مؤسسه پژوهشی حکمت و فلسفه ایران جاویدان خرد 2251-8932 22 1 2025 05 22 Universal and Particular in Proclus: An Analysis Based on The Elements of Theology کلی و جزئی در فلسفۀ پروکلوس بر اساس کتاب اصول الهیات 7 28 234523 10.22034/iw.2025.521182.1839 FA امیرحسین ساکت عضو هیئت علمی گروه فلسفۀ دانشگاه شهید بهشتی 0000-0002-9814-5069 Journal Article 2025 05 06 Proclus broadly uses the terms "universal" and "particular" as well as "whole" and "part" almost interchangeably, without making a clear distinction based on their fundamental meanings. "Universal" (καθόλου) and "particular" (κατὰ μέρος) are derived from "whole" (ὅλον) and "part," (μέρος) but they are used independently of those terms in meaning. The meanings of "whole" and "part" are quite obvious and well-defined: a "whole" is something composed of parts, while a "part" is something that, when combined with other parts, forms a whole. The terms "universal" and "particular," however, have two different common meanings. In the first sense, "universal" refers to a term or concept like "human" that can be applied to more than one individual, as opposed to a "particular" which applies only to a single individual, such as "Socrates." In the second sense, "universal" is a broader concept that includes other concepts, and, conversely, "particular" is a narrower concept within "universal." For example, "animal" is a universal with respect to "human," and "human" is a particular within the broader concept of "animal." Initially, it might seem that there is no direct connection or correlation between "whole" and "part" and "universal" and "particular" in any of the meanings mentioned above. However, there may be some relationship between them. Generally, it is believed that "universal" and "particular" relate to concepts, while "whole" and "part" pertain to physical objects. Today, we often use "universal" and "particular" to compare two concepts and in relation to their instances. Among these two, a "universal" is a term that applies to all instances of a concept, whereas a "particular" applies only to some instances of that concept. For example, "animal" is a universal, and "human" is a particular, since "animal" applies to all instances of "human," but "human" does not apply to all instances of "animal." Nonetheless, the relationship between instances of "human" and "animal" is one of whole and part, because a collection of animals forms a whole that is larger than and includes the collection of humans. In other words, the set of humans is a part of the broader set of animals, which, combined with other species, makes up the entire collection of animals. Based on this, perhaps, in the next stage, the relationship between "animal" and "human" could be viewed purely as whole and part, disregarding their instances — meaning that "animal" could be considered a whole, with "human" and other species as parts within it. It’s important to note that this is, in fact, a kind of analogy; the relationship between concepts is not literally one of part and whole. It’s possible that the reason behind the names "universal" and "particular" and their derivation from "whole" and "part" is precisely this — i.e., the idea that a concept containing other concepts has been likened to a whole, with those concepts as its parts, thus earning the names. It seems that Proclus also regards "whole" and "universal" as nearly synonymous and often uses the term "wholeness" (ὁλότης) to refer to both meanings. He employs these terms in relation to principles and forms. He considers principles to be universal and particular because, at their core, these principles are a series of concepts with varying degrees of universality, where each level is more universal than the lower level and more particular than the higher level. For example, "unit" is a more universal concept than "being," and "being" is more universal than "life." Conversely, "life" is particular relative to "being," and "being" is particular relative to "unit." He also views each of these concepts as a whole composed of parts, considering them as whole or parts in relation to each other. For instance, "being" already includes "life" and "intellect," and can be seen as a whole constructed from these parts. For this reason, even when "life" and " intellect" appear as independent principles at lower levels, it can still be said that "being" is a whole relative to them, and they are parts relative to "being." On the other hand, Proclus considers these concepts as a hierarchy of causes, where each level is the cause of the lower levels and the effect of the higher levels. In this view, all four terms are generalized to causes, which are also called whole and universal, as well as parts and particulars. Although these terms are originally characteristics of concepts, applying them to natural or metaphysical causes seems unwarranted. Thus, each cause is considered universal relative to its subsequent causes—its effects—and particular relative to its higher causes—its own causes. As a result of this generalization, each cause is a whole composed of parts, which are, in fact, its effects. پروکلوس اصطلاحات «کل»و «کلی»و نیز «جزء»و «جزئی»را تقریباً به یک معنا و ملازم یکدیگر به کار میبرد و هریک از مبادی را کل و کلی یا جزء وجزئی میخواند. علت آن است که هریک از این مبادی در واقع یک مفهوم است که نسبت به مفاهیم پایینی کلی و نسبت به مفاهیم بالایی جزئی است. پروکلوس رابطۀ کلی و جزئی را همان رابطۀ کل وجزء میداند و از این رو هریک از این مفاهیم کلی را یک کل و مفاهیم جزئی را اجزاء آن میشمارد. درنتیجه در نظر او هریک از مبادی نسبت به مبادی پایینتر کل و کلی و نسبت به مبادی بالاتر جزء وجزئی است. ازآنجا که این مفاهیم در عین حال سلسله‌ای از علل است، پروکلوس این اصطلاحات را به این علل نیز تعمیم میدهد و هریک از این علل را نسبت به معلولهای خود کل و کلی و نسبت به علل خود جزء و جزئی میخواند.

http://www.javidankherad.ir/article_234523_53d02930353c523d13db490fe7d391f8.pdf

مؤسسه پژوهشی حکمت و فلسفه ایران جاویدان خرد 2251-8932 22 1 2025 05 22 A Comparative Study of Suhrawardi’s Methodology in His Illuminationist Philosophy and Intuitionistic Logic مقایسه روش‌شناسی فلسفه اشراق با منطق شهودگرا 29 54 235935 10.22034/iw.2025.544876.1847 FA محمد شفیعی دکترای فلسفه از دانشگاه پانتئون-سوربن 0000-0002-4604-8793 Journal Article 2025 09 05 In this article, we aim to shed new light on the methodology of Illuminationist philosophy, focusing on some of the principles and rules that are specific to this school of thought. Suhrawardi (1154–1191) dedicates the first part of his Hikmat al-Ishraq to logic, offering innovative discussions that challenge certain tenets of traditional logic. In the other sections of this book and in some of his illuminationistic writings, he introduces principles and rules that could be considered relevant to logic. The main root of the differences with traditional logic lies in Suhrawardi’s methodology, which we will argue is essentially different from that of the Peripatetic school. In this paper, we discuss that Suhrawardi developed a subjectivist philosophy, which we will characterize as radical rationalism. Suhrawardi’s specific arguments in his illuminationist philosophy align with a logic that supports this subjectivist approach. In this regard, we observe interesting similarities with intuitionist logic and its philosophical foundations, particularly the anti-realist view of logic. The structure of the paper is as follows: In the first half of the paper, we discuss the thesis that both aforementioned views are based on a subjectivist approach. In the second half, we will analyze some of the most significant of the similarities between the two on a case-by-case basis. Section 1 highlights the methodological originality of illuminationism, emphasizing that it is a rationalist and subjectivist philosophy. This makes it radically different from the common philosophical tradition of the time, although Suhrawardi’s approach is not without predecessors. Some commentators see illuminationism’s differentia in its mystical orientation. Therefore, our discussion of the methodological priority of consciousness in illuminationism, in accordance with a new trend in Suhrawardi scholarship, is to contribute to debates on the proper interpretation of Suhrawardi’s work. The focus of our discussion is on the implications of the aforementioned approach for epistemology and, consequently, the status of logic. Section 2 begins with a brief introduction to intuitionism. I then discuss the philosophical foundations of this approach, developing an interpretation that demonstrates how the formal differences between intuitionistic and classical logic reflect certain philosophical and epistemological characteristics. This demonstrates the proper sense of anti-realism attributed to intuitionism. Understood as a methodological orientation, this anti-realism is clearly akin to Suhrawardi’s philosophy of consciousness. In section 3, I list some of the specific rules and logical remarks of illuminationism, and then in the following section, on the basis of the foundational affinities discussed, I compare them with their counterparts in intuitionistic logic. The issues raised and discussed in this article are as follows: 1- 'knowledge by presence' in illuminationism corresponds to 'intuition' in Brouwer's intuitionist philosophy. Also, logic is related to acquired science and has no application in presential knowledge, just as according to Brouwer's view, primary intuition is speechless, and mathematics, as a science built from intuition, is independent of logic. 2- The concept of 'rational i’tibar' in Suhrawardi's view, which concerns philosophical concepts such as existence, unity, possibility, attributes and numbers, is similar to the concept of 'transcendental' in the Kantian or, more precisely, Husserlian sense. For Suhrawardi, categories’ being i’tibar-i aqli also indicates that the mind (aql) is active in articulating objects, just as Brouwer considers the “creating subject” to be constructive, not merely a discoverer (of mathematics, in particular). 3- The peripatetic theory of definition is based on the idea that meanings in the external world are composed of genus and species that exist independently of the mind. This view is akin to the image theory of meaning and is based on a methodological realism. Suhrawardi's denial of the peripatetic theory of definition, that they are essentially combination of genus and species, is akin to anti-realism as in Brouwer's intuitionism. 4. Suhrawardi's considerations in the field of logic may be related to the use of logic in the Illuminationist approach, rather than to the formal structure of logic, which in the latter case, as some contemporary logicians have shown, would present problems. These considerations would be similar to those that exist in intuitionism regarding the use of existential propositions or negative propositions, without the aforementioned considerations demandig the elimination of these propositional forms from the formal structure of logic. This approach is consistent with the general view of Illuminationist philosophy as well as intuitionism in restricting the dominion of formal logic. سهروردی ابتدای کتاب حکمه الاشراق خویش را به مباحث منطقی اختصاص می‌دهد و در آنجا به نوآوری‌هایی در مسائل منطقی دست زده و برخی دیدگاه منطق سنتی را به چالش می‌کشد. همچنین در بخش‌های دیگری از حکمه الاشراق و نیز در دیگر آثار اشراقی‌این فیلسوف قواعد و اصولی مطرح می‌شوند که به نحوی از انحاء به علم منطق مربوط می‌شوند. در‌این مقاله در پی آشکارسازی بصیرت‌های تازه‌ای در مورد برخی از‌این اصول و قواعد با تحلیل آنها در زمینه کلی روش شناسی فلسفه اشراق هستیم. در‌این راستا مشابهت‌های جالب توجهی با منطق شهودگرا، و مبانی فلسفی آن به خصوص دیدگاه پادواقع‌گرایانه به منطق مشاهده می‌شود. مقابله‌این نظریات معاصر با منطق مفروض در پس استدلال‌های اشراقی سهروردی نکات فلسفی مهمی را از هر دو طرف آشکار می‌کند.بعد از بحثی درباره اینکه فلسفه اشراق و همینطور شهودگرایی مبتنی بر روشی سوبژکتیویستی هستند به تحلیل مورد به مورد شباهت های مذکور می پردازیم.

http://www.javidankherad.ir/article_235935_c2e8e8eb242bf94c40b74068f42a8762.pdf

مؤسسه پژوهشی حکمت و فلسفه ایران جاویدان خرد 2251-8932 22 1 2025 05 22 Is Logical Contextualism a Serious Challenge for Logical Monism? آیا زمینه‌گرایی منطقی چالشی جدّی برای وحدت‌گرایی منطقی است؟ 55 80 242178 10.22034/iw.2026.576805.1878 FA حمید علایی نژاد استادیار منطق، گروه منطق، مؤسّسۀ پژوهشی حکمت و فلسفۀ ایران، تهران، ایران 0000-0002-7003-7015 Journal Article 2026 02 19 1. Introduction According to contextualism, the correctness of a logical system depends on the context in which it is employed; validity is not absolute but context-relative. Contextualists maintain that this approach enables them to respond to two major objections facing pluralism: the collapse argument and the meaning-variance objection. 2. Logical Contextualism Logical contextualism maintains that a given argument may be valid in one context and invalid in another. Consequently, the correctness of a logical system depends on the context of application. This view has been developed in different forms by philosophers such as Stewart Shapiro and Colin Caret. On Caret’s formulation, validity contains a parameter for a deductive standard determined by context. Each context fixes its own inferential standard, and the extension of the concept of validity varies accordingly. 3. The Collapse Argument The collapse argument was originally raised against the influential pluralism of Jc Beall and Greg Restall. Their pluralism accepts multiple correct logics, each satisfying three admissibility conditions: necessity, normativity, and formality. Adopting a generalized Tarskian account of logical consequence, they argue that different legitimate precisifications of “cases” yield different correct consequence relations. Critics such as Graham Priest contend that the normativity of logic undermines pluralism. If a logic is normative—if one must accept its consequences upon accepting its premises—then in situations of conflict one must defer to the strongest logic. Since classical logic validates all inferences validated by intuitionistic or relevant logic, its normativity effectively overrides the others, collapsing pluralism into monism. Contextualism proposes a solution: normativity itself is context-relative. The obligation to accept a conclusion arises only within the context governed by a particular inferential standard. Once normativity is relativized, the collapse is avoided, since no single logic imposes universal normative force across contexts. 4. The Meaning-Variance Objection The meaning-variance objection claims that pluralism entails that logical constants have different meanings in different logical systems. Drawing on ideas associated with Quine, critics argue that if the meanings of logical constants vary, disagreements between logics reduce to merely verbal disputes. Contextualists respond by distinguishing between meaning and extension. Logical constants retain stable meanings, but their inferential behavior depends on contextual parameters. On this view, differences between classical and intuitionistic negation, for example, arise not from semantic ambiguity but from differing contextual standards. Thus, contextualism attempts to preserve genuine disagreement while avoiding semantic relativism. 5. Assessment of Contextualism 5.1 Three Senses of “Correct Logic” To assess whether contextualism constitutes an acceptable pluralism, the notion of a “correct logic” must be clarified. We can distinguishes three senses of logic: 1. Pure logic: a formal system ⟨L, ⊨⟩. Correctness here is purely structural (e.g., consistency, non-triviality). 2. Applied logic: a deductive theory intended to model reasoning in a specific domain. Here, correctness is relative to the domain modeled. 3. A theory of logical consequence itself: logic as an account of extra-systematic or absolute validity. Global monism claims that there is exactly one correct theory of logical consequence. 5.2 Contextualism and Monism This tripartite distinction reveals that debates between monism and pluralism often equivocate between different senses of correctness. Against local monism, contextualism would need to show that more than one logic is correct within a single context. Yet no existing formulation of contextualism makes such a claim. By definition, each context determines a unique inferential standard. Even when assessment-sensitivity is invoked, a shift in standards entails a shift in context. Thus, contextualism is compatible with local monism. Against global monism, contextualism would need to claim either that multiple theories correctly capture logical consequence itself or that none does. But contextualism does neither. It denies that there is a single context-independent standard, yet this does not exclude the possibility of a globally correct theory of consequence in the absolute sense. Since contextual correctness is context-indexed, it does not compete with global correctness understood univocally. Therefore, contextualism neither refutes local monism nor contradicts global monism. It operates at a different level of analysis, rendering its apparent pluralism weaker than advertised. 5.3 Further Difficulties Additional challenges confront contextualism: the problem of mixed domains, the charge of ad hoc maneuvering, the indeterminacy of context individuation, and the lack of explanation regarding how contexts determine logical standards. While none of these objections is decisive on its own, together they underscore the theoretical incompleteness of contextualism. 6. Conclusion Logical contextualism offers an elegant strategy for avoiding the collapse argument and the meaning-variance objection. By relativizing normativity and distinguishing meaning from contextual parameters, it appears to secure a defensible pluralist position. However, once the notion of “correct logic” is carefully disambiguated, contextualism fails to provide a substantive alternative to either local or global monism. Its pluralism does not constitute a genuine challenge to monism. In this respect, logical contextualism falls short of being serious challenge for logical monism. بر اساس زمینه‌گرایی منطقی، بیش از یک منطقِ درست وجود دارد که هر یک در زمینۀ خاصّ خود اعتبار استدلال‌ها را به‌درستی ارزیابی می‌کند. زمینه‌گرایان مدّعی‌اند که این رویکرد می‌تواند به دو چالش اساسیِ پیش‌روی بسیاری از انواع کثرت‌گرایی منطقی پاسخ دهد: نخست، استدلال فروپاشی که بر اساس آن پذیرش هنجارمندی منطق، کثرت‌گرایی را به وحدت‌گرایی فرو می‌کاهد؛ و دوم، اشکال تغایر معنایی که مطابق آن، کثرت‌گرایی منطقی مستلزم پذیرش تفاوت در معنای ادوات منطقی در نظام‌های گوناگون و در نتیجه فروکاستن اختلاف میان آن‌ها به نزاعی لفظی است. در این مقاله، با پذیرش پاسخ زمینه‌گرایی به این دو اشکال، می‌کوشیم نشان دهیم که زمینه‌گرایی منطقی همچنان نمی‌تواند چالشی جدّی برای وحدت‌گرایی منطقی به‌شمار آید. بدین منظور، با تفکیک میان وحدت‌گرایی موضعی و وحدت‌گرایی فراگیر، استدلال می‌کنیم که زمینه‌گرایی نه می‌تواند مدّعی وجود بیش از یک منطق درست در یک زمینۀ واحد باشد و بدین‌ترتیب مدّعای وحدت‌گرایی موضعی را نقض کند؛ و نه قادر است با ادّعای نبودِ منطق درست یا وجود بیش از یک منطق درست برای رابطۀ پیامد منطقی، وحدت‌گرایی فراگیر را ابطال نماید. افزون بر این، ملاحظات انتقادی دیگری نیز وجود دارد که پذیرش زمینه‌گرایی منطقی را به‌عنوان صورتی موجّه از کثرت‌گرایی منطقی با دشواری مواجه می‌سازد.

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مؤسسه پژوهشی حکمت و فلسفه ایران جاویدان خرد 2251-8932 22 1 2025 05 22 Poetics of Avicenna’s Cure: A Critical Evaluation of Its Editions ارزیابی تصحیح‌های «فن شعر» الشفاء 81 109 234522 10.22034/iw.2025.547626.1848 FA هادی ربیعی استادیار گروه فلسفه هنر، دانشکده علوم نظری و مطالعات عالی هنر، دانشگاه هنرایران، تهران، ایران. 0000-0001-5293-9376 Journal Article 2025 09 17 Badawī published two critical editions of Poetics of Avicenna’s Cure. Both editions have served as foundational sources for translations and scholarly studies. Prior to him, Margoliouth had also produced an edition. This study asks: how reliable are these editions, both textually and codicologically, and is there a need for a new critical edition? To address these questions, the two editions are compared in order to assess their textual accuracy. In addition, the earliest surviving manuscripts of the treatise, as well as those used as the basis of the editions, are analyzed. The findings show that Badawī’s first edition suffers from fewer shortcomings than his later one, though it is heavily dependent on Margoliouth’s work. Given the textual and codicological deficiencies of all three editions, and in light of earlier and more reliable manuscripts identified in this study, the preparation of a new critical edition of the treatise proves necessary. عبدالرحمن بدوی دو تصحیح از فن الشعر کتاب الشفاء ابن سینا منتشر کرده که هر دو منبعی برای ترجمه‌ها و آثار پژوهشی متعددی بوده‌اند. مارگولیوث نیز پیش از او تصحیحی نگاشته است. این تصحیح‌ها تا چه اندازه از لحاظ محتوایی و نسخه‌شناختی معتبرند؟ و آیا ضرورتی برای تدوین تصحیحی جدید وجود دارد؟ برای پاسخ به این پرسش‌ها، با مقایسه این دو تصحیح، میزان صحت محتوای آنها سنجیده می‌شود. همچنین، نسخه‌های خطی اقدم این رساله و نسخ اساس این دو تصحیح معرفی و بررسی می‌شود. نتایج این پژوهش حاکی از آن است که نخستین تصحیح بدوی از کاستی‌های کمتری نسبت به تصحیح بعدی او برخوردار است. هرچند، به‌طور قابل توجهی زیادی بر تصحیح مارگولیوث تکیه دارد. با توجه به اشکالات محتوایی و نسخه‌شناختی هر سه تصحیح و در نظرگرفتن نسخه‌های خطی اقدم و اصحّی که در این پژوهش برشمرده می‌شود، نگارش تصحیح جدیدی از این رساله ضروری به نظر می‌رسد.

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مؤسسه پژوهشی حکمت و فلسفه ایران جاویدان خرد 2251-8932 22 1 2025 05 22 Three Civilization-Building Kings in Avestā and Shāhnāmeh سه شهریار تمدّن‌آفرین در اوستا و شاهنامه 110 137 241836 10.22034/iw.2024.467640.1798 FA زهرا زارع استادیار پژوهشکدۀ مردم‌شناسی، پژوهشگاه میراث فرهنگی و گردشگری، تهران، ایران 0009-0008-7201-5646 بابک عالیخانی دانشیار گروه ادیان و عرفان. موسسه پژوهشی حکمت و فلسفه ایران Journal Article 2024 07 13 The three civilization-building kings mentioned in the Shāhnāmeh, also described as the first kings in the Zāmyād Yasht of the Avesta, are Hushang, Tahmureth, and Jamshid. These three kings are considered the embodiment of the creative power of God Almighty, and they embark on a process of innovation and invention in six stages, and then in the seventh stage, they undertake a task more wondrous than any other. In Zoroastrian doctrine, the six creations of Ahura Mazda are, in order: the stony or metallic sky, water, earth, plants, animals, and humans. Especially Hushang, in his constructive works, followed precisely this divine plan and model. This article seeks to explain the correspondence between the three aspects of Ahura Mazda -that is "Zamān", "Den", and "Gāh"- and the attributes and works of the three culture heroes. سه شهریار تمدّن‌آفرین مذکور در شاهنامه که به مثابۀ نخستین شهریاران در زامیادیشت اوستا توصیف شده‌اند، هوشنگ و طهمورث و جمشید نام دارند که مظهر آفرینندگی و خلّاقیت خدای تعالی به شمار می‌روند. این سه شهریار فرهمند، همانند خالق جهان هستی، در شش مرحله به ابداع و نوآوری دست می‌یازند، و سپس در مرحۀ هفتم به کاری شگفت‌تر از شگفت می‌پردازند که نقطۀ اوج کارهای ششگانۀ پیشین آنان است. این نوشتار بر آن است تا بر پایۀ روش اشراقی به شرح تناظر موجود در میان سه شأن یا وصف داداراورمزد -یعنی«گاه» و «دین» و «زمان»- با اوصاف و احوال آن سه شهریار بپردازد.

http://www.javidankherad.ir/article_241836_df09b5f698d50d3020b9a920f867e289.pdf

مؤسسه پژوهشی حکمت و فلسفه ایران جاویدان خرد 2251-8932 22 1 2025 05 22 From Natural Structure to Moral Exemplar: A Critical Analysis of the Virtue Theories of Foot and Zagzebski از ساختار طبیعی تا الگوی اخلاقی: بررسی نقادانه‌ی نظریه‌ی فضیلت فوت و زگزبسکی 138 165 234606 10.22034/iw.2025.549017.1849 FA امیرحسین خداپرست استادیار مؤسسه‌ی پژوهشی جکمت و فلسفه‌ی ایران Journal Article 2025 09 30 Virtue ethics, one of the three principal traditions of normative ethical theory alongside consequentialism and deontology, experienced a significant revival in the twentieth century, particularly through the seminal contributions of Philippa Foot and Linda Zagzebski. Their theories represent two of the most influential and philosophically sophisticated attempts to reinterpret and rearticulate virtue ethics within a contemporary framework. Both thinkers draw extensively on Aristotelian thought, yet they diverge markedly in foundational assumptions, methodological strategies, and conceptions of normativity. Together, their approaches illuminate central debates in modern ethical theory, including the grounding of moral obligation, the relationship between moral cognition and motivation, the nature of moral judgment, and the interplay between reason and affect in ethical deliberation. Philippa Foot advances a naturalistic and teleologically informed account of virtue ethics, situating moral evaluation within the objective conditions necessary for human flourishing. She rejects the notion that virtues are mere social conventions or subjective preferences, arguing instead that they constitute species-relative excellences indispensable to living well as human beings. Drawing on the concept of “Aristotelian necessities,” Foot maintains that just as the flourishing of plants or animals depends upon the proper realization of their characteristic traits and functions, human flourishing requires the cultivation and exercise of dispositions such as justice, temperance, and courage. Central to her framework is practical wisdom (phronesis), which enables the agent to discern the appropriate application of virtues in particular contexts, thereby bridging the descriptive aspects of human life with normative ethical evaluation. In doing so, Foot seeks to overcome the persistent gap between factual understanding and moral prescription, grounding normative claims in the teleological structure of human nature. Linda Zagzebski, by contrast, develops an exemplarist and motivational model of virtue ethics that emphasizes the affective and psychological dimensions of moral life. According to her approach, moral understanding originates not in abstract principles or purely teleological reasoning but in the immediate experience of admiration for morally exemplary individuals. By observing and reflecting upon such exemplars—whose character inspires deep moral respect—we identify the traits that constitute genuine virtue. On this account, virtue is defined not only by the external conformity of action to moral standards but also by the internal quality of motivation, especially the sincere desire to promote the good for its own sake. Moral knowledge and judgment emerge through processes of affective response, imitation, habituation, and careful reflection on exemplars, highlighting the formative role of admiration and the cultivation of moral sensibilities. Despite their shared Aristotelian heritage, Foot and Zagzebski diverge in fundamental ways. Foot’s approach is realist, externalist, and teleological, grounding normativity in the objective requirements of human nature and the conditions for flourishing. Zagzebski’s account, in contrast, is phenomenological, internalist, and motivational, locating normativity in the authority of exemplars and the affective power of moral admiration. Foot emphasizes rationality, natural function, and the continuity between biological and ethical evaluation, whereas Zagzebski foregrounds the emotional, motivational, and psychological dimensions of virtue, stressing character development and the internal cultivation of moral motivation. These differences reflect broader debates within contemporary virtue ethics regarding the relationship between reason and emotion, nature and culture, and objectivity and subjectivity. Comparative analysis further shows how each thinker addresses contemporary challenges confronting virtue ethics, including conceptual circularity, the problem of action guidance, the empirical challenges posed by situationism, the threat of cultural relativism, and the is–ought gap. Foot responds by emphasizing the teleological organization of human nature and the central role of phronesis in mediating between facts and norms. Zagzebski, meanwhile, appeals to the epistemic and motivational authority of exemplars and the educative function of moral admiration, highlighting how virtuous dispositions are formed and sustained in practical life. Taken together, the two approaches suggest not opposition but potential complementarity. Foot’s emphasis on natural teleology and objective normativity provides a firm account of the structural foundations of ethical evaluation, while Zagzebski’s focus on exemplarity, motivation, and moral psychology enriches our understanding of how virtue is perceived, internalized, and enacted. Integrating these insights points toward a two-level model of virtue ethics: one level articulating the objective, species-relative conditions for human flourishing, and a second level elucidating the subjective processes of moral perception, motivation, and character formation. Such a synthesis offers a comprehensive and dynamic conception of virtue, uniting natural and psychological, rational and emotional, and universal and particular dimensions within a coherent and practically relevant ethical framework. نظریه‌ی فضیلت، به منزله‌ی یکی از رویکردهای اصلی در اخلاق هنجاری، در قرن بیستم با آثار فیلسوفانی چون فیلیپا فوت و لیندا زگزبسکی احیا و به بدیلی برای پیامدگرایی و وظیفه‌گرایی بدل شد. فوت، در چارچوبی که می‌توان آن را طبیعی‌گرایی ارسطویی نامید، فضیلت‌ها را نه ساخته‌های ذهنی یا قراردادهای اجتماعی بلکه ویژگی‌هایی آفاقی می‌داند که در جهت تحقق غایت طبیعی و شکوفایی گونه‌ی انسانی عمل می‌کنند. او با ارجاع به مفهوم ضرورت‌های ارسطویی و نقش عقل عملی، استدلال می‌کند که داوری‌های اخلاقی در ساختار طبیعی زندگی انسان ریشه دارند و از شرایطی برمی‌خیزند که امکان شکوفایی حیات انسانی را فراهم می‌کنند. در سوی دیگر، زگزبسکی نظریه‌ای الگومدار و انگیزشی از فضیلت ارائه می‌کند که بر تجربه‌ی زیسته‌ی فاعل اخلاقی، تحسین الگوها و کوشش برای تشبّه به منش آنان متمرکز است. در این چشم‌انداز داوری اخلاقی نه صرفاً محصول استدلال عقلانی یا تحلیل مفهومی بلکه برآمده از واکنش‌های عاطفی و شهودهایی اخلاقی است که در مواجهه با الگوهای تحسین‌برانگیز پدید می‌آیند و راهنمای عمل اخلاقی می‌شوند. به‌رغم این تفاوت‌ها، امکان تلفیق عناصر اساسی این دو رویکرد وجود دارد. پیوند دادن بنیان‌های طبیعی و عقلانی نظریه‌ی فوت با مؤلفه‌های شهودی و الگومدار زگزبسکی می‌تواند زمینه‌ساز شکل‌گیری چشم‌اندازی دو‌سطحی و در اخلاق فضیلت شود که در آن عقل و طبیعت، از یک سو، و شهود و انگیزش، از سوی دیگر، در تبیین و راهبری زندگی اخلاقی نقش اساسی دارند.

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مؤسسه پژوهشی حکمت و فلسفه ایران جاویدان خرد 2251-8932 22 1 2025 05 22 Mulla Sadra and Perennial Philosophy: Gradational Levels of Wisdom خرد جاویدان از منظرملاصدرا: حکمت تشکیکی 166 196 241834 10.22034/iw.2026.528175.1843 FA نفیسه مصطفوی دانشیار دانشکده چندرسانه ای، دانشگاه هنر اسلامی تبریز، تبریز ، ایران 0000-0002-8964-3787 Journal Article 2025 10 04 The strength of Perennial Philosophy in the contemporary world, with its cultural, political, and intellectual tensions, lies in its emphasis on commonalities and its capacity to lay the groundwork for dialogue among nations and religions. This study adopts a comparative-analytical approach to examine the relationship between Mullā Ṣadrā's Transcendent Wisdom (al-Ḥikmah al-Mutaʿāliyah) and this philosophical school. It addresses the critical ambiguity concerning their compatibility and seeks to determine, if they are compatible, the precise position of Ṣadrā’s thought within established Perennialist models. The research therefore answers this core question: What is the precise relationship between Mullā Ṣadrā's philosophical doctrines and both traditional Perennial Philosophy (Ḥikmat al-Khālidah) and its "soft perennialist" variant? Is Ṣadrā's system compatible with the Perennial Philosophy, and if so, which of its specific variants best accommodates his worldview? Based on the research findings, Mullā Ṣadrā recognizes intuitive discovery and rational demonstration as two paths parallel to revelation for attaining truth. Although, in pursuit of uncovering common truths across various traditions, he acknowledges similarities in mystical experiences, he does not overlook the fundamental distinctions between divine and human religions. From his perspective, truth is like a deep sea; individuals from different traditions can retrieve gems from varying depths and find parallels in their spiritual experiences, and these commonalities can serve as the basis for dialogue and interaction. In divine religions, wisdom can be attained through the esoteric dimension of the religious law (sharīʿah); in human religions, through "intellectual liberation" (ḥurriyyah) from false beliefs; and for secular societies, through heightened spiritual intelligence and divine attraction. Based on Mulla Sadra’s ontology, this stance can be characterized as the “gradational levels of wisdom.” The study concludes by clarifying how Mulla Sadra’s framework both diverges from and partially intersects with soft perennialism. نقطه قوت حکمت خالده، در دنیای معاصر با تنش‌های فرهنگی، سیاسی و فکری آن تکیه بر اشتراکات و زمینه‌سازی برای گفتگوی ‌فرهنگی ملت‌ها و ادیان است. اما این رویکرد دارای خوانشهای متفاوتی است. در این میان، نسبت‌سنجی حکمت متعالیه ملاصدرا با این نظریه، مسئله‌ای است که این پژوهش با روش تحلیلی-تطبیقی به آن می‌پردازد. تعیین جایگاه دقیق آن در میان مدل‌های حکمت خالده خلأیی است که این تحقیق در صدد پر کردن است. بنابراین پرسش اصلی تحقیق عبارت است از اینکه نسبت آرای ملاصدرا با اقسام حکمت خالده و پرنیالیزم نرم چیست؟ یافته‌های تحقیق نشان می‌دهد که ملاصدرا کشف شهودی و برهان عقلی را به عنوان دو مسیر موازی با وحی برای دستیابی به حقیقت به رسمیت می‌شناسد. اگرچه او با هدف کشف حقایق مشترک، مشابهات موجود در تجارب عرفانی را می‌پذیرد، اما تمایزات بنیادین میان ادیان الهی و بشری را نادیده نمی‌گیرد. از منظر او، حقیقت همچون دریایی عمیق است که افراد از سنتهای گوناگون می‌توانند گوهرهایی را از اعماق متفاوت صید و مشابهت هایی را در تجارب معنوی خود بیابند و همین اشتراکات موضوع گفتگو و تعامل باشد. در ادیان الهی از باطن شریعت و در ادیان بشری، با «حریت» از عقاید باطل و برای جوامع سکولار با هوش معنوی بالا و جذبه الهی می‌توان به حکمت دست یافت. این موضعگیری را براساس وجودشناسی صدرایی، می‌توان «حکمت تشکیکی» نامید. در این تحقیق تفاوتهای رویکرد ملاصدرا با پرنیالیزم نرم بیان شد.

http://www.javidankherad.ir/article_241834_6838a3ddd7e60076c57fbf94039160a9.pdf

مؤسسه پژوهشی حکمت و فلسفه ایران جاویدان خرد 2251-8932 22 1 2025 05 22 The evolution of the ontology of perceptual states in Islamic philosophy تطور هستی شناسی حالات ادراکی در فلسفه اسلامی 197 212 242364 10.22034/iw.2026.565942.1866 FA فائزه بنی خزاعی دانشجوی دکتری فلسفه و حکمت اسلامی موسسه پژوهشی حکمت و فلسفه ایران 0009-0000-0515-1869 مهدی ساعتچی استادیار فلسفه دانشگاه شهید مطهری تهران. ایران. 0000-0003-0485-7434 Journal Article 2025 12 13 In Islamic philosophical tradition prior to the modern period, epistemological discussions were not treated separately from metaphysical inquiries. This reality highlights the necessity of research and extraction of Islamic philosophers’ views on epistemology and its relationship with their ontological stances. Accordingly, this research, driven by the concern to understand the historical development of the ontology of cognitive states in the Islamic philosophical tradition, examines various dimensions of the problem of the existential reality of perceptions and its evolution in the thought of three foundational philosophers: Ibn Sīnā, Suhrawardī, and Mullā Ṣadrā. To this end, by situating a phenomenological analysis of cognition within the framework of each philosopher’s metaphysical system, their conception of the cognitive subject and the foundation of their epistemological system is inferred. Since in Islamic philosophy epistemology is grounded in ontology, evolution in the ontology of cognitive states occurs when a philosopher establishes a fundamental difference from his predecessors concerning the existential grounds and phenomenological characteristics of perception. Such shifts in principles and characteristics lead to transformations in explaining the cognitive process and the nature of the subject. Ibn Sīnā is an essentialist, advocating the necessity of a generic unity between the perceiver and the perceived. Suhrawardī, moving beyond essentialism and the necessity of generic unity, introduces the notion of the ishrāqī relation . Mullā Ṣadrā, based on his novel principles, offers a fresh reading of essentialism and generic unity. The soul (nafs) is consistently the perceiver, yet it is explained diversely: from an Avicennan perspective, the soul is like a mirror for the manifestation of cognitive states; from Suhrawardī’s viewpoint, the soul is akin to vision, possessing an eye-like identity that observes the worlds; and in accordance with Ṣadr al-Muta’allihīn’s thought, the soul is a re-creator, reconstructing the external world within the inner world. In Islamic philosophical tradition prior to the modern period, epistemological discussions were not treated separately from metaphysical inquiries. This reality highlights the necessity of research and extraction of Islamic philosophers’ views on epistemology and its relationship with their ontological stances. Accordingly, this research, driven by the concern to understand the historical development of the ontology of cognitive states in the Islamic philosophical tradition, examines various dimensions of the problem of the existential reality of perceptions and its evolution in the thought of three foundational philosophers: Ibn Sīnā, Suhrawardī, and Mullā Ṣadrā. To this end, by situating a phenomenological analysis of cognition within the framework of each philosopher’s metaphysical system, their conception of the cognitive subject and the foundation of their epistemological system is inferred. Since in Islamic philosophy epistemology is grounded in ontology, evolution in the ontology of cognitive states occurs when a philosopher establishes a fundamental difference from his predecessors concerning the existential grounds and phenomenological characteristics of perception. Such shifts in principles and characteristics lead to transformations in explaining the cognitive process and the nature of the subject. Ibn Sīnā is an essentialist, advocating the necessity of a generic unity between the perceiver and the perceived. Suhrawardī, moving beyond essentialism and the necessity of generic unity, introduces the notion of the ishrāqī relation . Mullā Ṣadrā, based on his novel principles, offers a fresh reading of essentialism and generic unity. The soul (nafs) is consistently the perceiver, yet it is explained diversely: from an Avicennan perspective, the soul is like a mirror for the manifestation of cognitive states; from Suhrawardī’s viewpoint, the soul is akin to vision, possessing an eye-like identity that observes the worlds; and in accordance with Ṣadr al-Muta’allihīn’s thought, the soul is a re-creator, reconstructing the external world within the inner world. Ibn Sīnā is an essentialist, advocating the necessity of a generic unity between the perceiver and the perceived. Suhrawardī, moving beyond essentialism and the necessity of generic unity, introduces the notion of the ishrāqī relation . Mullā Ṣadrā, based on his novel principles, offers a fresh reading of essentialism and generic unity. The soul (nafs) is consistently the perceiver, yet it is explained diversely: from an Avicennan perspective, the soul is like a mirror for the manifestation of cognitive states; from Suhrawardī’s viewpoint, the soul is akin to vision, possessing an eye-like identity that observes the worlds; and in accordance with Ṣadr al-Muta’allihīn’s thought, the soul is a re-creator, reconstructing the external world within the inner world. مباحث معرفت‌شناسی در سنت فلسفه اسلامی پیش از دوره معاصر مجزا از مباحث مابعدالطبیعی مطرح نشده است و همین امر ضرورت پژوهش و استخراج آراء فیلسوفان اسلامی در مباحث معرفت‌شناسی و نسبت آن با آراء هستی‌شناختی ایشان را گوشزد می‌کند. بر این اساس پژوهش پیش‌رو با دغدغه‌ی فهم سیر تطور هستی‌شناسی حالات ادراکی در سنت فلسفه اسلامی، به بررسی ابعاد مختلف مسئله هستی‌مندی ادراکات و سیر تحول آن، در آراء سه فیلسوف مکتب‌ساز، ابن‌سینا، سهروردی و ملاصدار می‌پردازد. بدین منظور با قرارگیری تحلیل پدیداری ادراک در چارچوب نظام متافیزیکی فیلسوف تصویر او از مدرِک و مبنای نظام معرفتی‌اش استنباط می‌شود. از آنجا که در فلسفه اسلامی، معرفت‌شناسی مبتنی بر هستی‌شناسی است، تطور هستی‌شناسی حالات ادراکی، آنجا رخ می‌دهد که فیلسوف، اختلافی مبنایی در مبانی هستی‌مندی و شاخصه‌های پدیدار ادراک با آراء فیلسوف پیش از خود پیدا می‌کند و تحول در اصول و شاخصه‌ها منجر به تحول در تبیین فرایند ادراک و مدرِک می‌شود. ابن‌سینا ذات‌گرا و قائل به ضرورت وحدت سنخی میان مدرِک و مدرَک است. سهروردی با عبور از ذات‌گرایی و ضرورت وحدت سنخی میان مدرِک و مدرَک، اضافه اشراقیه را مطرح می‌کند. ملاصدرا با مبانی نوین خود به خوانش تازه‌ای از ذات‌گرایی و وحدت سنخی می‌پردازد. نفس همواره مدرک است، اما تبیین‌های گوناگون می‌یابد؛ در نگاه سینوی، نفس به مثابه آینه‌ای برای تمثل حالات ادراکی است؛ از منظر سهروردی، نفس همچون بصر است و هویتی چشم‌گونه دارد که به مشاهده عوالم می‌پردازد. منطبق با آراء صدرالمتالهین، نفس بازآفریننده‌ای است که به بازسازی جهان بیرون در جهان درون می‌پردازد.

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مؤسسه پژوهشی حکمت و فلسفه ایران جاویدان خرد 2251-8932 22 1 2025 05 22 Examining Mir Dāmād’s Arguments on the Objectivity of Things بررسی استدلال‌های میرداماد در مورد نحوه عینیت موجودات 213 238 242366 10.22034/iw.2026.562603.1863 FA محمد برومند دانش آموخته کارشناسی ارشد فلسفه دانشکدگان فارابی دانشگاه تهران. قم. ایران. 0009-0005-9496-0313 محمد حسین انصاری دانش آموخته کارشناسی ارشد فلسفه دانشکدگان فارابی دانشگاه تهران. قم. ایران. 0009-0008-5556-5259 مهدی صفائی اصل استادیار فلسفه دانشکدگان فارابی دانشگاه تهران. قم. ایران. 0000-0002-4807-301X Journal Article 2025 11 28 The most fundamental issue in Islamic philosophy—given the breadth of its implications—is the manner in which the objectivity of things is realized. The present study investigates this issue within the philosophical system of Mir Dāmād in order to clarify his position, the criticisms that have been raised against it, and the manner in which he defends his view. Employing a descriptive-analytical method, the study first explicates Mir Dāmād’s thesis and then analyzes his arguments. It demonstrates that by distinguishing between objective being and relational being, he rejects the objectivity of both with respect to the Necessary being as well as possible beings. Mir Dāmād denies the objectivity of objective being on the grounds that it entails both the inversion of predication and the necessitation of all creatures; the former contradicts what is self-evident and leads to sophistry, while the latter conflicts with multiple principles, including the temporal origination and contingency of created beings (Lahiji 2012, 134). In refuting relational being, he points to consequences such as the collapse of simple whetherness, the reduction of concrete reality to a mere concept (Mir Dāmād 1995a, 37), and the resulting infinite regress (Mir Dāmād 2012, 255). His approach to the Necessary being and to possible beings, however, is not uniform. Drawing on the doctrine of the Natural universal, Mir Dāmād affirms the objectivity of quiddity in possible beings (Mir Dāmād 2012, 77), whereas in the Necessary being he denies even the objectivity of quiddity. His arguments for rejecting the objectivity of quiddity in the Necessary being are grounded in certain characteristics of quiddity that cannot be applied to the Necessary being—such as the possibility of multiplicity, the lack of self-individuation, the need for an agent or individuator, and the entailment of contingency. Mir Dāmād regards the essence of the Necessary being as a core unknown, accessible only through demonstrative proof. Neither conceptual knowledge nor intuitive knowledge can grant comprehensive cognition of Him. He considers this view consistent with the teachings reported from the Imams (peace be upon them), who cautioned against both symbolism and agnosticism (Mir Dāmād 1989, 50). The final section reviews several criticisms raised by some of Mir Dāmād’s students and commentators—such as Mullā Ṣadrā and Āghājānī. One major objection concerns the principle of “proportionality” (sanḵiyyat), which is taken to undermine the very foundations of Mir Dāmād’s thesis. Moreover, the rejection of the objectivity of objective being is challenged through both affirmative and negative arguments. The affirmative critique cites various proofs, such as the assertion that all beings exist by “being”—that is, possess being in actuality (Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī 2009, 134; Āghājānī Astarābādī, n.d., 122). The negative critique challenges Mir Dāmād’s claim that the consequence of accepting objective being is the necessitation of all entities, arguing that this conflicts with their essential poverty (Lahiji 2012, 134; Āghājānī Astarābādī, n.d., 123). Regarding relational being, critics argue that if being were identical to the essence of a thing, none of the difficulties Mir Dāmād mentions would arise. In response, Mir Dāmād maintains that the difference between the Necessary being and possible beings can be justified only if their objectivity is not taken to be of a single kind. Thus, the intended meaning of proportionality is similarity in essence and attributes, not identity in objectivity. Moreover, he argues that the realization of possible beings does not require a conditional mode; rather, a mere causative mode suffices. Consequently, one cannot infer the necessity of the realization of being merely by positing a conditioned mode of existence. By critiquing this reasoning and other arguments offered for the necessary realization of existence, Mir Dāmād undermines the foundations of responses that attempted to refute his arguments against relational being, for all such responses presuppose that being is identical to the essence of a thing—an assumption he rejects by denying objective being. Finally, he dismisses the critics’ objections regarding the impossibility of objective being, insisting that poverty cannot be conceived as intrinsic to a thing’s essence; need becomes meaningful only in relation to that which a thing lacks. In this way, Mir Dāmād’s claim regarding the impossibility of the objective realization of existence—whether in its attributed (mawṣūfī) or qualificational (waṣfī) mode—is established and affirmed in an absolute manner with respect to both the Necessary being and contingent beings. با توجه به اینکه مسئله عینیت موجودات (اصالت و اعتباریت) مشخص کننده مصداق حقیقی و بذات موضوع فلسفه است، می‌توان آن را از تاثیرگذار‌ترین مسائل فلسفه‌اسلامی در نظر گرفت. پرسش این پژوهش بررسی این مسئله در فلسفه میرداماد بوده تا روشن شود دیدگاه او در این‌باره چیست و چه نقدهایی بر آن وارد شده و او چگونه به دفاع از خود برآمده است. پژوهش با روش توصیفی‌ـ‌تحلیلی، ابتدا ادعای میرداماد را تبیین کرده و پس از آن استدلال‌های او را بررسی می‌کند و نشان می‌دهد وی ضمن تفکیک میان «وجود موصوفی» و «وجود وصفی»، عینیت هر دو را در «واجب» و «ممکن» مردود می‌داند. میرداماد در نفی عینیت «وجود‌ موصوفی» به سفسطه و واجب ‌بودن همه موجودات تمسک کرده و در نفی «وجود وصفی» به پیامدهایی مانند از بین رفتن «هلیه بسیطه»، مفهومی‌شدن امر عینی و وقوع تسلسل اشاره دارد. البته رویکرد او در باب «واجب» و «ممکن» یکسان نیست؛ میرداماد بر اساس اتحاد «کلی طبیعی» با مصادیق خود قائل به عینیت ماهیت در «ممکنات» شده، اما در «واجب» حتی عینیت «ماهیت» را هم نفی می‌کند. در بخش نهایی به برخی از انتقادات مطرح شده توسط عده‌ای از شاگردان و شارحین میرداماد - مانند ملاصدرا و آقاجانی - پرداخته شده و بر اساس فلسفه وی به آن‌ها پاسخ داده شده است.

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مؤسسه پژوهشی حکمت و فلسفه ایران جاویدان خرد 2251-8932 22 1 2025 05 22 Comparing Avicenna's theory of imitation with the theories of Plato and Aristotle, with an emphasis on solving the new challenges of this theory مقایسه نظریه بازنمایی ابن سینا با نظریه افلاطون و ارسطو با تأکید بر حل چالشهای نوین این نظریه‌ 239 262 242365 10.22034/iw.2026.565482.1865 FA حسین هاشم نژ اد عضو هیأت علمی گروه قرآن و حدیث، دانشکده اندیشه و معارف اسلامی، دانشگاه تهران 0000-0002-7389-3343 Journal Article 2025 12 10 The theory of representation of Plato and Aristotle is the oldest theory in the field of philosophy of art, which had no rival until the nineteenth century. In the 19th century, with the emergence of new styles in painting and sculpture, as well as the emergence of new examples for art, the weaknesses and shortcomings of this theory in explaining these new works became apparent. For example, in the late 19th century and into the 20th century, Cubist, Actionist, and Minimalist painters distanced themselves so much from nature that their paintings eventually became completely unrecognizable. These examples of diverse artworks undermined the theory of representation in art. Also, with the emergence of symphonic music, the question arose as to whether this type of music could be representational. On the other hand, literature, especially the literature of the modern period, has never been able to be analyzed and explained in the framework of representation theory. Because novels are made up of words, and words are not identical or copied versions of their signifiers. Or some types of poetry, such as mystical, lyrical, philosophical, moral, etc., cannot be justified by representation theory. So in the 19th century, the theory of expressionism was first proposed by Leo Tolstoy, ending the twenty-five centuries of dominance of the theory of imitation. Gradually, German Expressionist painters abandoned the attempt to accurately represent the appearances of objects and instead used specific expressive surfaces. Throughout the nineteenth, twentieth, and contemporary centuries, numerous criticisms of the theory of representation have been raised. One of these theories is the theory of formalism, which was presented by thinkers such as Clive Bell, Roger Fry, and Susan Langer. This theory considered the inherent concept of art to be the representation of a form that signifies aesthetic experience, rather than the representation of a form. In this research, after analyzing the theory of representation of Plato and Aristotle and quoting the most important criticisms raised, we have proposed and explained the theory of representation from the perspective of Avicenna. Therefore, the main question of this research is: What is the difference between Avicenna's theory of imitation and Plato's and Aristotle's theory of imitation? The sub-question of this research is: To what extent and how does Avicenna's theory of imitation respond to contemporary criticisms of the theory of imitation? The aim of this research is to demonstrate the fact that Avicenna's representation theory is different and can respond to most of the contemporary challenges and criticisms of the theory of imitation And the secondary goal is to take a small step towards formulating the philosophy of Islamic art or the philosophy of art of Muslim philosophers. The method of this research is comparative analysis. In this method, by describing and analyzing theories and then comparing them in different contexts, the similarities and differences, advantages and disadvantages of theories are discovered. In this method, the goal is to clarify concepts by comparing systems, to resolve theoretical challenges and criticisms raised. According to the findings of this research, Avicenna's theory of representation is different from Plato's and Aristotle's theory of representation, both quantitatively and qualitatively. Avicenna has discussed in more detail the types of representation, its origin and purpose. Avicenna considers representation to be the essence of imagination. Therefore, wherever imagination exist , representation is also present. The power of imagination in the works of Ibn Sina is a power that intervenes in imaginary forms and other forms of mental stock and invents new forms. Therefore, since every work of art is mixed with imagination or imagination is the proximate origin of all works of art, it is better to analyze and explain works of art with Avicenna's theory of representation. Modern and postmodern works of art are not free from imagination, but the presence of imagination is significant in these works. With Avicenna's theory of imitation, it is possible to explain and analyze literature, as well as the various types of music and paintings prevalent in the 20th and contemporary centuries. Because imagination is an ever-present part of all these works of art. The innovation of this research is in explaining and proving the claim that with Avicenna's theory of imaginary and imaginative imitations , it is possible to explain and interpret the works of art of contemporary centuries (modernism and postmodernism) and to provide a logical response to the criticisms raised نظریه بازنمایی افلاطون و ارسطو کهن‌ترین نظریه در عرصه فلسفه هنر است که تا قرن نوزدهم رقیب نداشت. در طول قرن نوزدهم، بیستم و معاصر، نقدهای متعددی به نظریه بازنمایی مطرح شده است. این نقدها در دو دسته کلی جامع افراد و مانع اغیار نبودن این نظریه، قابل دسته بندی‌اند.در این پژوهش بعد از تحلیل نظریه بازنمایی افلاطون و ارسطو و نقل مهمترین نقدهای مطرح شده، به طرح و تبیین نظریه بازنمایی از منظر ابن‌سینا پرداخته‌ایم. هدف این پژوهش نشان دادن این حقیقت است که نظریه بازنمایی ابن سینا متفاوت است و می‌تواند به اکثر چالش‌ها و نقدهای معاصر به نظریه بازنمایی را پاسخ بدهد. روش این تحقیق تحلیلی_تطبیقی است. طبق یافته‌های این پژوهش، نظریه بازنمایی ابن سینا، هم به لحاظ کمّی و هم به لحاظ کیفی، متفاوت از نظریه بازنمایی افلاطون و ارسطوست. ابن‌سینا به طور مبسوط‌تر به اقسام بازنمایی، منشاء و غایت آن پرداخته است. ابن‌سینا بازنمایی را ذاتی خیال و تخیّل می‌داند. بنابراین هرجا خیال و تخیّل هست، بازنمایی هم حضور دارد. ابن سینا بین قوّه خیال و تخیل تفکیک قائل می‌شود. قوه تخیل در آثار ابن سینا قوّه‌ای است که در صور خیالی و دیگر صور مخزون ذهنی، دخل و تصرف می‌کند و صور جدید ابداع می‌نماید. نوآوری این پژوهش از جهت تبیین و اثبات این ادعاست که با نظریه بازنمایی خیالی و تخیلی ابن‌سینا می-توان آثار هنری قرون معاصر(مدرنیسم و پست مدرنیسم) را تبیین و تفسیر کرد و به نقدهای مطرح شده، پاسخ منطقی داد.

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مؤسسه پژوهشی حکمت و فلسفه ایران جاویدان خرد 2251-8932 22 1 2025 05 22 The Possibility of Hierarchical comparison among Philosophical Systems: A Study of the Problem of “Third Matters” in Mullā Ṣadrā’s Philosophy بررسی امکان تطبیق رتبی میان فلسفه ها با تمرکز برمسئله موادث ثلاث در فلسفه ملاصدرا 263 289 242398 10.22034/iw.2026.573991.1874 FA حمیدرضا بیات دانشجوی دکترا دانشکده الهیات و معارف اسلامی دانشگاه قم 0000-0003-0901-8525 مهدی منفرد گروه فلسفه و کلام اسلامی دانشکده الهیات و معارف اسلامی دانشگاه قم 0009-0006-1375-1788 Journal Article 2026 02 05 Thinkers like Corbin argue that the comparative study of philosophies must consider both similarities and differences. Initially, common elements are identified, followed by an exploration of divergences in relation to these shared features. Since all philosophical systems contain universal elements, they can be assessed within a hierarchical framework called “hierarchical comparison” (taṭbīq-i rotbī). This method is not limited to comparison; it also reveals deficiencies in each system and suggests ways to improve them internally. The main criterion for ranking philosophical systems is their “most general conceptual principle,” typically their fundamental conception of existence. Its rank is determined by its “ontological scope,” the range of reality the system can theoretically comprehend. Other conceptual and propositional principles also influence the ranking. Hence, “extent of ontological coverage” becomes the key measure, with broader systems ranked higher. The relationship between higher and lower systems is analogous to that of Environment and enclosed. Hierarchical comparison starts with selecting a specific issue, determining each system’s ontological scope, and establishing their rank, a stage called “external critique.” Comparison then proceeds in two ways: ascending or descending. In the ascending method, analysis begins with the lowest-ranked system. The issue is examined, and logical shortcomings are identified through “internal critique.” During or at the end of this process, the weakness of the system in correctly explaining the issue in question in some areas of reality becomes apparent, and it is shown how this weakness stems from some of the system's conceptual and confirmation principles. By modifying or replacing them, the system rises to a higher rank, repeating this process until the highest system is reached. In the descending method, first, the problem is explained at the highest-ranked system, after which corresponding elements are identified in lower-ranked systems for comparison. Mulla Sadra’s treatment of the “three fundamental categories” (al-mavād ath-thulāth) exemplifies the ascending method. He ranks the systems as follows: the “personal unity of existence” (absolute divided existence) at the highest level, “specific gradation” (absolute existence with degrees) at the intermediate level, and the Peripatetic (Mashāʾī) system (concept of existence) at the lowest rank. Sadra begins using Peripatetic terminology but subjects it to internal critique, reconstructing the concepts of necessity, impossibility, and possibility. Necessity (wujūb) is defined as “existent by itself” (bayn bi-nafsihi), affirming existence and correcting logical inconsistencies in the Peripatetic framework. External critique reveals the Peripatetic system’s ontological limitations due to its emphasis on conceptual spaces and essences (māhiyāt). Its threefold division fails to explain the actual existence of the Necessary Being. Sadra replaces these principles with the conceptual principle of “existential truth” and the propositional principle of “primacy of existence in the external world.” The Necessary Being is an entity whose existence derives from its essence, whereas possible beings require something else for realization. This shift from conceptual space to external reality forms the basis of Sadra’s reconstruction and the correct explanation of existence. After analyzing the Peripatetic system and confirming specific gradation, Sadra establishes the “personal unity of existence.” Here, essences are realized through the unfolding of existential truth. Specific gradation acknowledges multiplicity across levels of existence, but personal unity of existence negates external multiplicity, treating all reality as a single being. Possible entities, attributes, and manifestations are aspects of this one being. In the descending method, beings and their multiplicity are compared across the three systems. In the personal unity of existence, the primary principle is “absolute, undivided, unconditional existence,” which is limitless; reality consists of only one being. Multiplicity is explained via “aspect” (shan) and “essential connection” (‘ayn al-rabṭ), showing beings as relational manifestations of the single truth. Variations among beings reflect differences in intensity and weakness in “aspect-being,” arising from successive impositions of limitations. In specific gradation, the principle is “absolute, unconditional existence with degrees.” Its propositional principle, the primacy of existence, affirms unity within multiple levels. Essences exist derivatively (mawjūd bi-tabi‘), realized according to their existential level. Multiplicity arises from variations in existential intensity and imposed limits, with the Necessary Being occupying the limitless highest level. In the Peripatetic system, the conceptual principle is the “concept of existence” in the mind. Reality consists of multiple existents, with unity preserved only in conceptual understanding. Multiplicity is explained through general gradation (taškīk-i ‘āmī), reflecting differences in applying the general concept of existence to particular entities and distinctions in their essential limits. Sadra’s hierarchical comparison demonstrates both the evaluation of systems according to their ontological breadth and their internal reconstruction, whether ascending from simpler frameworks or descending from the most comprehensive. Deficiencies are identified, principles refined, and a coherent system emerges that accounts for both unity and multiplicity, exemplified by Sadra’s personal unity of existence. در تطبیق فلسفه‌ها بنابر آن‌چه که پیشگامانی هم‌چون کربن درنظر دارند، هم باید به مشترکات دو دستگاه فکری نظر داشت و هم بر تمایزات؛ درواقع با یافتن نقاط مشترک و بر مبنای آنها، به مقارنه دو تفکر در موارد اختلافی پرداخت. براساس‌این و نیز با پذیرش این واقعیت که در همه دستگاه‌های فلسفی ، عنصر و یا عناصری مشترک هستند، می‌توان همه این نظام‌های فکری را در ضمن ساختاری سلسله‌مراتبی، مورد تطبیق قرارداد وآن ‌را «تطبیق‌رتبی» نامید، هدف این نوع تطبیق، می‌تواند چیزی بیش از مقارنۀ صرف دستگاه‌های فلسفی باشد و شاید بتواند در بستر مفاهمه‌ای علمی و منطقی، نقص هردستگاه را نشان‌داده و متناسب با خود آن دستگاه، راه ارتقاء آن‌را نشان‌داد. لذا در این نوشتار با بهره از روش تحلیلی، توصیفی، پس‌از بیان مختصات چنین تطبیقی میان دستگاه‌های فلسفی، چگونگی پیاده‌سازی آن در قالب دو روش صعودی و نزولی، بیان‌شده و به‌منظور ارائه یک نمونه از هر دو روش، ابتدا با معرفی ملاصدرا به‌عنوان فیلسوفی که می‌توان از منظری خاص، چنین تطبیقی را درآثارش صورت‌بندی نمود، تلاش‌گردید که با بررسی نوع مواجهه او با مسئله مواد ثلاث در بخش کوچکی ازکتاب اسفار اربعه، امکان و چگونگی روش نزولیِ این تطبیقی، میان سه دستگاه فلسفی مشائی، تشکیک خاصی و وحدت شخصی وجود در مسئله مذکور، نشان‌داده‌شود. هم‌چنین؛ مسئله نحوه تحقق موجودات و کثرت آن‌ها در سه دستگاه مذکور از این منظر رتبی، مورد تطبیق قرار گرفت تا نمونه‌ای برای روش صعودی تطبیق مذکور، ارائه‌شود

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مؤسسه پژوهشی حکمت و فلسفه ایران جاویدان خرد 2251-8932 22 1 2025 05 22 The Possibility of Psychology as a Science in Kant’s Philosophy امکان روان‌شناسی به‌مثابه علم در فلسفۀ کانت 290 319 241829 10.22034/iw.2026.555343.1854 FA محمدحسین وفائیان استادیار گروه مطالعات علم و فناوری دانشگاه امیر کبیر 0009-0005-5881-5258 سید مهدیار رحیمی دانشجوی ارشد مشاوره، دانشگاه تهران 0009-0002-5087-1982 Journal Article 2025 10 25 More than a century and a half after the establishment of psychology as a science in the nineteenth century, the very nature and possibility of this discipline—aimed at providing a scientific explanation of consciousness or conscious experience—remains a matter of debate among both psychologists and philosophers. The roots of this dispute, which seems to bear within itself a structural crisis in the very domain of its subject matter, lie in the architectural model of cognition that Kant develops in his transcendental philosophy, especially in the Critique of Pure Reason. Kant’s framework appears to render impossible the very notion of psychology as an empirical and experimental science. Yet, the possibility or impossibility of psychology in Kant’s philosophy is by no means self-evident or absolute. The present study seeks to elucidate this issue by examining Kant’s various conceptions of psychology. By distinguishing between the tripartite division of empirical (experimental) psychology, rational psychology, and pragmatic anthropology, the focus will be placed on the first two. The aim is to clarify, as far as possible, the nature of each of these conceptions and the extent to which psychology, as a scientific discipline, can be founded within each. Finally, the paper also considers how psychology, as a concrete and institutionalized science, became possible in the period following Kant. More than a century and a half after the establishment of psychology as a science in the nineteenth century, the very nature and possibility of this discipline—aimed at providing a scientific explanation of consciousness or conscious experience—remains a matter of debate among both psychologists and philosophers. The roots of this dispute, which seems to bear within itself a structural crisis in the very domain of its subject matter, lie in the architectural model of cognition that Kant develops in his transcendental philosophy, especially in the Critique of Pure Reason. Kant’s framework appears to render impossible the very notion of psychology as an empirical and experimental science. Yet, the possibility or impossibility of psychology in Kant’s philosophy is by no means self-evident or absolute. The present study seeks to elucidate this issue by examining Kant’s various conceptions of psychology. By distinguishing between the tripartite division of empirical (experimental) psychology, rational psychology, and pragmatic anthropology, the focus will be placed on the first two. The aim is to clarify, as far as possible, the nature of each of these conceptions and the extent to which psychology, as a scientific discipline, can be founded within each. Finally, the paper also considers how psychology, as a concrete and institutionalized science, became possible in the period following Kant. More than a century and a half after the establishment of psychology as a science in the nineteenth century, the very nature and possibility of this discipline—aimed at providing a scientific explanation of consciousness or conscious experience—remains a matter of debate among both psychologists and philosophers. The roots of this dispute, which seems to bear within itself a structural crisis in the very domain of its subject matter, lie in the architectural model of cognition that Kant develops in his transcendental philosophy, especially in the Critique of Pure Reason. Kant’s framework appears to render impossible the very notion of psychology as an empirical and experimental science. Yet, the possibility or impossibility of psychology in Kant’s philosophy is by no means self-evident or absolute. The present study seeks to elucidate this issue by examining Kant’s various conceptions of psychology. By distinguishing between the tripartite division of empirical (experimental) psychology, rational psychology, and pragmatic anthropology, the focus will be placed on the first two. The aim is to clarify, as far as possible, the nature of each of these conceptions and the extent to which psychology, as a scientific discipline, can be founded within each. Finally, the paper also considers how psychology, as a concrete and institutionalized science, became possible in the period following Kant. More than a century and a half after the establishment of psychology as a science in the nineteenth century, the very nature and possibility of this discipline—aimed at providing a scientific explanation of consciousness or conscious experience—remains a matter of debate among both psychologists and philosophers. The roots of this dispute, which seems to bear within itself a structural crisis in the very domain of its subject matter, lie in the architectural model of cognition that Kant develops in his transcendental philosophy, especially in the Critique of Pure Reason. Kant’s framework appears to render impossible the very notion of psychology as an empirical and experimental science. پس از گذشت حدود یک قرن و نیم از تاسیس علم روان‌شناسی در قرن نوزدهم، هنوز چیستی و امکان این علم که درصدد تبیین علمیِ آگاهی یا تجربۀ آگاهانه است، هم نزد روان‌شناسان و هم فیلسوفان محل پرسش و نزاع است. خاستگاه این نزاع که گویی بحرانی را در ذات(قلمرو) موضوع این علم به دوش می‌کشد، طرحی از معماری شناخت است که کانت در فلسفه استعلائی خود، مخصوصا در نقد اول یعنی نقد عقل محض، ارائه می‌دهد؛ طرحی که گویی امکان روان‌شناسی به‌مثابه علمی تجربی و آزمایشگاهی را ناممکن می‌کند. اما امکان یا امتناع علم روان‌شناسی در فلسفه کانت، امری کاملا بدیهی یا مطلق نیست. جستار پیش رو، تلاشی برای فهم این امکان یا امتناع در بستر کاوش در برداشت‌های مختلف کانت از روان‌شناسی است. با تفکیک بین سه‌گانۀ روان‌شناسی تجربی(آزمایشگاهی)، روان‌شناسی عقلی و انسان‌شناسی پراگماتیک، تمرکز بر دوگانۀ اول بوده و سعی بر آن است تا چیستی هر یک از آنها و امکان‌ تاسیس روان‌شناسی به‌مثابه علم، در هر یک از این دو تلقی، تاحدممکن آشکار شود و در پی این آشکارسازی، تحقق انضمامی علم روان‌شناسی پس از کانت نیز، بررسی گردد.

http://www.javidankherad.ir/article_241829_e7f73a93b7edcc0e428a4d4ca35e806f.pdf