مؤسسه پژوهشی حکمت و فلسفه ایرانجاویدان خرد2251-8932184020220220Model of hermeneutic understanding of the Qur'an based on Gadamer's thoughtمدل فهم هرمنوتیکی قرآن، در اندیشۀ گادامر53614317710.22034/iw.2021.294671.1548FAهاجر اسدیعلوم قرآن و حدیث، الهیات و معارف اسلامی، الزهراء، تهران. ایران0000-0002-8159-1759فتحیه فتاحی زادهعلوم قرآن و حدیث، الهیات و معارف اسلامی، الزهراء، تهران، ایرانابوالفضل ساجدیفلسفه دین، موسسه آموزشی و پژوهشی امام خمینی ره. قمیوسف دانشور نیلوفلسفه دین، موسسه آموزشی و پژوهشی امام خمینی ره.(پردیس). قمJournal Article20210711<strong>Abstract</strong><br />In Truth and Method, Gadamer deals with the concept of understanding and how it is formed. His thoughts have greatly influenced on the Qur'anic studies of Muslim religious enlighteners. In addition to depicting different types of understanding, he also peels off their weaknesses to show the true model of "understanding". In this research, an acceptable form of understanding the Qur'an based on Gadamer's system of thought has been revealed.<br />Tise study tries to show with a descriptive-analytical method that the types of understanding, whether "pure objective or historical", "pure Subjective or modern" and "dialogue", do not reveal the truth of the Qur'an. Their defect is due to the negation of the role of some constructive elements of understanding. According to Gadamer, the true understanding of the Qur'an is "theological-dialogue". In fact, we encounter an important addition to Gadamer's "model of general dialogue" as the "monotheistic belief of the interpreter". whatness-wh<br /> <br />Key<strong> </strong>words<strong>: </strong>Truth and Method, Religious Enlightenment, Understanding the Qur'an, Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics.<br /> <br />Hermeneutics was initially founded on an epistemological approach based on the empirical method, but with the entry of <em>Heidegger</em> and especially <em>Gadamer</em> into the field, an "ontological" approach was introduced. An important point of difference between the two approaches is the complete dominance over "understanding" or lack of it. In the epistemological approach, the understander (subject) is able to fully understand the "text" as an "object" by applying a series of rules and methods. But in the ontological approach, understanding is an existential phenomenon and not a pure epistemology, and the comprehensor cannot completely master the "truth of the text" (the subject matter), because the subject understands itself in the context of existence, and existence is infinite.<br />In <em>Truth and Method</em>, <em>Gadamer</em> criticizes those who have diverted hermeneutics from its original way, it means understanding the subject matter. He tries to peel off the true meaning of understanding because from his point of view, hermeneutics influenced by the Enlightenment has distanced from its true meaning. He believes that the followers of the Enlightenment consider understanding as predictable phenomenon by the subject. <em>Gadamer</em> rejects the theory of the transcendence of the subject because the subject is present in the formation of understanding as the object (text).<br />Muslim religious modernists have introduced hermeneutics to the context of the Qur'an in the last century, and the choice of any of these approaches has had a significant impact on Muslims' understanding of the Qur'an. The most challenging Qur'anic hermeneutic approach is <em>Gadamer</em>'s ontological approach that its use by some religious intellectuals has encountered the islamic world with serious doubts.<br />It seems that an important part of the Qur'anic understandings acquired by contemporary intellectuals, following the application of philosophical hermeneutics, is the product of Lack of accurate understanding of <em>Gadamer</em>'s positions on different types of understanding, and its acceptable form, especially about understanding sacred texts. Therefore, this research tries based on <em>Gadamer</em>'s <em>truth and method</em>, by adopting a descriptive-analytical method, to answer the question: what model does <em>Gadamer</em> propose for hermeneutic understanding of the Qur'an?! In order to, the types of patterns of understanding from <em>Gadamer</em>'s point of view are discussed, and then by adapting each of these patterns to the field of understanding of the Qur'an tries to show: which patterns of understanding does <em>Gadamer</em> consider incomplete?!<br /> <br />This study shows that <em>Gadame</em> speaks of four models for understanding including "purely or historically objective", "purely or modernly subjective" and "general dialogue" and "specific or theological dialogue".<br />According to <em>Gadamer</em>, purely objective or subjective understandings are "silent" and "monologue." In historical understanding, the omission of the subject and the lack of attention to the present language of the addressee cause the Qur'an to be considered as an old and mythical text. In modern understanding, too, the omission of the object and the lack of attention to the past language will lead to an understanding of the Qur'an that is, in fact, imposed on it. He sees correct understanding as a "productive" process, not a "pure reproduction" and productive understanding is formed only in a "dialogue" relationship. <em>Gadamer</em> does not see the objectification of the author's lived experience in the process of reproduction as a possible thing , because of the historical principle of understanding. In his view, this impossibility is other than the possibility of the reader reaching the meaning intended by the author.<br />In addition to, the findings of this study show, in a sense, there are two types of understanding: the outward and the inward understanding. The outward understanding means knowing the meaning of the "author", and the inward understanding means understanding the truth beyond the text that is related to the "subject matter". The meaning that <em>Gadamer</em> considers in his hermeneutics is second meaning, although this does not mean denying the possibility of obtaining the first meaning. He also speaks of two kinds of understanding in another sense: a "immediate" and "mediated" understanding of the subject matter. mediated understanding is "historical and psychological interpretation. In the first, reader is naturally able to comprehend the text, if he is not alien to the language of the text and its subject matter. But in the second, if the reader encounters a foreign language, or an unfamiliar subject matter, the natural process of comprehension is disturbed. Therefore, to solve it, he must use grammatical, historical and psychological interpretation and as soon as eimination of disorder, the "main act of understanding" (discovering the truth of the subject matter) is done immediately.<br />According to <em>Gadamer</em>, in understanding the divine text, understander of the Qur'an must have a hermeneutical principle called "common sense" or "intuition of heart" or "monotheistic faith" which is the divine power. In other words, the presupposition that the comprehensor of the scriptures must have ,not merely general or existential, but derived from the position of true and practical faith. Faith means the obligation and commitment of a belief, not merely a state of inner attraction to God.<br />Although for <em>Gadamer</em> the model of dialogue of understanding is an acceptable model, he proposes a more complete model for the sacred texts, as understanding of "dialogue-theology". According to him, if the understander of the Qur'an is "foreign" to its language, he should first use "grammatical-linguistic interpretation" as a "preliminary condition" for understanding in order to "identifying" with the original reader of the Qur'an and remove obscurities in the history and language of its revelation. Now that a commen language has been found, the discussion will be on the "the subject matter". If the subject matter itself is "comprehensible" to the reader (such as the moral parts of the Qur'an), the process of comprehending it begins immediately, and the reader understands the truth beyond the text. And the validity of this understanding also depends on the "corresponding" the productive meaning with the intended meaning of the author. But if the subject matter, in itself, has a hieroglyphic or incomprehensible nature, it is necessary to discover the purpose and mentality of the author through historical data, in order to achieve his intended meaning.گادامر در کتاب حقیقت و روش به مقولة فهم و چگونگی شکلگیری آن پرداخته است. اندیشههای او، بیشترین تأثیر را بر مطالعات قرآنیِ روشنفکران دینیِ مسلمان داشته است. وی ضمن بهتصویرکشیدن گونه-های مختلفی از فهم، از نقاط ضعف آنها لایهبرداری میکند، تا بدینوسیله صورتِ حقیقیِ "فهمیدن" را نشان دهد. در این پژوهش، سعی شده است با انطباقِ این مدلهای فهم بر حوزة فهم قرآن و ارزیابیِ آنها از منظر گادامر، صورت مقبول فهمِ قرآن بر اساس منظومة فکریِ او آشکار شود.<br />پژوهش حاضر با روش توصیفی _تحلیلی نشان میدهد که گونههای فهم، اعم از "عینیِ محض یا تاریخی"، "ذهنیِ محض یا مدرن" و "دیالوگی" اساساً کاشف از حقیقت قرآن نیستند. نقص آنها، به دلیل نفی یا کمرنگ-کردنِ نقش برخی عناصر سازندة فهم است. بر اساس اندیشة گادامر، فهمِ حقیقی قرآن، فهمِ "دیالوگی-الهیاتی" است؛ یعنی ما با یک فزونی مهم با عنوان "باور توحیدیِ فهمنده" در "الگوی دیالوگی عامِ" گادامر مواجهایم.http://www.javidankherad.ir/article_143177_3e12efacef76fe8343f053d43f975fcf.pdfمؤسسه پژوهشی حکمت و فلسفه ایرانجاویدان خرد2251-8932184020220220The Foundations of Heraclitus' Criticism of Poetsمبانی انتقاد هراکلیتوس از شاعران376214318810.22034/iw.2021.276783.1512FAعلیرضا اسمعیل زاده برزیدانشگاه علامه طباطباییJournal Article20210308<strong>Abstract</strong><br />This article examines the main reason for Heraclitus’ criticism of poets. In this way, we first make a brief reference to the principles of Heraclitus’ views and then, we study his manner of expression, attaching this enigmatic method of expression to his pivotal view of language. From this perspective, language is at least one of the meanings that Heraclitus refers to in his application of the concept of the Logos. And thus, contemplating the language and the exploration of the facilities of the language, in his view, is a way to attain wisdom and grasping the truth of the world. Based on this interpretation and based on this conclusion, we will examine some fragments as case study in which Heraclitus criticized poets such as Homer and Hesiod. In this study, we will show that this criticism can also be considered essentially based on Heraclitus’ view of language; i.e. Although the application of language is the main substance and essence of the art of poetry, Heraclitus insinuates in various ways that poets are unable to comprehend the essence and profundity of language and, in other words, are unable to solve the enigma of language, the enigma that requires the content of harmony and accommodation of contradictions. Therefore, it can be said that Heraclitus’ aim in criticizing poets is to try to exclude those who can be considered as rivals for him in the field of language comprehension.<br /><strong>Keywords</strong>: Heraclitus, Poets, Criticism, Language, Logos, Enigma<br />As Plato said, the conflict between the poetry and philosophy is old in the Greece tradition. Besides Plato and Xenophanes, Heraclitus also had participated in this conflict and criticized the poets in his philosophy. However, each of them had their special perspective in criticizing the poets and participated in this conflict based on their special theoretical principles. Xenophanes especially had a religious view and considered the poets' definitions of gods as a shameful image. It is not so easy to summarize the critical view of Plato but we can say that, among all the subjects and issues, the main subject that had motivated him to criticize the poets was the harm that he believed the poets, in terms of ethics, imposed on the audiences.<br />Among these, the clarity of Heraclitus' view, which forced him to criticize the poets, is the least. Maybe, the complexity of Heraclitus' language is one of the reasons for the lack of clarity. The efforts for interpreting and understanding Heraclitus' thought were mostly focused on the essential basics of his thought, his polemical fragments also have been seen together, and there are no special attention to the basics of his criticism of poets.<br />In this paper, we will explain the especial view of Heraclitus about criticizing the poets and try to show how his critique has an unbreakable bond to the basics of this thought. According to this paper, the kind of Heraclitus' view of language is the most essential basic, which his critique about the poets is based upon it. In this regard, the author of this paper has two tasks: first, explaining the role of language in Heraclitus' philosophy, and second, indicating the connection between his critique of the poets and his especial view about the language. <br />Heraclitus always has been known as a philosopher who presents his ideas in a complex and puzzling way. The recent studies about his philosophy consider the essential view of Heraclitus about the importance of language as a justified and documented reason for the kind of use of language; according to this essential view language is no less than of a manifestation of the basic truth of the universe. From this point of view, Heraclitus considers the language as one of the most important implications of 'logos' by understanding of which we can understand the Logos in its basic meaning i.e. the principle of the world. In the other words, language is a complex and puzzling image of the complex and puzzling rationality of the world and we can understand the main truth by understanding the complexity and meaning of this image. Therefore, since he believes that the language itself is like a puzzle then his language is also puzzling; he also believes that we can understand the truth of the world by addressing this puzzle and solving it.<br />However, in spite of this presenting method of Heraclitus that can be considered as a poetic method, although never converts to a poem termly, he criticizes the poets such as Homer and Hesiod repeatedly. In this paper, we have tried to explain the common point of reliance and basis of these critiques in the framework of Heraclitus' philosophy by studying the fragments related to the critique of the poets. This study shows that always, in all cases, it is assumed that the poets could not understand the deep layers of language such as the various relations between words and phrases, and the hidden and secondary meanings that can be extracted from them. For example, we can mention these critiques: 1.The lack of understanding of Hesiod about the identity of night and day that are connected in the linguistic level. 2. The inability of Homer in solving a childish puzzle that needs an uncommon and unexpected meaning of the expressions to solve. 3. The hidden contradiction of Homer's sayings in the cases where he speaks about the war and its importance. Finally, 4. Emphasizing the priority of the hidden harmony compared to the apparent one can be an implication of the confrontation between the deep harmony between words and the superficial and rhythmic harmony existed in the poem. These cases are the most important critiques about the poets that existed in the Heraclitus' fragments and we can refer all of them to the common principle of inability in the deep understanding of the language.<br />Therefore, as a conclusion, we can say that Heraclitus sees the language as an image or manifestation of Logos, and therefore it can be a manifestation of the truth of the world. In the other words, the language itself is a puzzle that needs a hearing ear, an expectation for finding an unexpected matter, and any attempt to deepen in the depth of the words. However, based on the interpretation of his critical fragments, Heraclitus believes that the poets could not deepen in the depth of the language, although they addressed the complexity of the language and explored the meanings of the words more than anyone else explored apparently. In Heraclitus' opinion, the poets cannot understand the puzzle, which means he believes that they are unable to reach the depth of language. If they understand the meanings of the words, even the meaning of the words they say, then they could understand the truth of the unity of opposites. As Heraclitus attempts to show, poets only address the language superficially, trapped in its apparent harmony, and only the prose-writer wise who achieve the mystery of unity could understand the hidden truth. In a sense, we can say that since the poets commonly are considered as the most familiar people with the deep essence of the language and the best people in recognizing the capabilities, complexities, and hidden meanings of the language, Heraclitus, the prose-writer, who knows the language as a manifestation of the world's truth and a domain for understanding and expressing it, can guarantee his position as a person who has an original and deep relationship with the language only by indicating the inability of the poets in deepening in the depth of the language.در این مقاله پس از اشارهای مختصر به اصول نظرات هراکلیتوس، به بررسی سبک بیان او میپردازیم و این شیوهی معماگونهی بیان را به دیدگاه او دربارهی زبان پیوند میدهیم. از این منظر، زبان دستکم یکی از معانی مورد اشارهی هراکلیتوس در استفاده از مفهوم لوگوس است و بنابراین از نظر او تعمق در زبان راهی برای دست یافتن به حقیقت عالم است. مبتنی بر این تفسیر به بررسی قطعاتی خواهیم پرداخت که در آنها هراکلیتوس به انتقاد از شاعران پرداخته است و نشان خواهیم داد که این انتقاد نیز میتواند اساسا مبتنی بر دیدگاه هراکلیتوس در خصوص زبان دانسته شود. هراکلیتوس این معنا را القاء میکند که شاعران ناتوان از دستیابی به عمق زبان هستند و به تعبیری از حل معمای زبان عاجزند. به این ترتیب به تعبیری میتوان گفت که مقصود هراکلیتوس در نقد شاعران، به در کردن آنان از میدان رقابت در فهم زبان است.http://www.javidankherad.ir/article_143188_0612d067f9d4077924c3d66553f2ca97.pdfمؤسسه پژوهشی حکمت و فلسفه ایرانجاویدان خرد2251-8932184020220220"Individuation" From Ghias-al-Din Mansur Dashtaki's Perspective Based on Transcendent Philosophy«تشخص» از دیدگاه غیاثالدین منصور دشتکی بر مبنای حکمت متعالیه638814608910.22034/iw.2022.312301.1574FAمعصومه اسماعیلیاستادیار و عضو هیئت علمی دانشگاه شهید مطهریمنیره پلنگیدانشیار و مدیر گروه فلسفه دانشگاه مطهری تهران ایرانJournal Article20211027In most of the philosophical books, the issue of "Individuation" and the determination of its criteria have been discussed about which various statements have been made by philosophers. This research aims to examine the opinion of "Ghiyas al-Din Mansur Dashtaki Shirazi", one of the philosophers in the Shiraz Philosophical School, regarding Individuation. With deliberation on the works of this philosopher on the basis of Sadrian thought and by a descriptive-analytical method, it turned out that Ghiyas al-Din considers "Individuation" as a mentally posited issue and amongst the Secondary Intelligibles. Moreover, he considered it as redundant to the quiddity and relevant to the identity of the object; in the sense that it does not have an independent existence outside and is the same as the individual quiddity. Ghiyas al-Din considers the stability of human personality in this world and the hereafter as the continuation of its quiddity and in regard to the cause of human Individuation he has been contradicting himself. What placed Ghiyas al-Din in opposition to Mulla Sadra, is that the basis of his view of Individuation is the principality of quiddity while that of Mulla Sadra is the principality of existence.در بیشتر کتب فلسفی مسألهی «تشخّص»، و تعیین ملاک آن مورد بحث قرار گرفته و اقوال مختلفی از سوی فلاسفه ابراز گشته است. این پژوهش بر آن است تا نظر «غیاثالدین منصور دشتکی شیرازی» یکی از متفکران حوزه فلسفی شیراز را در باب تشخّص بررسی نماید. با تتبّع در آثار این متفکر بر مبنای تفکر صدرایی و با روش توصیفی تحلیلی مشخص میگردد که دشتکی «تشخّص» را امری اعتباری و در زمره معقولات ثانی به شمار آورده، آن را زائد بر ماهیت و داخل در هویّت شیء میداند؛ به این معنا که تشخص وجود مستقلی در خارج ندارد و همان ماهیت متشخّصه است. غیاثالدین، ثبات شخصیت انسان را در دنیا و آخرت به استمرار ماهیتش دانسته و در باب عامل تشخّص انسان دچار تهافتگویی شده است. آنچه غیاثالدین منصور را رو در روی ملاصدرا نشانده؛ این است که مبنای تشخّص در وی اصالت ماهیت است و در ملاصدرا اصالت وجود.http://www.javidankherad.ir/article_146089_7e419f8ab3121a233fabc1763ab49891.pdfمؤسسه پژوهشی حکمت و فلسفه ایرانجاویدان خرد2251-8932184020220220Critical Study of Burckhardt's view on Iranian Paintingبررسی انتقادی دیدگاه بورکهارت درباره نگارگری ایرانی8911814319010.22034/iw.2021.287982.1531FAمحمد جواد سعیدی زادهعضو هیات علمی موسسه هنر و اندیشه اسلامیJournal Article20210526<strong>Abstract</strong><br />Traditionalists are considered as one of the most influential intellectual movements in the purview of Islamic art. Titus Burckhardt is one of important thinkers who has interpreted Iranian paintings with a gnostic and mystic approach.The extent of his discussion in terms of time begins from the patriarchal period and continues until the second half of the sixteenth century.<br />Now, the question is that can we get a correct understanding of the paintings with his interpretation? The aim of this essay is to find a closer understanding to Iranian paintings by criticizing Burckhardt's view. The findings of this research indicate that his view is faced with serious challenges and criticisms in three purviews of non- realism, eternal hecceities and the world of imagination. The research is conducted based on library sources, using analytical- descriptive method.<br /> <br /><strong>Key words:</strong> Iranian Painting, Burckhardt, Imaginal World, Eternal Hecceities, Non-Realism.<br /> <br /> <br /> <br /> <br /> <br /> <br />Iranian paintings are one of the most controversial topics in the field of Islamic art that has been researched and studied by various researchers. Titus Burckhardt is one of important thinkers who has interpreted Iranian paintings with a gnostic and mystic approach. Now, the question is that can we get a correct understanding of the paintings with his interpretation? In order to find the answer of this question, first a descriptive report of his point of view will be presented and then, we will elaborate on his words and finally, try to examine it with other criteria such as historical and analytical-logical approach. From his point of view, the Persian miniature does not seek to portray the outward world; instead, what it is indirectly describing is the "immutable essences" (al-aʿyān ath-thābitah) of things. Although the “immutable essences” of things, cannot be apprehended because they are beyond form, but they are none the less reflected in the contemplative imagination. Therefore, the above can be summarized in three statements: First: The Iranian artist is not trying to illustrate the sensible world. Second: he draws the imaginary space directly. Third: he indirectly represents immutable essences.<br />Now, we have to ask what is Burckhardt's argument for the first statement? In this regard, it seems that he points to the lack of use of shading and perspective and considers it as evidence of his claim.<br />As for the second proposition, it must be noted that Burckhardt does not claim that Iranian paintings are always imaginary, but he says that this atmosphere occasionally confers upon the Persian miniature a kind of Edenic reverberation.<br />But as for the third sentence, why does he believe that the artist seeks to depict - al-aʿyān ath-thābitah? it seems that Burckhardt tries to justify the generality of the images with this theory.<br />this research indicate that his view is faced with serious challenges and criticisms in three purviews of non- realism, eternal hecceities and the world of imagination. Here it is enough to mention some of them, such as:<br /><br />From referring to literary works, it defines that the principle of non-realism existed in painting, but this view was not specific to the Ilkhanate, Timurid and Safavid periods, but also existed before that. In addition, although some scholars tried to infer non-realism from some works of painters like Qanun as-Suwar of Sadiqi Beg, but by referring to these works, it becomes clear that the lack of realism can not be used. Moreover, the concept of realism needs to be explained. In other words, there are two types of realism that must be distinguished between them: The first is European realism and the other is Iranian realism. Burckhardt does not deny both of them in relation to Iranian miniatures, but he only denies the European realism about it.<br /> But really, does the Iranian artist want to paint imaginal world? Some historical documents do not show that the painters are trying to draw the world of imagination, rather, they refer only to the imagination of the painter. But is this a critique of Burckhardt? it seems that the lack of historical documents in this regard is not a reason to deny it because works such as albums were not the place to declare this subject. Of course, by referring to some historical sources like Golestan-e Honar, we can find some mystical descriptions about some painters such as Pir and Dervish, etc but the fact is that these attributes can only indicate the possibility of connection with the world of imagination and they do not prove anything more.<br /><br />According to Burckhardt, the Iranian miniature seeks to indirectly draw al-aʿyān ath-thābitah and in this way he tries to explain the generality of the miniatures. But referring to the sources of theoretical mysticism, it becomes clear that eternal essences are not specific to generalities, but there are also individual eternal hecceities. Now, the question here is why the painters did not draw individual eternal essences when they wanted to paint the faces of individual persons? In addition, general and individual are terms that have different meanings in different sciences. For example, the definition of this term in logic is different from its definition in mysticism. But when Burckhardt speaks of the generality of miniatures, his explanation is compatible with the definition of the general in logic, whereas if the paintings are general and they refer to the generality of fixed entities, they must be consistent with the mystical explanation of the general. In response to this critique, one might say that if all painters are not people of intuition and want to draw the generality of objects, they have no choice but to abstract and discard the details of each object. For this reason, Burckhardt's view is that all normal painting is dependent upon sensory intuition to take sense experience and draw out from it those qualities that are typical of a individual thing and transmit them to the surface of the paperچکیده<br />سنتگرایان یکی از جریانهای فکری تأثیرگذار در عرصه هنراسلامی به شمار میآیند. تیتوس بورکهارت، از جمله چهرههای شاخصی است که با رویکردی حکمی و عرفانی به تفسیر نگارههای ایرانی دست زده است. دامنه و گستره بحث وی به لحاظ زمانی، از دوره ایلخانی آغاز شده و تا نیمه دوم قرن شانزدهم ادامه مییابد. حال، پرسش نوشتار آن است که آیا با تفسیر وی میتوان به درک درستی از نگارهها رسید؟ هدف از پژوهش حاضر در وهله نخست، فهم دیدگاه بورکهارت و در نهایت، درک نگارههای ایرانی است. بنا به نتایج مقاله، نظرگاه وی در سه عرصۀ عدم واقعنمایی، ترسیم عالم خیال و اعیان ثابته با چالشهایی همراه است که نگارنده به طرح و بررسی آن خواهد پرداخت. روش تحقیق این نوشتار توصیفی، تحلیلی و انتقادی است و ابزار گردآوری اطلاعات کتابخانهای است. رویکرد مقاله تحلیلی ـ منطقی و تاریخی است و نسبت به رویکرد عرفانی به نحو همدلانه است.http://www.javidankherad.ir/article_143190_29a179cb639e9a51855fae0f8808f8a3.pdfمؤسسه پژوهشی حکمت و فلسفه ایرانجاویدان خرد2251-8932184020220220Political Theology: Essence and Limits of a Problemالهیات سیاسی: چیستی و حدود یک مسأله11914614620610.22034/iw.2022.332961.1605FAمسعود سینائیانموسسه پژوهشی حکمت و فلسفه0000-0002-6735-5522Journal Article20220307The study of political theology is flourishing in both a variety of cultural and religious traditions and different fields of humanities and social sciences. Yet, the central question of ‘what is political theology’ looms over the field. This article first overviews the situation and historical background of its central questions and then reconstructs a framework for the problem of political theology within the context of its central thinkers from the last century. In that mindset, it argues that a relative distinction can be made in terms of the political eschatology (as well as the transformed higher-order orientations of the political act of the collective or the individual), and the theological legitimacy (as well as the metaphysical perspectives in which the belief in political order finds justifications). It contends that a series of genealogies of the secular bears a strong relation to an approach first defined within frames of political theology. This concerns the theological birth-marks that continued significant into the conceptual structures of state theory since early modernity. This approach can still maintain the closure of any pure theological claim upon the modern the political, and yet make distinctions of itself from both mere archaism and theological politics.مطالعات الهیات سیاسی بهطور روزافزون گستردهتر میشود اما پرسش ماهیت الهیات سیاسی همچنان مسئلهای محوری است. محور این جستار مسئله الهیات سیاسی در بنیادی دینی و تاریخی و حدود و امکان آن در مختصات سیاسیـحقوقی جدید است. این مقاله ابتدا مختصری از موقعیت و پیشینه پرسشهای آن را بررسی میکند؛ سپس چارچوبی اولیه را برای طرح مسئله الهیاتهای سیاسی بازسازی میکند. در استدلال آن: دو رویکرد اساسی تفکیک میشوند: اول، رابطه انواع فرجامشناسی و اشکال تحولیافته آن با فعلِ و سازوکار اجتماع یا قوای حاکمه؛ دوم، بنیان سیاسیـالاهیاتی مشروعیت و توان توجیه ساختار نظمِ عمومی در هماهنگی با منظومهای متافیزیکی. این چارچوب از یک سو، به تحلیل نسبت این دو مقوله، و از سویی به درکِ نظاممندترِ پرسشهایِ برآمده از این پیشینه تا تجدد کمک میکند. از نظرگاه این مقاله، بنمایه رویکرد نهایی به الهیات سیاسی شناختِ تبار مفاهیم و ساختارهای نظریه سیاسیـحقوقی تجدد در نسبت با نهاد فکر الهیاتی است. در نتیجهگیری آن، رویکرد اخیر توان پاسخ به برخی نقدهای اساسی پیرامون امکان الاهیاتهای سیاسی و پرسشهای غایتانگاری و باستانگرایی در مختصات سیاسیـحقوقی تجدد را دارد.http://www.javidankherad.ir/article_146206_9577a46453da352d260065444a04ecf4.pdfمؤسسه پژوهشی حکمت و فلسفه ایرانجاویدان خرد2251-8932184020220220Boghossian on Constructivism about Rational Explanationارزیابی انتقادهای بوغوسیان به برساختهانگاری تبیین عقلانی باور14717314135810.22034/iw.2021.292476.1542FAشهرام شهریاریپژوهشگر/ مؤسسهٔ پژوهشی حکمت و فلسفهٔ ایران0000-0001-5398-5614Journal Article20210628<strong>Abstract</strong><br />Paul Boghossian regards constructivism about the explanation of belief as one of the theses espoused by the constructivist picture of knowledge. The strong version of this thesis assumes the cause of belief exclusively social and gives no place to epistemic reasons and its weak version while making room for epistemic reasons, never considers them sufficient without the intervention of social influences. Boghossian explicitly considers the strong version of this thesis to be rooted in the Strong Program, but implicitly attributes its weak version to it. He tries hard to refute both versions; however, as I will indicate in this paper, his criticisms are based either on unsuccessful arguments or on a misconception of the Strong Program. Since, this program does not consider epistemic reasons ineffective or insufficient in creating belief; rather, it considers the reasons themselves socially constructed or constituted. Therefore, the Strong Program’s position does not undermine rational discourse and contrary to Boghossian’s claim, its proponents can argue in defense of themselves without committing any contradictions or falling into the trap of self-refutation.<br /><strong> </strong><br /><strong>Keywords</strong>: Strong Program, David Bloor, Rational Explanation of Belief, Constructivism, Paul Boghossian, Symmetry tenet, Underdetermination<br /><strong> </strong><br /><br /><strong> Introduction</strong><br /><br />First in his “What is social construction?” (2001), and then in his Fear of Knowledge (2006), Paul Boghossian criticized the social construction of knowledge. He attributed this conviction to the sociologists of scientific knowledge, and especially to the Strong Program’s advocates. In this paper, I assess his arguments from the same perspective.<br /><br /><strong> Constructivism about rational explanation</strong><br /><br />This thesis, according to Boghossian, argues that explaining why we have current beliefs always requires the intervention of social causes and factors, since epistemic reasons are never sufficient to explain them. The strong version of this view (SCE) denies the role of epistemic reasons in the causal explanation of beliefs thoroughly, and considers the correct explanation exclusively based on our social interests. Its weak version (WCE), however, holds that our epistemic reasons make some partial contribution to the causal explanation of our beliefs, while, our contingent social interests also need to be intervened.<br /><br /><strong> Boghossian’s criticisms of the constructivism about rational explanation</strong><br /><br />Boghossian considers SCE to be derived from the Strong Program’s principle of symmetry accordingly the explanation of beliefs should always be symmetrical. In his view, this principle requires that only social interests be invoked to explain beliefs, rather than any appeal to epistemic reasons. Boghossian finds no reason in favor of this principle, but argues against it. Since this view, he says, unreasonably negates the causal role of epistemic reasons in creating belief, ignores the distinction between justified beliefs and unjustified ones, and makes the principle itself unjustified and self-refuting.<br />Boghossian considers WCE to come from the thesis underdetermination of theory by evidence, and cites two sources for it: Kuhn’s doctrine of incommensurability, and Duhem’s thesis about auxiliary hypotheses. Boghossian argues that incommensurability of scientific paradigms, even if true, cannot result in WCE; since the situation is restricted to certain junctures in the history of science and does not encompass all our beliefs.<br />As for the Duhem-thesis, Boghossian argues that the presence of auxiliary hypotheses in extracting testable predictions from theories has led Duhem and the constructivists to conclude that belief revision in science is not purely rational. Boghossian, however, argues that neither Quine’s arguments nor any other argument can defend Duhem’s thesis. Since some hypotheses in scientific experiments are more acceptable than others, and therefore, some revisions are more plausible than others.<br /><br /><strong> SCE and the principle of symmetry</strong><br /><br />The Strong Program’s symmetry tenet does not imply SCE to which Boghossian attributes it. He erroneously concludes from the program’s commitment to sociological explanations of beliefs that they can no longer be explained evidentially. Whereas the Strong Program regards the epistemic evidence itself a kind of social cause and constituted by it. Consequently, the sociological explanation of beliefs does not conflict with their rationality or accepting them by reason.<br />Bloor argues for this claim that in reasoning, categorizing objects and determining whether a proposition corresponds with reality there is a kind of rule-following. According to him, the correct criterion for the implementation of rules—even mathematical or logical rules—is determined by consensus. Therefore, the consensus of experts is always present in all our rational beliefs and indicates the role of social interests in all types of knowledge. As a result, the Strong Program considers the same reasons that others give to justify propositions sufficient or effective in creating belief, while explaining the nature of these reasons differently. Thus, Boghossian arguments fail, and the symmetry principle is acquitted of the charge of ignoring the causal role of reasons in belief.<br /><br /><strong> WCE and the underdetermination thesis</strong><br /><br />WCE which Boghossian implicitly attributes to the sociologists of scientific knowledge is not endorsed by them. Concerning incommensurability, Boghossian rightly says that this doctrine cannot support WCE. However, he did not say who has ever made the argument. At least the proponents of the Strong Program have never done so.<br />In the case of Duhem’s thesis, contrary to Boghossian, the Strong Program holds that the same rational evidence and theoretical virtues that are used to prefer one theory over another have been constructed by social interests. Similarly, that scientists consider some experiments conclusive and some theories falsified requires a sociological explanation: socialization in a normal science tradition.<br />This does not mean denying the role of reason or its adequacy and replacing it with social conditioning. Rather, it means that rational criteria are social constructs. As a result, Boghossian critiques here also aim in the wrong direction.<br /><br /><strong> Appraisal of Boghossian’s other account of social construction of belief</strong><br /><br />In “What is Social Construction?”, Boghossian interprets social constructivists as claiming that social values, in addition to the context of discovery, are also present in the context of justification. Since, in this view, the rational is constitutively social; rather than considering the social as filling the gap left by the rational. He, however, finds this view impossible; for if all reasons depend on perspectives and contexts, then the claimants of this view become incoherent by trying to argue for others or convincing them to accept their own relativistic position. But Boghossian is wrong; this view simply obliges its proponents that their arguments will be credible only to those who live in more or less similar societies, and not to everyone in any society.<br /><br /><strong> Conclusion</strong><br /><br />The Strong Program is not committed to either strong (SCE) or weak versions of constructivism about rational explanation (WCE). This program, in contrast, has admitted a more effective version of social constructivism that has survived Boghossian’s attacks.پل بوغوسیان در کتاب هراس از معرفت، برساختهانگاری تبیین باور را یکی از آراء برساختهانگارانه از معرفت معرفی میکند. نسخة قوی این رأی علت باور را منحصراً عوامل اجتماعی میداند و هیچ نقشی برای دلایل معرفتی قائل نیست. اما نسخة ضعیف آن، اگر چه نقشی برای دلایل معرفتی در ایجاد باور قائل است، آن را بدون مداخلة عوامل اجتماعی کافی نمیداند. بوغوسیان نسخة قوی برساختهانگاری تبیین باور را صریحاً و نسخة ضعیف آن را تلویحاً به برنامة قوی نسبت میدهد و استدلالهایی در رد هر دو نسخه اقامه میکند. من در این مقاله، نشان خواهم داد که انتقادهای وی یا بر استدلالهایی ناموفق یا بر تلقیای نادرست از برساختهانگاری برنامة قوی مبتنی است. این برنامه دلایل معرفتی را در ایجاد باور بیتأثیر یا ناکافی نمیداند؛ بلکه خودِ دلایل معرفتی را برساخته یا قوامیافتة علایق و منافع اجتماعی میداند. بنابراین، برنامة قوی منکر گفتمان عقلانی نیست و حامیان آن بدون افتادن به دام خودشکنی یا تناقض میتوانند در دفاع از خود نیز استدلال کنند.http://www.javidankherad.ir/article_141358_029cb36f4447af6b3fd09a301afe8568.pdfمؤسسه پژوهشی حکمت و فلسفه ایرانجاویدان خرد2251-8932184020220220The Relationship Between Linguistic Understanding and Tacit Knowledge in Wittgenstein; Evaluation of the Scandinavian Approachنسبت فهم زبانی و شناخت ضمنی از نظر ویتگنشتاین؛ نقد رویکرد اسکاندیناوی17520214318910.22034/iw.2021.290179.1536FAابوالفضل صبرآمیزپژوهشگاه علوم انسانی و مطالعات اجتماعی جهاد دانشگاهی (IHSS)Journal Article20210611<strong>Abstract</strong><br />Later Wittgenstein considers understanding (especially linguistic) in relation to ability. He believes that the grammar of the word "knows" and "understands" is evidently closely related to the grammar of the word "can” and “is able to”. An interpretation of the relationship between understanding and ability can be found in the works of Scandinavian philosophers. Johansen, one of the most prominent figures in this movement, believes that linguistic understanding is a strong form of tacit knowledge. tacit knowledge means that we know things that we cannot, in principle, articulate linguistically. In this article we will show that the interpretation cannot explain this simple phenomenon that we immediately understand when we encounter linguistic words and phrases according to the context and position of the sentence. In addition, the interpretation of tacit knowledge is conceptually ambiguous. Ultimately is unclear that Wittgenstein really agrees with this kind of interpretation of understanding due to the close relationship between the concept of intuition and tacit knowledge.<br /><strong>Key</strong><strong> </strong><strong>words</strong><strong>: </strong>Wittgenstein; Scandinavian approach; Linguistic understanding; tacit knowledge; Ability.<br /> <br />When we come face linguistic words and phrases, we understand them immediately. We understand them the moment we face them. In Phenomenological terms, this is a simple description of hearing linguistic phrases. But it is difficult for some theories to articulate this simple description. One of these theories is related to Wittgenstein's later view of meaning and language. He describes this problem in paragraph 138 of his work Philosophical investigations (1986) as follows: “… We grasp it in a flash, and what we grasp in this way is surely something different from the 'use' which is extended in time!”<br />To solve this misconception, Wittgenstein examines what understanding is in paragraphs 143 to 197 of this book. He gives several reasons why understanding is not a comprehension of a mental thing or what he calls "particular circumstances" The general reading, in Wittgenstein's view of understanding, is that it is the same as ability or in relation to ability. In Philosophical investigations he writes: “The grammar of the word "knows" is evidently closely related to that of "can", "is able to". But also closely related to that of "understands". (Mastery' of a technique)” (1986, $150).<br />An interpretation of the relationship between understanding and ability can be found in the Scandinavian approach to Wittgenstein. Johannessen (1990), one of the most prominent figures in this movement, believes that linguistic understanding is a strong form of tacit knowledge. Strong tacit knowledge means that we know things that we cannot, principally, articulate. One of the best examples of strong tacit knowledge is skill work. A skilled craftsman who makes significant works of art with mud, knows what he is doing. For example, how to hold hands, how to prepare raw materials, etc. are effective in making a jar, and many of them can be learned through experience and practice, but cannot be formulated in linguistic forms.<br />With this in mind, in three steps, Johannessen tries to show why linguistic understanding is a kind of tacit knowledge according to Wittgenstein. In the first stage (1990a: 159) he believes that the use of language is based on following the rule and following the rule is considered to be an activity. Johannessen’s second point (1990a: 161-3) is that the use of linguistic rules is irregular. According to what we said in the first point, following the rule is an activity. Finally, Johannessen's last point (1990a: 159-160) is that practice and action should be considered as "intransitive understanding".<br />And according to Wittgenstein, intransitive understanding is a kind of understanding that is not expressed and cannot be formulated linguistically (Johannessen, 1990a: 167). Like understanding music or understanding a poem that cannot be translates or expressed differently from what it is now. The application of the linguistic rules is not regular; it is not interpretable. Just as understanding a work of art or understanding music or understanding poetry is an experience that cannot be replaced by anything else and cannot even be delivered by other means, so the use of a rule cannot be expressed by another rule.<br />But can this interpretation of the relationship between understanding and ability, which ultimately considers understanding as a kind of tacit knowledge, provide an answer to the main question of this article, which was raised in paragraph 138 of the Philosophical investigations? Namely, how to "immediately” understand a phrase or a word which has continuous application?<br />If we emphasize on the characteristics of knowledge in tacit knowledge, then it seems that Johannessen places Wittgenstein among philosophers who have a cognitive view of linguistic understanding. Understanding linguistic comprehension as a kind of knowledge (whether implicit or implicit) rises criticisms that any theory which considers comprehension as a kind of knowledge must respond to. For example, according to some philosophers, (linguistic) understanding is compatible with Gettier problem and chance, while knowledge is not. Or that understanding is transparent while knowledge, due to the factor of truth, which has an external aspect, is not transparent.<br />The second objection is that understanding as an ability can provide an explanation for understanding linguistic expressions in a typical way (meaning of the expression type). This refers to understanding a linguistic phrase only according to its linguistic meaning and not in relation to the situation of its utterance, the way of expression, gesture, etc. This is the ability that any native-speaker has. But the main point of understanding a linguistic phrase is not understanding in typical form, but in a specific form. That is, understanding a phrase in a particular situation and according to the situation, the tone of expression, gesture, and so on. Johannessen's arguments may be used to obtain linguistic rules, but he does not talk about understanding a certain sentence in a particular situation.<br />The third objection to Johannessen's interpretation is whether Wittgenstein really supports the thesis of tacit knowledge. The term “tacit knowledge” is not used in Wittgenstein's works, but a term close to the tacit knowledge used in Wittgenstein's works is the concept of ‘intuition’. In general, we can talk about the correlation between the concept of intuition and the concept of tacit knowledge. For example, a skilled craftsman who has knowledge of something but cannot express it, intuitively knows what the solution is when faced with a defect or problem. Wittgenstein explicitly believes that grasping the rule is not a matter of intuition. Because intuition ultimately is seen as an internal thing and a process or state of mind, while he believes that no hidden process can be equal to understanding or consolidating the understanding, while tacit knowledge is a hidden process. Now, according to what has been said, even if the concept of tacit knowledge is not exactly the same as the concept of intuition, but since the literature under discussion at least suggests a close relationship between these two concepts, to attribute tacit knowledge to Wittgenstein and to understand linguistic understanding as a kind of strong tacit knowledge should clarify the relationship between tacit knowledge and intuition. And this is what Johannessen did not do.ویتگنشتاین متاخر فهم (به خصوص زبانی) را در نسبت با توانایی در نظر میگیرد. وی معتقد است دستور زبان واژه «میداند» و «میفهمد»، ربط نزدیکی با دستور زبان واژه «میتواند» دارد. یک نوع تفسیر از نسبت میان فهمیدن و توانایی را میتوان در کارهای تفسیری فیلسوفان اسکاندیناوی از ویتگنشتاین مشاهده کرد. یوهانسن از شاخصترین چهرههای این جریان معتقد است که فهم زبانی شناخت ضمنی از نوع قوی آن است. شناخت ضمنی قوی به این معناست که ما چیزهایی را میدانیم که علیالاصول نمیتوانیم آنها را صورتبندی زبانی کنیم. در این مقاله نشان خواهیم داد این تفسیر نمیتواند تبیینی از این توصیف پدیداری ساده که زمانی که با کلمات و عبارتهای زبانی روبرو میشویم آنها را بلافاصله میفهمیم به-دست بدهد. علاوه بر این تفسیر شناخت ضمنی در ویتگنشتاین دارای ابهام مفهومی است. و در نهایت با توجه به نسبت نزدیک مفهوم شهود با شناخت ضمنی مشخص نیست که ویتگنشتاین با توجه به رد مفهوم شهود و یا هر نوع امر درونی واقعا با این نوع تفسیر از فهم موافق باشد.http://www.javidankherad.ir/article_143189_bf3f753228fc8b8e03d7bdc662b282ae.pdfمؤسسه پژوهشی حکمت و فلسفه ایرانجاویدان خرد2251-8932184020220220The Treatise "Fi l-Wujūd" of Khayyamرسالۀ «فی الوجود» از حجّة الحق خیّام20322814361210.22034/iw.2022.300961.1562FAصادق نوکهن اهوازیفلسفه، دانشکده ادبیات و زبانهای خارجی، دانشگاه علامه طباطبایی، تهران0000-0001-7992-5310بابک عالیخانیگروه ادیان و عرفان. موسسه پژوهشی حکمت و فلسفه ایران0000-0000-0000-0000Journal Article20210830So far, many scholars have studied Khayyām’s quatrains; however, nothing more than some brief studies have been done as to his treatises, especially the philosophical ones. Khayyām propounded important discussions on the existence as a rational abstraction, discussions that have not been ineffective in Islamic philosophical tradition. Historically speaking, Khayyām occupies a prominent place in the gap between Ibn Sina and Suhrawardī. Khayyām's most important philosophical treatise is Fi l-Wujūd, a critical edition of which is contained in this paper. In his philosophical treatises, the most principal issues Khayyām intends to solve are the Universal Hierarchy (silsilat at-tartib) and problem of evil. In order to explain that evil is non-existential (ʿadamī) and essentially cannot be attributed to the Necessary Being, he first discusses attributes of things and categorizes them to explicate which things are intrinsic and which are not. He then states that the intrinsic attributes of different quiddities are extrinsically in opposition to each other, the opposition which gives rise to evil in this world. Therefore, quiddities are all good in themselves and all emanated from the First Principle in accordance to the Universal Hierarchy.پژوهندگان تاکنون دربارۀ رباعیّات خیّام پژوهشهای بسیاری ارائه دادهاند، ولی درباب رسائل وی -بالاخص رسائل فلسفی او- تنها به مختصری بسنده کردهاند. خیّام مطالبی دربارۀ اعتباری بودن پارهای از اوصاف، و به خصوص وجود، مطرح کرده که در سنّت فلسفۀ اسلامی بیتأثیر نبوده است. به طور کلّی، به لحاظ تاریخی درفاصلۀ میان ابن سینا تا سهروردی، خیّام حائز شأن بسزایی است. مهمترین رسالۀ فلسفی خیّام، رسالۀ «فی الوجود» است که در این مقاله تصحیح دیگری از آن-اصطلاحاً به روش التقاطی- ارائه شده است. عمدهترین مسئلهای که خیّام در همۀ رسائل فلسفی خود سعی در پاسخ دادن به آنها دارد، مسئلۀ سلسلة التّرتیب و تبیین شرور در عالم است. وی برای آنکه نشان دهد شرّ در عالم عدمی است و بالذّات به واجب تعالی بازنمیگردد، در ابتدا به بحث در صفات اشیاء و دستهبندی آنها میپردازد. از این بحث روشن میشود که چه صفاتی ذاتی است و چه صفاتی ذاتی نیست. سپس بیان میدارد که صفات ذاتی ماهیّات مختلف، بالعرض در تضادّ با یکدیگرند و این تضادّ باعث پیدایش شرّ در عالم جسمانی است. ماهیّات همگی خیرند و بر حسب سلسة التّرتیب از حقّ تعالی فیضان یافتهاند.http://www.javidankherad.ir/article_143612_a4cc2b79a010f49234866bddbc020315.pdfمؤسسه پژوهشی حکمت و فلسفه ایرانجاویدان خرد2251-8932184020220220The Principle of Simplicity in the Hayʾa Books : A Revision to the Motivations behind the Development of non-Ptolemaic Planetary Modelsاصل سادگی در آثار هیئت و نگاهی دوباره به انگیزههای ایجاد مدلهای غیربطلمیوسی22925814139210.22034/iw.2021.298775.1555FAامیر محمد گمینیدانشگاه تهران0000-0002-6919-4814Journal Article20210808Abstract: Quṭb al-Dīn Shīrāzī believed that according to Ptolemy in the introduction of Almagest, any entity that is not necessary for this astronomy should be omitted. This principle seems close to the definition of the notion of simplicity and parsimony in the philosophy of science. the phrase “omitting what is not necessary” is not mentioned explicitly in the Almagest. It seems that Isḥāq or Thābit added this phrase to the Arabic translation. The Islamic astronomers mentioned “simplicity” within their discussion of the solar model again and again and believed that a model with fewer orbs is acceptable for the sun because it is “simpler”. Nevertheless, the Maragha astronomers’ non-Ptolemaic models include more orbs than the number of the orbs in the Ptolemaic models. The non-Ptolemaic models were produced to solve the contradiction between Ptolemaic models and the Aristotelian natural principle of uniform motion. Although there were at least two other Aristotelian natural principles for the celestial motions which were in contrast with Ptolemaic models, Maragha astronomers did not pay attention to these contradictions. It is possible that they felt that supposing more orbs with uniform motion is simpler or more elegant than fewer orbs with non-uniform motion.چکیده: قطب الدین شیرازی معتقد بود بطلمیوس در مقدمۀ مجسطی گفته: هر هویتی را که در نجوم نیازی به آن نباشد باید حذف کرد. این اصل با بعضی تعاریف مفهوم سادگی و صرفهجویی در فلسفۀ علم نزدیکی دارد. عبارت «حذف آنچه به آن نیاز نیست» در مجسطی نیامده. ظاهرا اسحاق یا ثابت آنرا درترجمۀ عربی آن افزوده اند. هیئتدانان جهان اسلام در ضمن بحثِ هیئت افلاک خورشید بارها به این اصل اشاره کرده اند و معتقد بودند که برای خورشید مدلی با افلاک کمتر قابلقبول است، چون «سادهتر» است. اما مدلهای غیربطلمیوسی که منجمان مراغه، از جمله شیرازی، در آثار هیئت خود عرضه کرده اند دارای افلاک بیشتری نسبت به مدلهای بطلمیوسی بودند. مدلهای غیربطلمیوسی به خاطر حل تناقضات مدلهای بطلمیوسی با اصل «حرکت یکنواخت» افلاک در فلسفۀ طبیعی ارسطو مطرح شده بودند. با اینکه در فلسفۀ طبیعی ارسطو حداقل دو اصل دیگر نیز برای حرکات افلاک وجود داشت که با هیئت بطلمیوس تعارض داشت، منجمان مکتب مراغه تعارض این دو اصل را مهم نمیدانستند و اشکالی از این جهت به مدلهای بطلمیوسی نمیگرفتند. شاید علت این رفتار دوگانه این بود که فرض افلاک بیشتر با سرعت یکنواخت سادهتر یا ظریفتر از فرض افلاک کمتر با سرعت نایکنواخت حس میشد.http://www.javidankherad.ir/article_141392_085edad96502f12888657511bf5be8c0.pdfمؤسسه پژوهشی حکمت و فلسفه ایرانجاویدان خرد2251-8932184020220220Violence against metaphysics: A critical study of radical criticisms against metaphysical violenceخشونت علیه متافیزیک: بررسی انتقادی نقدهای رادیکال به خشونت متافیزیک25928914318710.22034/iw.2021.294447.1546FAسیده زهرا مبلّغپژوهشگاه علوم انسانی و مطالعات فرهنگیJournal Article20210710One of the most radical criticisms by contemporary philosophers against metaphysics refers to the violence embedded in and developed by metaphysics. This criticism rejects the possibility of thinking about Being arguing that metaphysical thought due to its insistence on thinking clearly and distinctly, and for its method of transcendence results in suppression, possession, and tyranny. Different versions of this criticism unravel many secret points within the history of philosophy; yet, they all relate a specific narration of the history of philosophy that can be criticized itself. Many of such criticisms involve a kind of bias, sophistication, and negligence in their reading (and interpreting) of the history of philosophy. They rarely refer to philosophical texts, and their claims seldom are supported by a close reading of a text in its context. Contrary to this criticism, a different narration of the story of philosophy can be provided in which metaphysics and morality have the same origin. This article studies two versions of the criticisms against metaphysical violence: that of Levinas, as the most significant critic of metaphysics, and of Mc Cumber, as he has explained in more details how metaphysical violence transpires on the realm of act. Then, an explanation will be provided to argue for another narration of metaphysics in which metaphysics is a moral act in its origin and in its development: it requires to be humble in front of reality, and to be in search of the common foundation between the self and the other.<br /> <br />Key<strong> </strong>words<strong>: </strong>Criticism of metaphysis, violence, ignoring the other, suppression, Levinas, humility<br />During the last century, radical criticisms against metaphysics have changed the concept and status of metaphysics in the field of philosophy. The most important among the radical criticisms is that metaphysics is a violent discipline that justifies, even motivates, violence in practice. This criticism not only unravels the methodological and theoretical error of metaphysics; it also examines the practical implications of metaphysics for the concrete life of human in the history of philosophy. This is due to this latter point that the criticism of metaphysical violence can be regarded as the most overwhelming critique against metaphysics. Violence, first and most, refers to action and the material life. As Merleau-Ponty (1969: 109) explains, “Inasmuch as we are incarnate beings, violence is our lot.” In his Humanism and terror, he analysis political violence in terms of embodiment and as an implication of living in a material world with complicated relations toward the others. Where there is no violence is a utopia: a world of pure, bodiless consciousness. But in the real world, every human being is an embodied consciousness. The Other is a material face and she is to be understood through reciprocal concrete interactions. So, when we talk about violence, we talk about a material process that can happen only within the world of embodied consciousness. This necessarily material denotation of violence makes the criticisms against metaphysics radical. If this critique claims that metaphysics justifies or authorizes violence, it should demonstrate the influence of metaphysical though on the real concrete world. And this is what the different versions of this critique endeavor to show: they argue that metaphysical prescriptions have permeated beyond the realm of theoretical thinking, and found their way to the streets. Much, if not all, of violence, war, suppression, and ignorance against humanity in the history has been rooted from metaphysical views toward the world. In his criticisms against ontology, Emmanuel Levinas spreads the scope of metaphysical violence to concentration camps and gas chambers. He finds “the source of the bloody barbarism of National Socialism” in the “ontology of being” (Levinas, 1990: 63). A post-Heideggerian contemporary philosopher, John Mc Cumber, develops Levinas’ arguments discussing that metaphysics has produced the engines of suppression (Mc Cumber, 1999: 86).<br />The core of this criticism refers to the methodology that metaphysics prescribes as the only way to reach certainty and truth. This methodology requires clarity and distinctive though in grasping the whole nature (essence) of the things. This means that to get close to the truth, one should conceive (grasp) the other as the object of knowledge in the light of reason. Rationality, as both the goal and the method of metaphysics, presupposes the supremacy of reason over body and emotions. Reason can comprehend the things as they are represented to our understanding as phenomenon. Everything should be categorized under a certain general concept to be understood by reason. Rationality, thus, prescribes the method of ignoring the differences of every single being and scarifying individuality for the sake of generality. Put it another way, metaphysical idea of rationality postulates that everything can be known and completely grasp in the light of reason. This premise reaches its extreme form in modern philosophy by Descartes and then Hegel when they associate being with knowing: if something is not known, it does not exist. Being, in this view, is reduced to the perceivable aspects of beings.<br />This extreme formulation of metaphysical rationality thoroughly withdraws the unknown aspects of things. Metaphysics consists in neglecting the strangeness of reality, the differences of the others as the others, and reducing the individuality to generality. This method of rationality amounts to a fundamental violence against the other as an unknown reality. And this method, as the only method of rationality, justifies every kind of suppression and ignorance. In practice, this prescriptive methodology legitimizes the acts of domination, suppression, and tyranny. It has been penetrated from the realm of philosophy to the social and political life. Hence, metaphysics is an immoral discipline that can be regarded as the motivation behind many injustice and oppressions in the history of humanity.<br />This radical criticism reveals some concealed aspects of the history of metaphysics. Yet, it has concealed many details and differences. I argue that the radical criticism against metaphysical violence commits itself to what it criticizes in the history of metaphysics. This criticism depends on a certain reading/ reconstruction of the history of philosophy according to which all philosophers have collaborated to ignore the difference and individuality. And this reading itself ignores all of the differences and disagreements among philosophers. Various versions of this criticism do not refer to philosophical texts for their claims. They depict a consistent picture of what has happened in the long history of metaphysics: all of the upheavals and conflicts are being ignored and reduced to a simple narration.<br />Nonetheless, a different narration of the history of metaphysics can be provided that strongly resists this critique. Metaphysics can be understood, through a close reading of metaphysical texts, as an inevitable enthusiasm to get close to the unperceivable reality. For example, in Aristotelian thought, metaphysics emerges when one encounters the untouchable reality as a strange other that cannot be understood in terms of my concepts. Metaphysics, in this sense, arises from an emotional moment. It is a moral process of respecting the alterity of the other, and striving for getting close to that unknown other. This narration of the essence of metaphysics has less proponents and is not introduced as a systematic interpretation of the history of metaphysics. One can trace footprints of this view in the writings of Marta Nussbaum, Jean Grondin, and Martin Hägglund who demonstrate not only that metaphysics is practically possible, but also that metaphysics is the foundation of ethics. This article firstly examines the radical criticism against the violence of metaphysics, and then introduces an alternative narration of metaphysics as a moral process.یکی از مهمترین نقدهای معاصر به متافیزیک، نقد خشونت نهفته در متافیزیک و خشونت برآمده از آن است. لویناس و دریدا نمایندگان بارز این دیدگاه بودهاند که هرکدام به شیوهای، درباره لوازم و استلزامهای خشونتبار متافیزیک استدلال کردهاند. لویناس با تحلیل فرایند مفهومی و کلیسازی هر امر متفرد در متافیزیک، توضیح میدهد که روش متافیزیک مستلزم اولاً محو کردن وجه انضمامی و تفاوتهای دیگری و ثانیاً تملک دیگری برای خود است. از این جهت، متافیزیک بنیاد خشونت را در نظر و سپس در عرصه عمل استوار و توجیه میکند. دریدا همزمان با انتقال بنیاد خشونت از متافیزیک به زبان، معتقد است عدم خشونت محض ممکن نیست و به جای عدم خشونت، باید با آگاهی به ساختارهای خشونت و به کمک نوشتار، به سوی اقتصاد خشونت پیش رفت. در این مقاله، نخست نقدهای لویناس و دریدا به خشونت متافیزیک شرح داده میشود و سپس توضیح خواهم داد که بخشی از این نقدها خود نوعی خشونت در حق متافیزیک و نادیده گرفتن برخی از مهمترین وجوه تاریخ آن است.http://www.javidankherad.ir/article_143187_a5ac85856d4f56a7aed50643be069115.pdfمؤسسه پژوهشی حکمت و فلسفه ایرانجاویدان خرد2251-8932184020220220The evolution of Confucian concepts in the Neo-Confucian moral-cosmic systemبررسی مفاهیم اصلی نظام کیهانی- اخلاقی نوکنفوسیوسی29131414613110.22034/iw.2022.315430.1588FAمرجان نوریگروه ادیان و عرفان، دانشکده الهیات و معارف اسلامی، دانشگاه الزهرا، تهران، ایران0000-0002-2386-5256نوری سادات شاهنگیاندانشیار و مدیر گروه ادیان و عرفان. دانشکده الهیات. دانشگاه الزهرا. تهران . ایرانJournal Article20211213The concepts of Li (principle), Qi (vital energy) and Ren (humanity) have a special place in Confucian thought. In this article, what is the subject of discussion is how the evolution of Confucianism into Neo-Confucianism and the design of the moral -cosmic system by Neo-Confucians based on the mentioned concepts. In the present article, while examining the origin of these concepts, they are described in Confucian and Neo-Confucian thought and their role in creating neo-Confucian moral cosmology. The concepts mentioned in the article are expressed by referring to the works of Neo-Confucians, The Book of Changes, Great Learning, The Doctrine of the Mean, The Book of Mencius and the interpretations of prominent scholars of Confucian texts. Influenced by the supremacy of the Buddhist and Daoist religions, the Neo-Confucians were able to develop Confucian concepts and compete with the common religions; Buddhism, in particular, to create a moral-metaphysical system that Confucianism lacked. In this way, they established the Neo-Confucian religion in the field of Chinese thought history, and by drawing a general cosmological system, revived the Confucian religion in a new form and added to its strength and richness, and through this, received the general popularity of the people.مفاهیم لی، چی و ژن اصلیترین مفاهیم نوکنفوسیوسی هستند. در این مقاله با مراجعه به متون کنفوسیوسی مکالمات، معرفت بزرگ، آموزه اعتدال و منسیوس که به سبب اهمیتشان توسط نوکنفوسیوسیها به صورت یک مجموعه تحت عنوان «چهار کتاب» درآمدند، تفاسیر محققان برجسته از متون کنفوسیوسی و نیز آثار نوکنفوسیوسیها، مفاهیم مذکور تبیین شده و ضمن بررسی منشأ این مفاهیم، به توصیف جایگاه آنها در نظام کیهانشناسی اخلاقی نوکنفوسیوسی پرداخته شدهاست. آیین نوکنفوسیوسی در واقع پیشرفت خلاقانه مکتب کنفوسیوسی و نشانگر بلوغ آن و حاصل ادغام با جهانبینیهای رایج عصر خود، اعم از دین بودایی، دائویی و دیگر مکاتب فلسفی است. نوکنفوسیوسیها توانستند تحت تأثیر تفوق ادیان بودایی و دائویی مفاهیم کنفوسیوسی را بسط داده و برای رقابت با ادیان رایج؛ بویژه دین بودایی، نظام اخلاقی- متافیزیکی آیین کنفوسیوسی را برجسته سازند. آنها از این طریق آیین نوکنفوسیوسی را بر عرصه تاریخ تفکر چین بنا نهادند و با احیای آیین کنفوسیوسی بر قوت و غنای آن افزوده و بار دیگر مردم را متوجه حقیقت ناب این آیین کهن ساختند.<br /><strong>کلیدواژهها:</strong> آیین کنفوسیوسی، آیین نوکنفوسیوسی، نظام کیهانی اخلاقی، لی، چی، ژن.http://www.javidankherad.ir/article_146131_99059866df18e31a39655418015992ed.pdfمؤسسه پژوهشی حکمت و فلسفه ایرانجاویدان خرد2251-8932184020220220Ibn Sina's al-Mabdaʼ wa-al-maʻād
A Thematic Analysis, Studies' Appraisal and Codicological Aspectالمبدأ والمعاد ابنسینا تحلیل مضمونی، ارزیابی پژوهشها و نسخهشناسی اثر31534614613510.22034/iw.2022.333112.1606FAسید حامد هاشمیموسسه پژوهشی حکمت و فلسفه ایران0000-0002-4853-6694محمد جواد اسماعیلیعضو هیأت علمی موسسه پژوهشی حکمت و فلسفه ایران0000-0003-2292-3909Journal Article20220308Al-Mabda 'wa Al-Ma'ad is one of Ibn Sina's philosophical works in which many significant issues of Metaphysics and Natural philosophy are explained. It is noteworthy to say that later thinkers such as Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, Shahāb al-Dīn Suhrawardī and Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī have referred to this book. However this book has similarities with other Ibn Sina's works, especially Salvation (al-Najat), it contains different contents such as the perception of intelligibles, motion, the spheres and soul. These topics are definitely invaluable for further development in the history of Ibn Sina's reception. Since 1332/1953 to 1400/2021, four works were published on this books, two works included the text and the other two are Persian and French translations. In this article, having briefly introduced the book and evaluated the studies on it, it is meticulously examined the list of the MS copies of the as well as close look at fifty copies of them. Furthermore, the new detailed updated list of the work including seventy one copies has been reported in the appendix. On the basis of the current study, it’s essential to establish a critical edition of the work as well as avoiding the previous errors both in content and in methodologyالمبدأ والمعاد یکی از کتابهای فلسفی ابنسینا است که بسیاری از مسائل مهم الهیّات و طبیعیّات در آن تبیین شده و اندیشمندان بعدی نظیر فخرالدین رازی، شهاب الدین سهروردی و نصیرالدین طوسی به این کتاب استناد کردهاند. با آنکه این کتاب، مشابهتهایی با سایر آثار ابنسینا به ویژه کتاب النجاة دارد، دارای مطالب متفاوت در مباحثی مانند ادراک معقولات، حرکت، افلاک و نفس است که از نظر تطوّر مسائل فلسفی اهمیت دارد. از سال 1332 تا 1400 چهار اثر در خصوص این کتاب منتشر شده که دو اثر، شامل متن اصلی و دو اثر دیگر، ترجمه فارسی و فرانسوی متن است. در این مقاله، ضمن معرّفی اجمالی این کتاب و ارزیابی پژوهشهای انجام گرفته درباره آن، با بررسی دقیق فهرستهای ارائه شده از نسخههای این اثر و همچنین تهیّه و ملاحظه پنجاه نسخه خطّی از آن، فهرست کاملتری ارائه شده که شامل هفتاد و یک نسخه خطّی از این اثر است. با توجّه به اطّلاعات جدید نسخهشناسی و همچنین وجود اشکالات روشی و محتوایی و نیز نقصان فراوان از جهت نسخهشناسی در پژوهشهای پیشین، به نظر میرسد تصحیح انتقادی این کتاب برای ارائه متنی منقّح و مورد اعتماد از آن با رعایت اصول و قواعد علمی، امری ضروری است.http://www.javidankherad.ir/article_146135_cc45c365c418556edd49c7cf1b4fd645.pdf