Hegel is unable to love a mere
reconciliation of man with the course of world-history and the development of the world-spirit: "But since Hegelianism has the creature arise directly from God (as the centre) without mediation, so he will have it vanish again, directly, in God; and even so he may speak of "finding-itself" of the former in God he, so to speak, kills all the love by which both are connected, and shows God's creative work as being merely motivated by His want (to make himself into spirit) and by the poverty (neediness) of His self-love, rather than through the fullness of His binding love."26

Hegel's world-spirit, in the end, stands alone on the rubbish pile of history and devoid of all creatures. Hegel defines world-spirit in a way as if "this world-spirit or God, only after having covered the whole distance of complete world history, and over the debris of perished world epochs and catastrophes, rightly abandoned by him, and to which end all peoples and individuals have got their turn – thus left behind and absolutely alone and devoid of all creature, would he be capable of attaining his absoluteness."27

Conclusion

In conclusion, Baader's critique of Hegel can be summarized in coming back to Baader's principle once more. This principle, as we know, says: I am thought in, and by, God, therefore I can be and think. Hegel's principle on the other hand says: God is thought within me, therefore God thinks himself in me and I in him. There is a very big difference between these two principles. Hegel's theory of knowledge and self-conscience is that of pantheism and of the oneness of finite and infinite spirit. Baader's theory on the other hand can be designated as panentheism or the doctrine of the immanence of all things in God. Baader's conception of the connectivity of the finite and infinite is not one of an identity of the identity and non-identity of both, but one of the indwelling of the absolute in the finite, and of the participation of the finite in the absolute.

In closing, let us mention a sentence from one of Jacob Boehme's works, that constitutes the starting point of his whole theosophy. The quote is as follows: "Not I, the I that I am, know these things; but God knows them in me. (Nicht Ich, der Ich der Ich bin, weiß es, sondern Gott weiß es in mir)."28 Baader's philosophical-theological outset of
philosophy is also grounded in this theosophical starting point of Jacob Boehme. Baader understands philosophy in the literal sense of the word here, as the love for divine wisdom. In self-knowledge and in the self-contemplation of divine wisdom rest the source and the goal of human knowledge and being.

Notes


With regards to Plato, Baader is obviously referring to the explications in *Alcibiades I*, 232-233.
    XV, p. 692.
11. See Roland Pietsch, "Metaphysik des Feuers. Die esoterische Grundlegung der
    Gesellschaftslehre Franz von Baaders", in Gerd Klaus Kaltenbrunner (ed.),
    Wissende, Verschwiegene, Eingeweihte. Hinführung zur Esoterik,
12. See Johann Sauter, Baader und Kant, Jena 1928.
15. "Was mir als Schendem oder Vermünftigem (Vernehmendem) Licht sein oder
geben soll, ist ein ohne mich und vor mir (a priori) fertig bestehendes, bezüglich
mich, zentrales Sehen, in welches mein Sehen (Auge) eingeführt oder eingerückt
wird, und welches somit, in meinem Sehen aufgehend, dieses Seiner (als
schenden) teilhaft macht, womit also mein Sehen ein Bild des letzteren ist. Gott
Schen ist darum in Gott Sehen, d. h. in Gottes primitivem … Sehen." Franz von
Baader, Über die Vermünftigkeit der drei Fundamentaldoktrinen des
17. This is a sentence by Meister Eckhart. Cp. Meister Eckhart, Die deutschen und
lateinischen Werke, Abt.
    I: Die deutschen Werke, Vol. V. ed. by Josef Quint, Stuttgart 1963 (Reprint
18. Franz von Baader, Bemerkungen über einige antireligiöse Philosophie unserer
    Zeit (abbr. BPZ), in
    III, p. 244.
24. "Und in der Tat, seidem von Hegel das dialektische Feuer <das Auto de Fé der
    bisherigen Philosophie> einmal angezündet worden, kann man nicht anders, als
dadurch selig werden, d. h. indem man sich und seine Werke durch dieses Feuer
fühlt, nicht etwa indem man von selbem abstrahieren, oder es wohl gar
25. Friedrich Wilhelm Hegel, Sämtliche Werke, ed. by G. Lasson and J.
26. Franz von Baader, Rezension der Philosophie der Hegelschen Schule bezüglich
    auf das Christentum, in

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7-Geldhof, Joris, "'Cogito ergo sum': On the Meaning and Relevance of Baader’s Theological Critique of Descartes", in *Modern Theology*, 21, 2005, p. 237-251
12-Plato *Alicibiades I*, 232-233
13-Sauter, Johann, *Baader und Kant*, Jena 1928
14-Siegl, Josef, *Franz von Baader*, Munich 1957