Iranian Institute of Philosophy Sophia Perennis 2251-8932 22 1 2025 05 22 Universal and Particular in Proclus: An Analysis Based on The Elements of Theology Universal and Particular in Proclus: An Analysis Based on The Elements of Theology 7 28 234523 10.22034/iw.2025.521182.1839 FA Amirhossein Saket Faculty member of the Department of Philosophy at Shahid Beheshti University 0000-0002-9814-5069 Journal Article 2025 05 06 Proclus broadly uses the terms "universal" and "particular" as well as "whole" and "part" almost interchangeably, without making a clear distinction based on their fundamental meanings. "Universal" (καθόλου) and "particular" (κατὰ μέρος) are derived from "whole" (ὅλον) and "part," (μέρος) but they are used independently of those terms in meaning. The meanings of "whole" and "part" are quite obvious and well-defined: a "whole" is something composed of parts, while a "part" is something that, when combined with other parts, forms a whole. The terms "universal" and "particular," however, have two different common meanings. In the first sense, "universal" refers to a term or concept like "human" that can be applied to more than one individual, as opposed to a "particular" which applies only to a single individual, such as "Socrates." In the second sense, "universal" is a broader concept that includes other concepts, and, conversely, "particular" is a narrower concept within "universal." For example, "animal" is a universal with respect to "human," and "human" is a particular within the broader concept of "animal." Initially, it might seem that there is no direct connection or correlation between "whole" and "part" and "universal" and "particular" in any of the meanings mentioned above. However, there may be some relationship between them. Generally, it is believed that "universal" and "particular" relate to concepts, while "whole" and "part" pertain to physical objects. Today, we often use "universal" and "particular" to compare two concepts and in relation to their instances. Among these two, a "universal" is a term that applies to all instances of a concept, whereas a "particular" applies only to some instances of that concept. For example, "animal" is a universal, and "human" is a particular, since "animal" applies to all instances of "human," but "human" does not apply to all instances of "animal." Nonetheless, the relationship between instances of "human" and "animal" is one of whole and part, because a collection of animals forms a whole that is larger than and includes the collection of humans. In other words, the set of humans is a part of the broader set of animals, which, combined with other species, makes up the entire collection of animals. Based on this, perhaps, in the next stage, the relationship between "animal" and "human" could be viewed purely as whole and part, disregarding their instances — meaning that "animal" could be considered a whole, with "human" and other species as parts within it. It’s important to note that this is, in fact, a kind of analogy; the relationship between concepts is not literally one of part and whole. It’s possible that the reason behind the names "universal" and "particular" and their derivation from "whole" and "part" is precisely this — i.e., the idea that a concept containing other concepts has been likened to a whole, with those concepts as its parts, thus earning the names. It seems that Proclus also regards "whole" and "universal" as nearly synonymous and often uses the term "wholeness" (ὁλότης) to refer to both meanings. He employs these terms in relation to principles and forms. He considers principles to be universal and particular because, at their core, these principles are a series of concepts with varying degrees of universality, where each level is more universal than the lower level and more particular than the higher level. For example, "unit" is a more universal concept than "being," and "being" is more universal than "life." Conversely, "life" is particular relative to "being," and "being" is particular relative to "unit." He also views each of these concepts as a whole composed of parts, considering them as whole or parts in relation to each other. For instance, "being" already includes "life" and "intellect," and can be seen as a whole constructed from these parts. For this reason, even when "life" and " intellect" appear as independent principles at lower levels, it can still be said that "being" is a whole relative to them, and they are parts relative to "being." On the other hand, Proclus considers these concepts as a hierarchy of causes, where each level is the cause of the lower levels and the effect of the higher levels. In this view, all four terms are generalized to causes, which are also called whole and universal, as well as parts and particulars. Although these terms are originally characteristics of concepts, applying them to natural or metaphysical causes seems unwarranted. Thus, each cause is considered universal relative to its subsequent causes—its effects—and particular relative to its higher causes—its own causes. As a result of this generalization, each cause is a whole composed of parts, which are, in fact, its effects. Proclus broadly uses the terms "universal" and "particular" as well as "whole" and "part" almost interchangeably, without making a clear distinction based on their fundamental meanings. "Universal" (καθόλου) and "particular" (κατὰ μέρος) are derived from "whole" (ὅλον) and "part," (μέρος) but they are used independently of those terms in meaning. The meanings of "whole" and "part" are quite obvious and well-defined: a "whole" is something composed of parts, while a "part" is something that, when combined with other parts, forms a whole. The terms "universal" and "particular," however, have two different common meanings. In the first sense, "universal" refers to a term or concept like "human" that can be applied to more than one individual, as opposed to a "particular" which applies only to a single individual, such as "Socrates." In the second sense, "universal" is a broader concept that includes other concepts, and, conversely, "particular" is a narrower concept within "universal." For example, "animal" is a universal with respect to "human," and "human" is a particular within the broader concept of "animal." Initially, it might seem that there is no direct connection or correlation between "whole" and "part" and "universal" and "particular" in any of the meanings mentioned above. However, there may be some relationship between them. Generally, it is believed that "universal" and "particular" relate to concepts, while "whole" and "part" pertain to physical objects. Today, we often use "universal" and "particular" to compare two concepts and in relation to their instances. Among these two, a "universal" is a term that applies to all instances of a concept, whereas a "particular" applies only to some instances of that concept. For example, "animal" is a universal, and "human" is a particular, since "animal" applies to all instances of "human," but "human" does not apply to all instances of "animal." Nonetheless, the relationship between instances of "human" and "animal" is one of whole and part, because a collection of animals forms a whole that is larger than and includes the collection of humans. In other words, the set of humans is a part of the broader set of animals, which, combined with other species, makes up the entire collection of animals. Based on this, perhaps, in the next stage, the relationship between "animal" and "human" could be viewed purely as whole and part, disregarding their instances — meaning that "animal" could be considered a whole, with "human" and other species as parts within it. It’s important to note that this is, in fact, a kind of analogy; the relationship between concepts is not literally one of part and whole. It’s possible that the reason behind the names "universal" and "particular" and their derivation from "whole" and "part" is precisely this — i.e., the idea that a concept containing other concepts has been likened to a whole, with those concepts as its parts, thus earning the names. It seems that Proclus also regards "whole" and "universal" as nearly synonymous and often uses the term "wholeness" (ὁλότης) to refer to both meanings. He employs these terms in relation to principles and forms. He considers principles to be universal and particular because, at their core, these principles are a series of concepts with varying degrees of universality, where each level is more universal than the lower level and more particular than the higher level. For example, "unit" is a more universal concept than "being," and "being" is more universal than "life." Conversely, "life" is particular relative to "being," and "being" is particular relative to "unit." He also views each of these concepts as a whole composed of parts, considering them as whole or parts in relation to each other. For instance, "being" already includes "life" and "intellect," and can be seen as a whole constructed from these parts. For this reason, even when "life" and " intellect" appear as independent principles at lower levels, it can still be said that "being" is a whole relative to them, and they are parts relative to "being." On the other hand, Proclus considers these concepts as a hierarchy of causes, where each level is the cause of the lower levels and the effect of the higher levels. In this view, all four terms are generalized to causes, which are also called whole and universal, as well as parts and particulars. Although these terms are originally characteristics of concepts, applying them to natural or metaphysical causes seems unwarranted. Thus, each cause is considered universal relative to its subsequent causes—its effects—and particular relative to its higher causes—its own causes. As a result of this generalization, each cause is a whole composed of parts, which are, in fact, its effects.

http://www.javidankherad.ir/article_234523_53d02930353c523d13db490fe7d391f8.pdf

Iranian Institute of Philosophy Sophia Perennis 2251-8932 22 1 2025 05 22 A Comparative Study of Suhrawardi’s Methodology in His Illuminationist Philosophy and Intuitionistic Logic A Comparative Study of Suhrawardi’s Methodology in His Illuminationist Philosophy and Intuitionistic Logic 29 54 235935 10.22034/iw.2025.544876.1847 FA Mohammad Shafiei Phd in Philosophy, University of Paris 1, Panthéon-Sorbonne 0000-0002-4604-8793 Journal Article 2025 09 05 In this article, we aim to shed new light on the methodology of Illuminationist philosophy, focusing on some of the principles and rules that are specific to this school of thought. Suhrawardi (1154–1191) dedicates the first part of his Hikmat al-Ishraq to logic, offering innovative discussions that challenge certain tenets of traditional logic. In the other sections of this book and in some of his illuminationistic writings, he introduces principles and rules that could be considered relevant to logic. The main root of the differences with traditional logic lies in Suhrawardi’s methodology, which we will argue is essentially different from that of the Peripatetic school. In this paper, we discuss that Suhrawardi developed a subjectivist philosophy, which we will characterize as radical rationalism. Suhrawardi’s specific arguments in his illuminationist philosophy align with a logic that supports this subjectivist approach. In this regard, we observe interesting similarities with intuitionist logic and its philosophical foundations, particularly the anti-realist view of logic. The structure of the paper is as follows: In the first half of the paper, we discuss the thesis that both aforementioned views are based on a subjectivist approach. In the second half, we will analyze some of the most significant of the similarities between the two on a case-by-case basis. Section 1 highlights the methodological originality of illuminationism, emphasizing that it is a rationalist and subjectivist philosophy. This makes it radically different from the common philosophical tradition of the time, although Suhrawardi’s approach is not without predecessors. Some commentators see illuminationism’s differentia in its mystical orientation. Therefore, our discussion of the methodological priority of consciousness in illuminationism, in accordance with a new trend in Suhrawardi scholarship, is to contribute to debates on the proper interpretation of Suhrawardi’s work. The focus of our discussion is on the implications of the aforementioned approach for epistemology and, consequently, the status of logic. Section 2 begins with a brief introduction to intuitionism. I then discuss the philosophical foundations of this approach, developing an interpretation that demonstrates how the formal differences between intuitionistic and classical logic reflect certain philosophical and epistemological characteristics. This demonstrates the proper sense of anti-realism attributed to intuitionism. Understood as a methodological orientation, this anti-realism is clearly akin to Suhrawardi’s philosophy of consciousness. In section 3, I list some of the specific rules and logical remarks of illuminationism, and then in the following section, on the basis of the foundational affinities discussed, I compare them with their counterparts in intuitionistic logic. The issues raised and discussed in this article are as follows: 1- 'knowledge by presence' in illuminationism corresponds to 'intuition' in Brouwer's intuitionist philosophy. Also, logic is related to acquired science and has no application in presential knowledge, just as according to Brouwer's view, primary intuition is speechless, and mathematics, as a science built from intuition, is independent of logic. 2- The concept of 'rational i’tibar' in Suhrawardi's view, which concerns philosophical concepts such as existence, unity, possibility, attributes and numbers, is similar to the concept of 'transcendental' in the Kantian or, more precisely, Husserlian sense. For Suhrawardi, categories’ being i’tibar-i aqli also indicates that the mind (aql) is active in articulating objects, just as Brouwer considers the “creating subject” to be constructive, not merely a discoverer (of mathematics, in particular). 3- The peripatetic theory of definition is based on the idea that meanings in the external world are composed of genus and species that exist independently of the mind. This view is akin to the image theory of meaning and is based on a methodological realism. Suhrawardi's denial of the peripatetic theory of definition, that they are essentially combination of genus and species, is akin to anti-realism as in Brouwer's intuitionism. 4. Suhrawardi's considerations in the field of logic may be related to the use of logic in the Illuminationist approach, rather than to the formal structure of logic, which in the latter case, as some contemporary logicians have shown, would present problems. These considerations would be similar to those that exist in intuitionism regarding the use of existential propositions or negative propositions, without the aforementioned considerations demandig the elimination of these propositional forms from the formal structure of logic. This approach is consistent with the general view of Illuminationist philosophy as well as intuitionism in restricting the dominion of formal logic. In this article, we aim to shed new light on the methodology of Illuminationist philosophy, focusing on some of the principles and rules that are specific to this school of thought. Suhrawardi (1154–1191) dedicates the first part of his Hikmat al-Ishraq to logic, offering innovative discussions that challenge certain tenets of traditional logic. In the other sections of this book and in some of his illuminationistic writings, he introduces principles and rules that could be considered relevant to logic. The main root of the differences with traditional logic lies in Suhrawardi’s methodology, which we will argue is essentially different from that of the Peripatetic school. In this paper, we discuss that Suhrawardi developed a subjectivist philosophy, which we will characterize as radical rationalism. Suhrawardi’s specific arguments in his illuminationist philosophy align with a logic that supports this subjectivist approach. In this regard, we observe interesting similarities with intuitionist logic and its philosophical foundations, particularly the anti-realist view of logic. The structure of the paper is as follows: In the first half of the paper, we discuss the thesis that both aforementioned views are based on a subjectivist approach. In the second half, we will analyze some of the most significant of the similarities between the two on a case-by-case basis. Section 1 highlights the methodological originality of illuminationism, emphasizing that it is a rationalist and subjectivist philosophy. This makes it radically different from the common philosophical tradition of the time, although Suhrawardi’s approach is not without predecessors. Some commentators see illuminationism’s differentia in its mystical orientation. Therefore, our discussion of the methodological priority of consciousness in illuminationism, in accordance with a new trend in Suhrawardi scholarship, is to contribute to debates on the proper interpretation of Suhrawardi’s work. The focus of our discussion is on the implications of the aforementioned approach for epistemology and, consequently, the status of logic. Section 2 begins with a brief introduction to intuitionism. I then discuss the philosophical foundations of this approach, developing an interpretation that demonstrates how the formal differences between intuitionistic and classical logic reflect certain philosophical and epistemological characteristics. This demonstrates the proper sense of anti-realism attributed to intuitionism. Understood as a methodological orientation, this anti-realism is clearly akin to Suhrawardi’s philosophy of consciousness. In section 3, I list some of the specific rules and logical remarks of illuminationism, and then in the following section, on the basis of the foundational affinities discussed, I compare them with their counterparts in intuitionistic logic. The issues raised and discussed in this article are as follows: 1- 'knowledge by presence' in illuminationism corresponds to 'intuition' in Brouwer's intuitionist philosophy. Also, logic is related to acquired science and has no application in presential knowledge, just as according to Brouwer's view, primary intuition is speechless, and mathematics, as a science built from intuition, is independent of logic. 2- The concept of 'rational i’tibar' in Suhrawardi's view, which concerns philosophical concepts such as existence, unity, possibility, attributes and numbers, is similar to the concept of 'transcendental' in the Kantian or, more precisely, Husserlian sense. For Suhrawardi, categories’ being i’tibar-i aqli also indicates that the mind (aql) is active in articulating objects, just as Brouwer considers the “creating subject” to be constructive, not merely a discoverer (of mathematics, in particular). 3- The peripatetic theory of definition is based on the idea that meanings in the external world are composed of genus and species that exist independently of the mind. This view is akin to the image theory of meaning and is based on a methodological realism. Suhrawardi's denial of the peripatetic theory of definition, that they are essentially combination of genus and species, is akin to anti-realism as in Brouwer's intuitionism. 4. Suhrawardi's considerations in the field of logic may be related to the use of logic in the Illuminationist approach, rather than to the formal structure of logic, which in the latter case, as some contemporary logicians have shown, would present problems. These considerations would be similar to those that exist in intuitionism regarding the use of existential propositions or negative propositions, without the aforementioned considerations demandig the elimination of these propositional forms from the formal structure of logic. This approach is consistent with the general view of Illuminationist philosophy as well as intuitionism in restricting the dominion of formal logic.

http://www.javidankherad.ir/article_235935_c2e8e8eb242bf94c40b74068f42a8762.pdf

Iranian Institute of Philosophy Sophia Perennis 2251-8932 22 1 2025 05 22 Is Logical Contextualism a Serious Challenge for Logical Monism? Is Logical Contextualism a Serious Challenge for Logical Monism? 55 80 242178 10.22034/iw.2026.576805.1878 FA Hamid Alaeinejad Assistant professor of logic, Department of Logic, Iranian Institute of Philosophy, Tehran, Iran 0000-0002-7003-7015 Journal Article 2026 02 19 1. Introduction According to contextualism, the correctness of a logical system depends on the context in which it is employed; validity is not absolute but context-relative. Contextualists maintain that this approach enables them to respond to two major objections facing pluralism: the collapse argument and the meaning-variance objection. 2. Logical Contextualism Logical contextualism maintains that a given argument may be valid in one context and invalid in another. Consequently, the correctness of a logical system depends on the context of application. This view has been developed in different forms by philosophers such as Stewart Shapiro and Colin Caret. On Caret’s formulation, validity contains a parameter for a deductive standard determined by context. Each context fixes its own inferential standard, and the extension of the concept of validity varies accordingly. 3. The Collapse Argument The collapse argument was originally raised against the influential pluralism of Jc Beall and Greg Restall. Their pluralism accepts multiple correct logics, each satisfying three admissibility conditions: necessity, normativity, and formality. Adopting a generalized Tarskian account of logical consequence, they argue that different legitimate precisifications of “cases” yield different correct consequence relations. Critics such as Graham Priest contend that the normativity of logic undermines pluralism. If a logic is normative—if one must accept its consequences upon accepting its premises—then in situations of conflict one must defer to the strongest logic. Since classical logic validates all inferences validated by intuitionistic or relevant logic, its normativity effectively overrides the others, collapsing pluralism into monism. Contextualism proposes a solution: normativity itself is context-relative. The obligation to accept a conclusion arises only within the context governed by a particular inferential standard. Once normativity is relativized, the collapse is avoided, since no single logic imposes universal normative force across contexts. 4. The Meaning-Variance Objection The meaning-variance objection claims that pluralism entails that logical constants have different meanings in different logical systems. Drawing on ideas associated with Quine, critics argue that if the meanings of logical constants vary, disagreements between logics reduce to merely verbal disputes. Contextualists respond by distinguishing between meaning and extension. Logical constants retain stable meanings, but their inferential behavior depends on contextual parameters. On this view, differences between classical and intuitionistic negation, for example, arise not from semantic ambiguity but from differing contextual standards. Thus, contextualism attempts to preserve genuine disagreement while avoiding semantic relativism. 5. Assessment of Contextualism 5.1 Three Senses of “Correct Logic” To assess whether contextualism constitutes an acceptable pluralism, the notion of a “correct logic” must be clarified. We can distinguishes three senses of logic: 1. Pure logic: a formal system ⟨L, ⊨⟩. Correctness here is purely structural (e.g., consistency, non-triviality). 2. Applied logic: a deductive theory intended to model reasoning in a specific domain. Here, correctness is relative to the domain modeled. 3. A theory of logical consequence itself: logic as an account of extra-systematic or absolute validity. Global monism claims that there is exactly one correct theory of logical consequence. 5.2 Contextualism and Monism This tripartite distinction reveals that debates between monism and pluralism often equivocate between different senses of correctness. Against local monism, contextualism would need to show that more than one logic is correct within a single context. Yet no existing formulation of contextualism makes such a claim. By definition, each context determines a unique inferential standard. Even when assessment-sensitivity is invoked, a shift in standards entails a shift in context. Thus, contextualism is compatible with local monism. Against global monism, contextualism would need to claim either that multiple theories correctly capture logical consequence itself or that none does. But contextualism does neither. It denies that there is a single context-independent standard, yet this does not exclude the possibility of a globally correct theory of consequence in the absolute sense. Since contextual correctness is context-indexed, it does not compete with global correctness understood univocally. Therefore, contextualism neither refutes local monism nor contradicts global monism. It operates at a different level of analysis, rendering its apparent pluralism weaker than advertised. 5.3 Further Difficulties Additional challenges confront contextualism: the problem of mixed domains, the charge of ad hoc maneuvering, the indeterminacy of context individuation, and the lack of explanation regarding how contexts determine logical standards. While none of these objections is decisive on its own, together they underscore the theoretical incompleteness of contextualism. 6. Conclusion Logical contextualism offers an elegant strategy for avoiding the collapse argument and the meaning-variance objection. By relativizing normativity and distinguishing meaning from contextual parameters, it appears to secure a defensible pluralist position. However, once the notion of “correct logic” is carefully disambiguated, contextualism fails to provide a substantive alternative to either local or global monism. Its pluralism does not constitute a genuine challenge to monism. In this respect, logical contextualism falls short of being serious challenge for logical monism. 1. Introduction According to contextualism, the correctness of a logical system depends on the context in which it is employed; validity is not absolute but context-relative. Contextualists maintain that this approach enables them to respond to two major objections facing pluralism: the collapse argument and the meaning-variance objection. 2. Logical Contextualism Logical contextualism maintains that a given argument may be valid in one context and invalid in another. Consequently, the correctness of a logical system depends on the context of application. This view has been developed in different forms by philosophers such as Stewart Shapiro and Colin Caret. On Caret’s formulation, validity contains a parameter for a deductive standard determined by context. Each context fixes its own inferential standard, and the extension of the concept of validity varies accordingly. 3. The Collapse Argument The collapse argument was originally raised against the influential pluralism of Jc Beall and Greg Restall. Their pluralism accepts multiple correct logics, each satisfying three admissibility conditions: necessity, normativity, and formality. Adopting a generalized Tarskian account of logical consequence, they argue that different legitimate precisifications of “cases” yield different correct consequence relations. Critics such as Graham Priest contend that the normativity of logic undermines pluralism. If a logic is normative—if one must accept its consequences upon accepting its premises—then in situations of conflict one must defer to the strongest logic. Since classical logic validates all inferences validated by intuitionistic or relevant logic, its normativity effectively overrides the others, collapsing pluralism into monism. Contextualism proposes a solution: normativity itself is context-relative. The obligation to accept a conclusion arises only within the context governed by a particular inferential standard. Once normativity is relativized, the collapse is avoided, since no single logic imposes universal normative force across contexts. 4. The Meaning-Variance Objection The meaning-variance objection claims that pluralism entails that logical constants have different meanings in different logical systems. Drawing on ideas associated with Quine, critics argue that if the meanings of logical constants vary, disagreements between logics reduce to merely verbal disputes. Contextualists respond by distinguishing between meaning and extension. Logical constants retain stable meanings, but their inferential behavior depends on contextual parameters. On this view, differences between classical and intuitionistic negation, for example, arise not from semantic ambiguity but from differing contextual standards. Thus, contextualism attempts to preserve genuine disagreement while avoiding semantic relativism. 5. Assessment of Contextualism 5.1 Three Senses of “Correct Logic” To assess whether contextualism constitutes an acceptable pluralism, the notion of a “correct logic” must be clarified. We can distinguishes three senses of logic: 1. Pure logic: a formal system ⟨L, ⊨⟩. Correctness here is purely structural (e.g., consistency, non-triviality). 2. Applied logic: a deductive theory intended to model reasoning in a specific domain. Here, correctness is relative to the domain modeled. 3. A theory of logical consequence itself: logic as an account of extra-systematic or absolute validity. Global monism claims that there is exactly one correct theory of logical consequence. 5.2 Contextualism and Monism This tripartite distinction reveals that debates between monism and pluralism often equivocate between different senses of correctness. Against local monism, contextualism would need to show that more than one logic is correct within a single context. Yet no existing formulation of contextualism makes such a claim. By definition, each context determines a unique inferential standard. Even when assessment-sensitivity is invoked, a shift in standards entails a shift in context. Thus, contextualism is compatible with local monism. Against global monism, contextualism would need to claim either that multiple theories correctly capture logical consequence itself or that none does. But contextualism does neither. It denies that there is a single context-independent standard, yet this does not exclude the possibility of a globally correct theory of consequence in the absolute sense. Since contextual correctness is context-indexed, it does not compete with global correctness understood univocally. Therefore, contextualism neither refutes local monism nor contradicts global monism. It operates at a different level of analysis, rendering its apparent pluralism weaker than advertised. 5.3 Further Difficulties Additional challenges confront contextualism: the problem of mixed domains, the charge of ad hoc maneuvering, the indeterminacy of context individuation, and the lack of explanation regarding how contexts determine logical standards. While none of these objections is decisive on its own, together they underscore the theoretical incompleteness of contextualism. 6. Conclusion Logical contextualism offers an elegant strategy for avoiding the collapse argument and the meaning-variance objection. By relativizing normativity and distinguishing meaning from contextual parameters, it appears to secure a defensible pluralist position. However, once the notion of “correct logic” is carefully disambiguated, contextualism fails to provide a substantive alternative to either local or global monism. Its pluralism does not constitute a genuine challenge to monism. In this respect, logical contextualism falls short of being serious challenge for logical monism.

http://www.javidankherad.ir/article_242178_7e488f377d0498f12e9451fc328b9388.pdf

Iranian Institute of Philosophy Sophia Perennis 2251-8932 22 1 2025 05 22 Poetics of Avicenna’s Cure: A Critical Evaluation of Its Editions Poetics of Avicenna’s Cure: A Critical Evaluation of Its Editions 81 109 234522 10.22034/iw.2025.547626.1848 FA Hadi Rabiei Department of Philosophy of Art, Faculty of Theoretical Sciences and Higher Studies of Art, Iran University of Art, Tehran, Iran 0000-0001-5293-9376 Journal Article 2025 09 17 Badawī published two critical editions of Poetics of Avicenna’s Cure. Both editions have served as foundational sources for translations and scholarly studies. Prior to him, Margoliouth had also produced an edition. This study asks: how reliable are these editions, both textually and codicologically, and is there a need for a new critical edition? To address these questions, the two editions are compared in order to assess their textual accuracy. In addition, the earliest surviving manuscripts of the treatise, as well as those used as the basis of the editions, are analyzed. The findings show that Badawī’s first edition suffers from fewer shortcomings than his later one, though it is heavily dependent on Margoliouth’s work. Given the textual and codicological deficiencies of all three editions, and in light of earlier and more reliable manuscripts identified in this study, the preparation of a new critical edition of the treatise proves necessary. Badawī published two critical editions of Poetics of Avicenna’s Cure. Both editions have served as foundational sources for translations and scholarly studies. Prior to him, Margoliouth had also produced an edition. This study asks: how reliable are these editions, both textually and codicologically, and is there a need for a new critical edition? To address these questions, the two editions are compared in order to assess their textual accuracy. In addition, the earliest surviving manuscripts of the treatise, as well as those used as the basis of the editions, are analyzed. The findings show that Badawī’s first edition suffers from fewer shortcomings than his later one, though it is heavily dependent on Margoliouth’s work. Given the textual and codicological deficiencies of all three editions, and in light of earlier and more reliable manuscripts identified in this study, the preparation of a new critical edition of the treatise proves necessary.

http://www.javidankherad.ir/article_234522_85b027d46b848999586964d6d6dae882.pdf

Iranian Institute of Philosophy Sophia Perennis 2251-8932 22 1 2025 05 22 Three Civilization-Building Kings in Avestā and Shāhnāmeh Three Civilization-Building Kings in Avestā and Shāhnāmeh 110 137 241836 10.22034/iw.2024.467640.1798 FA Zahra Zare Assistant Professor, Department of Anthropology, Research Institute of Cultural Heritage and Tourism, Tehran, Iran. 0009-0008-7201-5646 Babak Alikhani Associate Professor in Iranian Institute of Philosophy Journal Article 2024 07 13 The three civilization-building kings mentioned in the Shāhnāmeh, also described as the first kings in the Zāmyād Yasht of the Avesta, are Hushang, Tahmureth, and Jamshid. These three kings are considered the embodiment of the creative power of God Almighty, and they embark on a process of innovation and invention in six stages, and then in the seventh stage, they undertake a task more wondrous than any other. In Zoroastrian doctrine, the six creations of Ahura Mazda are, in order: the stony or metallic sky, water, earth, plants, animals, and humans. Especially Hushang, in his constructive works, followed precisely this divine plan and model. This article seeks to explain the correspondence between the three aspects of Ahura Mazda -that is "Zamān", "Den", and "Gāh"- and the attributes and works of the three culture heroes. The three civilization-building kings mentioned in the Shāhnāmeh, also described as the first kings in the Zāmyād Yasht of the Avesta, are Hushang, Tahmureth, and Jamshid. These three kings are considered the embodiment of the creative power of God Almighty, and they embark on a process of innovation and invention in six stages, and then in the seventh stage, they undertake a task more wondrous than any other. In Zoroastrian doctrine, the six creations of Ahura Mazda are, in order: the stony or metallic sky, water, earth, plants, animals, and humans. Especially Hushang, in his constructive works, followed precisely this divine plan and model. This article seeks to explain the correspondence between the three aspects of Ahura Mazda -that is "Zamān", "Den", and "Gāh"- and the attributes and works of the three culture heroes.

http://www.javidankherad.ir/article_241836_df09b5f698d50d3020b9a920f867e289.pdf

Iranian Institute of Philosophy Sophia Perennis 2251-8932 22 1 2025 05 22 From Natural Structure to Moral Exemplar: A Critical Analysis of the Virtue Theories of Foot and Zagzebski From Natural Structure to Moral Exemplar: A Critical Analysis of the Virtue Theories of Foot and Zagzebski 138 165 234606 10.22034/iw.2025.549017.1849 FA Amirhossein Khodaparast Iranian Institute of Philosophy Journal Article 2025 09 30 Virtue ethics, one of the three principal traditions of normative ethical theory alongside consequentialism and deontology, experienced a significant revival in the twentieth century, particularly through the seminal contributions of Philippa Foot and Linda Zagzebski. Their theories represent two of the most influential and philosophically sophisticated attempts to reinterpret and rearticulate virtue ethics within a contemporary framework. Both thinkers draw extensively on Aristotelian thought, yet they diverge markedly in foundational assumptions, methodological strategies, and conceptions of normativity. Together, their approaches illuminate central debates in modern ethical theory, including the grounding of moral obligation, the relationship between moral cognition and motivation, the nature of moral judgment, and the interplay between reason and affect in ethical deliberation. Philippa Foot advances a naturalistic and teleologically informed account of virtue ethics, situating moral evaluation within the objective conditions necessary for human flourishing. She rejects the notion that virtues are mere social conventions or subjective preferences, arguing instead that they constitute species-relative excellences indispensable to living well as human beings. Drawing on the concept of “Aristotelian necessities,” Foot maintains that just as the flourishing of plants or animals depends upon the proper realization of their characteristic traits and functions, human flourishing requires the cultivation and exercise of dispositions such as justice, temperance, and courage. Central to her framework is practical wisdom (phronesis), which enables the agent to discern the appropriate application of virtues in particular contexts, thereby bridging the descriptive aspects of human life with normative ethical evaluation. In doing so, Foot seeks to overcome the persistent gap between factual understanding and moral prescription, grounding normative claims in the teleological structure of human nature. Linda Zagzebski, by contrast, develops an exemplarist and motivational model of virtue ethics that emphasizes the affective and psychological dimensions of moral life. According to her approach, moral understanding originates not in abstract principles or purely teleological reasoning but in the immediate experience of admiration for morally exemplary individuals. By observing and reflecting upon such exemplars—whose character inspires deep moral respect—we identify the traits that constitute genuine virtue. On this account, virtue is defined not only by the external conformity of action to moral standards but also by the internal quality of motivation, especially the sincere desire to promote the good for its own sake. Moral knowledge and judgment emerge through processes of affective response, imitation, habituation, and careful reflection on exemplars, highlighting the formative role of admiration and the cultivation of moral sensibilities. Despite their shared Aristotelian heritage, Foot and Zagzebski diverge in fundamental ways. Foot’s approach is realist, externalist, and teleological, grounding normativity in the objective requirements of human nature and the conditions for flourishing. Zagzebski’s account, in contrast, is phenomenological, internalist, and motivational, locating normativity in the authority of exemplars and the affective power of moral admiration. Foot emphasizes rationality, natural function, and the continuity between biological and ethical evaluation, whereas Zagzebski foregrounds the emotional, motivational, and psychological dimensions of virtue, stressing character development and the internal cultivation of moral motivation. These differences reflect broader debates within contemporary virtue ethics regarding the relationship between reason and emotion, nature and culture, and objectivity and subjectivity. Comparative analysis further shows how each thinker addresses contemporary challenges confronting virtue ethics, including conceptual circularity, the problem of action guidance, the empirical challenges posed by situationism, the threat of cultural relativism, and the is–ought gap. Foot responds by emphasizing the teleological organization of human nature and the central role of phronesis in mediating between facts and norms. Zagzebski, meanwhile, appeals to the epistemic and motivational authority of exemplars and the educative function of moral admiration, highlighting how virtuous dispositions are formed and sustained in practical life. Taken together, the two approaches suggest not opposition but potential complementarity. Foot’s emphasis on natural teleology and objective normativity provides a firm account of the structural foundations of ethical evaluation, while Zagzebski’s focus on exemplarity, motivation, and moral psychology enriches our understanding of how virtue is perceived, internalized, and enacted. Integrating these insights points toward a two-level model of virtue ethics: one level articulating the objective, species-relative conditions for human flourishing, and a second level elucidating the subjective processes of moral perception, motivation, and character formation. Such a synthesis offers a comprehensive and dynamic conception of virtue, uniting natural and psychological, rational and emotional, and universal and particular dimensions within a coherent and practically relevant ethical framework. Virtue ethics, one of the three principal traditions of normative ethical theory alongside consequentialism and deontology, experienced a significant revival in the twentieth century, particularly through the seminal contributions of Philippa Foot and Linda Zagzebski. Their theories represent two of the most influential and philosophically sophisticated attempts to reinterpret and rearticulate virtue ethics within a contemporary framework. Both thinkers draw extensively on Aristotelian thought, yet they diverge markedly in foundational assumptions, methodological strategies, and conceptions of normativity. Together, their approaches illuminate central debates in modern ethical theory, including the grounding of moral obligation, the relationship between moral cognition and motivation, the nature of moral judgment, and the interplay between reason and affect in ethical deliberation. Philippa Foot advances a naturalistic and teleologically informed account of virtue ethics, situating moral evaluation within the objective conditions necessary for human flourishing. She rejects the notion that virtues are mere social conventions or subjective preferences, arguing instead that they constitute species-relative excellences indispensable to living well as human beings. Drawing on the concept of “Aristotelian necessities,” Foot maintains that just as the flourishing of plants or animals depends upon the proper realization of their characteristic traits and functions, human flourishing requires the cultivation and exercise of dispositions such as justice, temperance, and courage. Central to her framework is practical wisdom (phronesis), which enables the agent to discern the appropriate application of virtues in particular contexts, thereby bridging the descriptive aspects of human life with normative ethical evaluation. In doing so, Foot seeks to overcome the persistent gap between factual understanding and moral prescription, grounding normative claims in the teleological structure of human nature. Linda Zagzebski, by contrast, develops an exemplarist and motivational model of virtue ethics that emphasizes the affective and psychological dimensions of moral life. According to her approach, moral understanding originates not in abstract principles or purely teleological reasoning but in the immediate experience of admiration for morally exemplary individuals. By observing and reflecting upon such exemplars—whose character inspires deep moral respect—we identify the traits that constitute genuine virtue. On this account, virtue is defined not only by the external conformity of action to moral standards but also by the internal quality of motivation, especially the sincere desire to promote the good for its own sake. Moral knowledge and judgment emerge through processes of affective response, imitation, habituation, and careful reflection on exemplars, highlighting the formative role of admiration and the cultivation of moral sensibilities. Despite their shared Aristotelian heritage, Foot and Zagzebski diverge in fundamental ways. Foot’s approach is realist, externalist, and teleological, grounding normativity in the objective requirements of human nature and the conditions for flourishing. Zagzebski’s account, in contrast, is phenomenological, internalist, and motivational, locating normativity in the authority of exemplars and the affective power of moral admiration. Foot emphasizes rationality, natural function, and the continuity between biological and ethical evaluation, whereas Zagzebski foregrounds the emotional, motivational, and psychological dimensions of virtue, stressing character development and the internal cultivation of moral motivation. These differences reflect broader debates within contemporary virtue ethics regarding the relationship between reason and emotion, nature and culture, and objectivity and subjectivity. Comparative analysis further shows how each thinker addresses contemporary challenges confronting virtue ethics, including conceptual circularity, the problem of action guidance, the empirical challenges posed by situationism, the threat of cultural relativism, and the is–ought gap. Foot responds by emphasizing the teleological organization of human nature and the central role of phronesis in mediating between facts and norms. Zagzebski, meanwhile, appeals to the epistemic and motivational authority of exemplars and the educative function of moral admiration, highlighting how virtuous dispositions are formed and sustained in practical life. Taken together, the two approaches suggest not opposition but potential complementarity. Foot’s emphasis on natural teleology and objective normativity provides a firm account of the structural foundations of ethical evaluation, while Zagzebski’s focus on exemplarity, motivation, and moral psychology enriches our understanding of how virtue is perceived, internalized, and enacted. Integrating these insights points toward a two-level model of virtue ethics: one level articulating the objective, species-relative conditions for human flourishing, and a second level elucidating the subjective processes of moral perception, motivation, and character formation. Such a synthesis offers a comprehensive and dynamic conception of virtue, uniting natural and psychological, rational and emotional, and universal and particular dimensions within a coherent and practically relevant ethical framework.

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Iranian Institute of Philosophy Sophia Perennis 2251-8932 22 1 2025 05 22 Mulla Sadra and Perennial Philosophy: Gradational Levels of Wisdom Mulla Sadra and Perennial Philosophy: Gradational Levels of Wisdom 166 196 241834 10.22034/iw.2026.528175.1843 FA Nafise Mostafavi Associate Professor, Multimedia Faculty, Tabriz Islamic Art University 0000-0002-8964-3787 Journal Article 2025 10 04 The strength of Perennial Philosophy in the contemporary world, with its cultural, political, and intellectual tensions, lies in its emphasis on commonalities and its capacity to lay the groundwork for dialogue among nations and religions. This study adopts a comparative-analytical approach to examine the relationship between Mullā Ṣadrā's Transcendent Wisdom (al-Ḥikmah al-Mutaʿāliyah) and this philosophical school. It addresses the critical ambiguity concerning their compatibility and seeks to determine, if they are compatible, the precise position of Ṣadrā’s thought within established Perennialist models. The research therefore answers this core question: What is the precise relationship between Mullā Ṣadrā's philosophical doctrines and both traditional Perennial Philosophy (Ḥikmat al-Khālidah) and its "soft perennialist" variant? Is Ṣadrā's system compatible with the Perennial Philosophy, and if so, which of its specific variants best accommodates his worldview? Based on the research findings, Mullā Ṣadrā recognizes intuitive discovery and rational demonstration as two paths parallel to revelation for attaining truth. Although, in pursuit of uncovering common truths across various traditions, he acknowledges similarities in mystical experiences, he does not overlook the fundamental distinctions between divine and human religions. From his perspective, truth is like a deep sea; individuals from different traditions can retrieve gems from varying depths and find parallels in their spiritual experiences, and these commonalities can serve as the basis for dialogue and interaction. In divine religions, wisdom can be attained through the esoteric dimension of the religious law (sharīʿah); in human religions, through "intellectual liberation" (ḥurriyyah) from false beliefs; and for secular societies, through heightened spiritual intelligence and divine attraction. Based on Mulla Sadra’s ontology, this stance can be characterized as the “gradational levels of wisdom.” The study concludes by clarifying how Mulla Sadra’s framework both diverges from and partially intersects with soft perennialism. The strength of Perennial Philosophy in the contemporary world, with its cultural, political, and intellectual tensions, lies in its emphasis on commonalities and its capacity to lay the groundwork for dialogue among nations and religions. This study adopts a comparative-analytical approach to examine the relationship between Mullā Ṣadrā's Transcendent Wisdom (al-Ḥikmah al-Mutaʿāliyah) and this philosophical school. It addresses the critical ambiguity concerning their compatibility and seeks to determine, if they are compatible, the precise position of Ṣadrā’s thought within established Perennialist models. The research therefore answers this core question: What is the precise relationship between Mullā Ṣadrā's philosophical doctrines and both traditional Perennial Philosophy (Ḥikmat al-Khālidah) and its "soft perennialist" variant? Is Ṣadrā's system compatible with the Perennial Philosophy, and if so, which of its specific variants best accommodates his worldview? Based on the research findings, Mullā Ṣadrā recognizes intuitive discovery and rational demonstration as two paths parallel to revelation for attaining truth. Although, in pursuit of uncovering common truths across various traditions, he acknowledges similarities in mystical experiences, he does not overlook the fundamental distinctions between divine and human religions. From his perspective, truth is like a deep sea; individuals from different traditions can retrieve gems from varying depths and find parallels in their spiritual experiences, and these commonalities can serve as the basis for dialogue and interaction. In divine religions, wisdom can be attained through the esoteric dimension of the religious law (sharīʿah); in human religions, through "intellectual liberation" (ḥurriyyah) from false beliefs; and for secular societies, through heightened spiritual intelligence and divine attraction. Based on Mulla Sadra’s ontology, this stance can be characterized as the “gradational levels of wisdom.” The study concludes by clarifying how Mulla Sadra’s framework both diverges from and partially intersects with soft perennialism.

http://www.javidankherad.ir/article_241834_6838a3ddd7e60076c57fbf94039160a9.pdf

Iranian Institute of Philosophy Sophia Perennis 2251-8932 22 1 2025 05 22 The evolution of the ontology of perceptual states in Islamic philosophy The evolution of the ontology of perceptual states in Islamic philosophy 197 212 242364 10.22034/iw.2026.565942.1866 FA Faeze Banikhazaee PhD student in Islamic Philosophy, Iranian Philosophy Research Institute 0009-0000-0515-1869 Mahdi Saatchi Shahid Motahari University, Tehran 0000-0003-0485-7434 Journal Article 2025 12 13 In Islamic philosophical tradition prior to the modern period, epistemological discussions were not treated separately from metaphysical inquiries. This reality highlights the necessity of research and extraction of Islamic philosophers’ views on epistemology and its relationship with their ontological stances. Accordingly, this research, driven by the concern to understand the historical development of the ontology of cognitive states in the Islamic philosophical tradition, examines various dimensions of the problem of the existential reality of perceptions and its evolution in the thought of three foundational philosophers: Ibn Sīnā, Suhrawardī, and Mullā Ṣadrā. To this end, by situating a phenomenological analysis of cognition within the framework of each philosopher’s metaphysical system, their conception of the cognitive subject and the foundation of their epistemological system is inferred. Since in Islamic philosophy epistemology is grounded in ontology, evolution in the ontology of cognitive states occurs when a philosopher establishes a fundamental difference from his predecessors concerning the existential grounds and phenomenological characteristics of perception. Such shifts in principles and characteristics lead to transformations in explaining the cognitive process and the nature of the subject. Ibn Sīnā is an essentialist, advocating the necessity of a generic unity between the perceiver and the perceived. Suhrawardī, moving beyond essentialism and the necessity of generic unity, introduces the notion of the ishrāqī relation . Mullā Ṣadrā, based on his novel principles, offers a fresh reading of essentialism and generic unity. The soul (nafs) is consistently the perceiver, yet it is explained diversely: from an Avicennan perspective, the soul is like a mirror for the manifestation of cognitive states; from Suhrawardī’s viewpoint, the soul is akin to vision, possessing an eye-like identity that observes the worlds; and in accordance with Ṣadr al-Muta’allihīn’s thought, the soul is a re-creator, reconstructing the external world within the inner world. In Islamic philosophical tradition prior to the modern period, epistemological discussions were not treated separately from metaphysical inquiries. This reality highlights the necessity of research and extraction of Islamic philosophers’ views on epistemology and its relationship with their ontological stances. Accordingly, this research, driven by the concern to understand the historical development of the ontology of cognitive states in the Islamic philosophical tradition, examines various dimensions of the problem of the existential reality of perceptions and its evolution in the thought of three foundational philosophers: Ibn Sīnā, Suhrawardī, and Mullā Ṣadrā. To this end, by situating a phenomenological analysis of cognition within the framework of each philosopher’s metaphysical system, their conception of the cognitive subject and the foundation of their epistemological system is inferred. Since in Islamic philosophy epistemology is grounded in ontology, evolution in the ontology of cognitive states occurs when a philosopher establishes a fundamental difference from his predecessors concerning the existential grounds and phenomenological characteristics of perception. Such shifts in principles and characteristics lead to transformations in explaining the cognitive process and the nature of the subject. Ibn Sīnā is an essentialist, advocating the necessity of a generic unity between the perceiver and the perceived. Suhrawardī, moving beyond essentialism and the necessity of generic unity, introduces the notion of the ishrāqī relation . Mullā Ṣadrā, based on his novel principles, offers a fresh reading of essentialism and generic unity. The soul (nafs) is consistently the perceiver, yet it is explained diversely: from an Avicennan perspective, the soul is like a mirror for the manifestation of cognitive states; from Suhrawardī’s viewpoint, the soul is akin to vision, possessing an eye-like identity that observes the worlds; and in accordance with Ṣadr al-Muta’allihīn’s thought, the soul is a re-creator, reconstructing the external world within the inner world. Ibn Sīnā is an essentialist, advocating the necessity of a generic unity between the perceiver and the perceived. Suhrawardī, moving beyond essentialism and the necessity of generic unity, introduces the notion of the ishrāqī relation . Mullā Ṣadrā, based on his novel principles, offers a fresh reading of essentialism and generic unity. The soul (nafs) is consistently the perceiver, yet it is explained diversely: from an Avicennan perspective, the soul is like a mirror for the manifestation of cognitive states; from Suhrawardī’s viewpoint, the soul is akin to vision, possessing an eye-like identity that observes the worlds; and in accordance with Ṣadr al-Muta’allihīn’s thought, the soul is a re-creator, reconstructing the external world within the inner world. In Islamic philosophical tradition prior to the modern period, epistemological discussions were not treated separately from metaphysical inquiries. This reality highlights the necessity of research and extraction of Islamic philosophers’ views on epistemology and its relationship with their ontological stances. Accordingly, this research, driven by the concern to understand the historical development of the ontology of cognitive states in the Islamic philosophical tradition, examines various dimensions of the problem of the existential reality of perceptions and its evolution in the thought of three foundational philosophers: Ibn Sīnā, Suhrawardī, and Mullā Ṣadrā. To this end, by situating a phenomenological analysis of cognition within the framework of each philosopher’s metaphysical system, their conception of the cognitive subject and the foundation of their epistemological system is inferred. Since in Islamic philosophy epistemology is grounded in ontology, evolution in the ontology of cognitive states occurs when a philosopher establishes a fundamental difference from his predecessors concerning the existential grounds and phenomenological characteristics of perception. Such shifts in principles and characteristics lead to transformations in explaining the cognitive process and the nature of the subject. Ibn Sīnā is an essentialist, advocating the necessity of a generic unity between the perceiver and the perceived. Suhrawardī, moving beyond essentialism and the necessity of generic unity, introduces the notion of the ishrāqī relation . Mullā Ṣadrā, based on his novel principles, offers a fresh reading of essentialism and generic unity. The soul (nafs) is consistently the perceiver, yet it is explained diversely: from an Avicennan perspective, the soul is like a mirror for the manifestation of cognitive states; from Suhrawardī’s viewpoint, the soul is akin to vision, possessing an eye-like identity that observes the worlds; and in accordance with Ṣadr al-Muta’allihīn’s thought, the soul is a re-creator, reconstructing the external world within the inner world. In Islamic philosophical tradition prior to the modern period, epistemological discussions were not treated separately from metaphysical inquiries. This reality highlights the necessity of research and extraction of Islamic philosophers’ views on epistemology and its relationship with their ontological stances. Accordingly, this research, driven by the concern to understand the historical development of the ontology of cognitive states in the Islamic philosophical tradition, examines various dimensions of the problem of the existential reality of perceptions and its evolution in the thought of three foundational philosophers: Ibn Sīnā, Suhrawardī, and Mullā Ṣadrā. To this end, by situating a phenomenological analysis of cognition within the framework of each philosopher’s metaphysical system, their conception of the cognitive subject and the foundation of their epistemological system is inferred. Since in Islamic philosophy epistemology is grounded in ontology, evolution in the ontology of cognitive states occurs when a philosopher establishes a fundamental difference from his predecessors concerning the existential grounds and phenomenological characteristics of perception. Such shifts in principles and characteristics lead to transformations in explaining the cognitive process and the nature of the subject. Ibn Sīnā is an essentialist, advocating the necessity of a generic unity between the perceiver and the perceived. Suhrawardī, moving beyond essentialism and the necessity of generic unity, introduces the notion of the ishrāqī relation . Mullā Ṣadrā, based on his novel principles, offers a fresh reading of essentialism and generic unity. The soul (nafs) is consistently the perceiver, yet it is explained diversely: from an Avicennan perspective, the soul is like a mirror for the manifestation of cognitive states; from Suhrawardī’s viewpoint, the soul is akin to vision, possessing an eye-like identity that observes the worlds; and in accordance with Ṣadr al-Muta’allihīn’s thought, the soul is a re-creator, reconstructing the external world within the inner world. Ibn Sīnā is an essentialist, advocating the necessity of a generic unity between the perceiver and the perceived. Suhrawardī, moving beyond essentialism and the necessity of generic unity, introduces the notion of the ishrāqī relation . Mullā Ṣadrā, based on his novel principles, offers a fresh reading of essentialism and generic unity. The soul (nafs) is consistently the perceiver, yet it is explained diversely: from an Avicennan perspective, the soul is like a mirror for the manifestation of cognitive states; from Suhrawardī’s viewpoint, the soul is akin to vision, possessing an eye-like identity that observes the worlds; and in accordance with Ṣadr al-Muta’allihīn’s thought, the soul is a re-creator, reconstructing the external world within the inner world.

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Iranian Institute of Philosophy Sophia Perennis 2251-8932 22 1 2025 05 22 Examining Mir Dāmād’s Arguments on the Objectivity of Things Examining Mir Dāmād’s Arguments on the Objectivity of Things 213 238 242366 10.22034/iw.2026.562603.1863 FA Mohammad Broomand University of Tehran, Frabi Faculty 0009-0005-9496-0313 Mohammad Hosain Ansari University of Tehran, Frabi faculty 0009-0008-5556-5259 Mehdi Safaei Asl Assistant Professor. University of Tehran, Farabi Faculty 0000-0002-4807-301X Journal Article 2025 11 28 The most fundamental issue in Islamic philosophy—given the breadth of its implications—is the manner in which the objectivity of things is realized. The present study investigates this issue within the philosophical system of Mir Dāmād in order to clarify his position, the criticisms that have been raised against it, and the manner in which he defends his view. Employing a descriptive-analytical method, the study first explicates Mir Dāmād’s thesis and then analyzes his arguments. It demonstrates that by distinguishing between objective being and relational being, he rejects the objectivity of both with respect to the Necessary being as well as possible beings. Mir Dāmād denies the objectivity of objective being on the grounds that it entails both the inversion of predication and the necessitation of all creatures; the former contradicts what is self-evident and leads to sophistry, while the latter conflicts with multiple principles, including the temporal origination and contingency of created beings (Lahiji 2012, 134). In refuting relational being, he points to consequences such as the collapse of simple whetherness, the reduction of concrete reality to a mere concept (Mir Dāmād 1995a, 37), and the resulting infinite regress (Mir Dāmād 2012, 255). His approach to the Necessary being and to possible beings, however, is not uniform. Drawing on the doctrine of the Natural universal, Mir Dāmād affirms the objectivity of quiddity in possible beings (Mir Dāmād 2012, 77), whereas in the Necessary being he denies even the objectivity of quiddity. His arguments for rejecting the objectivity of quiddity in the Necessary being are grounded in certain characteristics of quiddity that cannot be applied to the Necessary being—such as the possibility of multiplicity, the lack of self-individuation, the need for an agent or individuator, and the entailment of contingency. Mir Dāmād regards the essence of the Necessary being as a core unknown, accessible only through demonstrative proof. Neither conceptual knowledge nor intuitive knowledge can grant comprehensive cognition of Him. He considers this view consistent with the teachings reported from the Imams (peace be upon them), who cautioned against both symbolism and agnosticism (Mir Dāmād 1989, 50). The final section reviews several criticisms raised by some of Mir Dāmād’s students and commentators—such as Mullā Ṣadrā and Āghājānī. One major objection concerns the principle of “proportionality” (sanḵiyyat), which is taken to undermine the very foundations of Mir Dāmād’s thesis. Moreover, the rejection of the objectivity of objective being is challenged through both affirmative and negative arguments. The affirmative critique cites various proofs, such as the assertion that all beings exist by “being”—that is, possess being in actuality (Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī 2009, 134; Āghājānī Astarābādī, n.d., 122). The negative critique challenges Mir Dāmād’s claim that the consequence of accepting objective being is the necessitation of all entities, arguing that this conflicts with their essential poverty (Lahiji 2012, 134; Āghājānī Astarābādī, n.d., 123). Regarding relational being, critics argue that if being were identical to the essence of a thing, none of the difficulties Mir Dāmād mentions would arise. In response, Mir Dāmād maintains that the difference between the Necessary being and possible beings can be justified only if their objectivity is not taken to be of a single kind. Thus, the intended meaning of proportionality is similarity in essence and attributes, not identity in objectivity. Moreover, he argues that the realization of possible beings does not require a conditional mode; rather, a mere causative mode suffices. Consequently, one cannot infer the necessity of the realization of being merely by positing a conditioned mode of existence. By critiquing this reasoning and other arguments offered for the necessary realization of existence, Mir Dāmād undermines the foundations of responses that attempted to refute his arguments against relational being, for all such responses presuppose that being is identical to the essence of a thing—an assumption he rejects by denying objective being. Finally, he dismisses the critics’ objections regarding the impossibility of objective being, insisting that poverty cannot be conceived as intrinsic to a thing’s essence; need becomes meaningful only in relation to that which a thing lacks. In this way, Mir Dāmād’s claim regarding the impossibility of the objective realization of existence—whether in its attributed (mawṣūfī) or qualificational (waṣfī) mode—is established and affirmed in an absolute manner with respect to both the Necessary being and contingent beings. The most fundamental issue in Islamic philosophy—given the breadth of its implications—is the manner in which the objectivity of things is realized. The present study investigates this issue within the philosophical system of Mir Dāmād in order to clarify his position, the criticisms that have been raised against it, and the manner in which he defends his view. Employing a descriptive-analytical method, the study first explicates Mir Dāmād’s thesis and then analyzes his arguments. It demonstrates that by distinguishing between objective being and relational being, he rejects the objectivity of both with respect to the Necessary being as well as possible beings. Mir Dāmād denies the objectivity of objective being on the grounds that it entails both the inversion of predication and the necessitation of all creatures; the former contradicts what is self-evident and leads to sophistry, while the latter conflicts with multiple principles, including the temporal origination and contingency of created beings (Lahiji 2012, 134). In refuting relational being, he points to consequences such as the collapse of simple whetherness, the reduction of concrete reality to a mere concept (Mir Dāmād 1995a, 37), and the resulting infinite regress (Mir Dāmād 2012, 255). His approach to the Necessary being and to possible beings, however, is not uniform. Drawing on the doctrine of the Natural universal, Mir Dāmād affirms the objectivity of quiddity in possible beings (Mir Dāmād 2012, 77), whereas in the Necessary being he denies even the objectivity of quiddity. His arguments for rejecting the objectivity of quiddity in the Necessary being are grounded in certain characteristics of quiddity that cannot be applied to the Necessary being—such as the possibility of multiplicity, the lack of self-individuation, the need for an agent or individuator, and the entailment of contingency. Mir Dāmād regards the essence of the Necessary being as a core unknown, accessible only through demonstrative proof. Neither conceptual knowledge nor intuitive knowledge can grant comprehensive cognition of Him. He considers this view consistent with the teachings reported from the Imams (peace be upon them), who cautioned against both symbolism and agnosticism (Mir Dāmād 1989, 50). The final section reviews several criticisms raised by some of Mir Dāmād’s students and commentators—such as Mullā Ṣadrā and Āghājānī. One major objection concerns the principle of “proportionality” (sanḵiyyat), which is taken to undermine the very foundations of Mir Dāmād’s thesis. Moreover, the rejection of the objectivity of objective being is challenged through both affirmative and negative arguments. The affirmative critique cites various proofs, such as the assertion that all beings exist by “being”—that is, possess being in actuality (Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī 2009, 134; Āghājānī Astarābādī, n.d., 122). The negative critique challenges Mir Dāmād’s claim that the consequence of accepting objective being is the necessitation of all entities, arguing that this conflicts with their essential poverty (Lahiji 2012, 134; Āghājānī Astarābādī, n.d., 123). Regarding relational being, critics argue that if being were identical to the essence of a thing, none of the difficulties Mir Dāmād mentions would arise. In response, Mir Dāmād maintains that the difference between the Necessary being and possible beings can be justified only if their objectivity is not taken to be of a single kind. Thus, the intended meaning of proportionality is similarity in essence and attributes, not identity in objectivity. Moreover, he argues that the realization of possible beings does not require a conditional mode; rather, a mere causative mode suffices. Consequently, one cannot infer the necessity of the realization of being merely by positing a conditioned mode of existence. By critiquing this reasoning and other arguments offered for the necessary realization of existence, Mir Dāmād undermines the foundations of responses that attempted to refute his arguments against relational being, for all such responses presuppose that being is identical to the essence of a thing—an assumption he rejects by denying objective being. Finally, he dismisses the critics’ objections regarding the impossibility of objective being, insisting that poverty cannot be conceived as intrinsic to a thing’s essence; need becomes meaningful only in relation to that which a thing lacks. In this way, Mir Dāmād’s claim regarding the impossibility of the objective realization of existence—whether in its attributed (mawṣūfī) or qualificational (waṣfī) mode—is established and affirmed in an absolute manner with respect to both the Necessary being and contingent beings.

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Iranian Institute of Philosophy Sophia Perennis 2251-8932 22 1 2025 05 22 Comparing Avicenna's theory of imitation with the theories of Plato and Aristotle, with an emphasis on solving the new challenges of this theory Comparing Avicenna's theory of imitation with the theories of Plato and Aristotle, with an emphasis on solving the new challenges of this theory 239 262 242365 10.22034/iw.2026.565482.1865 FA Hosein Hashemnezhad Associate Professor, University of Tehran, Iran 0000-0002-7389-3343 Journal Article 2025 12 10 The theory of representation of Plato and Aristotle is the oldest theory in the field of philosophy of art, which had no rival until the nineteenth century. In the 19th century, with the emergence of new styles in painting and sculpture, as well as the emergence of new examples for art, the weaknesses and shortcomings of this theory in explaining these new works became apparent. For example, in the late 19th century and into the 20th century, Cubist, Actionist, and Minimalist painters distanced themselves so much from nature that their paintings eventually became completely unrecognizable. These examples of diverse artworks undermined the theory of representation in art. Also, with the emergence of symphonic music, the question arose as to whether this type of music could be representational. On the other hand, literature, especially the literature of the modern period, has never been able to be analyzed and explained in the framework of representation theory. Because novels are made up of words, and words are not identical or copied versions of their signifiers. Or some types of poetry, such as mystical, lyrical, philosophical, moral, etc., cannot be justified by representation theory. So in the 19th century, the theory of expressionism was first proposed by Leo Tolstoy, ending the twenty-five centuries of dominance of the theory of imitation. Gradually, German Expressionist painters abandoned the attempt to accurately represent the appearances of objects and instead used specific expressive surfaces. Throughout the nineteenth, twentieth, and contemporary centuries, numerous criticisms of the theory of representation have been raised. One of these theories is the theory of formalism, which was presented by thinkers such as Clive Bell, Roger Fry, and Susan Langer. This theory considered the inherent concept of art to be the representation of a form that signifies aesthetic experience, rather than the representation of a form. In this research, after analyzing the theory of representation of Plato and Aristotle and quoting the most important criticisms raised, we have proposed and explained the theory of representation from the perspective of Avicenna. Therefore, the main question of this research is: What is the difference between Avicenna's theory of imitation and Plato's and Aristotle's theory of imitation? The sub-question of this research is: To what extent and how does Avicenna's theory of imitation respond to contemporary criticisms of the theory of imitation? The aim of this research is to demonstrate the fact that Avicenna's representation theory is different and can respond to most of the contemporary challenges and criticisms of the theory of imitation And the secondary goal is to take a small step towards formulating the philosophy of Islamic art or the philosophy of art of Muslim philosophers. The method of this research is comparative analysis. In this method, by describing and analyzing theories and then comparing them in different contexts, the similarities and differences, advantages and disadvantages of theories are discovered. In this method, the goal is to clarify concepts by comparing systems, to resolve theoretical challenges and criticisms raised. According to the findings of this research, Avicenna's theory of representation is different from Plato's and Aristotle's theory of representation, both quantitatively and qualitatively. Avicenna has discussed in more detail the types of representation, its origin and purpose. Avicenna considers representation to be the essence of imagination. Therefore, wherever imagination exist , representation is also present. The power of imagination in the works of Ibn Sina is a power that intervenes in imaginary forms and other forms of mental stock and invents new forms. Therefore, since every work of art is mixed with imagination or imagination is the proximate origin of all works of art, it is better to analyze and explain works of art with Avicenna's theory of representation. Modern and postmodern works of art are not free from imagination, but the presence of imagination is significant in these works. With Avicenna's theory of imitation, it is possible to explain and analyze literature, as well as the various types of music and paintings prevalent in the 20th and contemporary centuries. Because imagination is an ever-present part of all these works of art. The innovation of this research is in explaining and proving the claim that with Avicenna's theory of imaginary and imaginative imitations , it is possible to explain and interpret the works of art of contemporary centuries (modernism and postmodernism) and to provide a logical response to the criticisms raised The theory of representation of Plato and Aristotle is the oldest theory in the field of philosophy of art, which had no rival until the nineteenth century. In the 19th century, with the emergence of new styles in painting and sculpture, as well as the emergence of new examples for art, the weaknesses and shortcomings of this theory in explaining these new works became apparent. For example, in the late 19th century and into the 20th century, Cubist, Actionist, and Minimalist painters distanced themselves so much from nature that their paintings eventually became completely unrecognizable. These examples of diverse artworks undermined the theory of representation in art. Also, with the emergence of symphonic music, the question arose as to whether this type of music could be representational. On the other hand, literature, especially the literature of the modern period, has never been able to be analyzed and explained in the framework of representation theory. Because novels are made up of words, and words are not identical or copied versions of their signifiers. Or some types of poetry, such as mystical, lyrical, philosophical, moral, etc., cannot be justified by representation theory. So in the 19th century, the theory of expressionism was first proposed by Leo Tolstoy, ending the twenty-five centuries of dominance of the theory of imitation. Gradually, German Expressionist painters abandoned the attempt to accurately represent the appearances of objects and instead used specific expressive surfaces. Throughout the nineteenth, twentieth, and contemporary centuries, numerous criticisms of the theory of representation have been raised. One of these theories is the theory of formalism, which was presented by thinkers such as Clive Bell, Roger Fry, and Susan Langer. This theory considered the inherent concept of art to be the representation of a form that signifies aesthetic experience, rather than the representation of a form. In this research, after analyzing the theory of representation of Plato and Aristotle and quoting the most important criticisms raised, we have proposed and explained the theory of representation from the perspective of Avicenna. Therefore, the main question of this research is: What is the difference between Avicenna's theory of imitation and Plato's and Aristotle's theory of imitation? The sub-question of this research is: To what extent and how does Avicenna's theory of imitation respond to contemporary criticisms of the theory of imitation? The aim of this research is to demonstrate the fact that Avicenna's representation theory is different and can respond to most of the contemporary challenges and criticisms of the theory of imitation And the secondary goal is to take a small step towards formulating the philosophy of Islamic art or the philosophy of art of Muslim philosophers. The method of this research is comparative analysis. In this method, by describing and analyzing theories and then comparing them in different contexts, the similarities and differences, advantages and disadvantages of theories are discovered. In this method, the goal is to clarify concepts by comparing systems, to resolve theoretical challenges and criticisms raised. According to the findings of this research, Avicenna's theory of representation is different from Plato's and Aristotle's theory of representation, both quantitatively and qualitatively. Avicenna has discussed in more detail the types of representation, its origin and purpose. Avicenna considers representation to be the essence of imagination. Therefore, wherever imagination exist , representation is also present. The power of imagination in the works of Ibn Sina is a power that intervenes in imaginary forms and other forms of mental stock and invents new forms. Therefore, since every work of art is mixed with imagination or imagination is the proximate origin of all works of art, it is better to analyze and explain works of art with Avicenna's theory of representation. Modern and postmodern works of art are not free from imagination, but the presence of imagination is significant in these works. With Avicenna's theory of imitation, it is possible to explain and analyze literature, as well as the various types of music and paintings prevalent in the 20th and contemporary centuries. Because imagination is an ever-present part of all these works of art. The innovation of this research is in explaining and proving the claim that with Avicenna's theory of imaginary and imaginative imitations , it is possible to explain and interpret the works of art of contemporary centuries (modernism and postmodernism) and to provide a logical response to the criticisms raised

http://www.javidankherad.ir/article_242365_4acf82e84aabf0a242601242ff804134.pdf

Iranian Institute of Philosophy Sophia Perennis 2251-8932 22 1 2025 05 22 The Possibility of Hierarchical comparison among Philosophical Systems: A Study of the Problem of “Third Matters” in Mullā Ṣadrā’s Philosophy The Possibility of Hierarchical comparison among Philosophical Systems: A Study of the Problem of “Third Matters” in Mullā Ṣadrā’s Philosophy 263 289 242398 10.22034/iw.2026.573991.1874 FA Hamid Reza Bayat Faculty of Theology and Islamic Studies.University of Qom 0000-0003-0901-8525 Mahdi Monfared Department of Islamic Philosophy and Theology, Faculty of Theology, University of Qom 0009-0006-1375-1788 Journal Article 2026 02 05 Thinkers like Corbin argue that the comparative study of philosophies must consider both similarities and differences. Initially, common elements are identified, followed by an exploration of divergences in relation to these shared features. Since all philosophical systems contain universal elements, they can be assessed within a hierarchical framework called “hierarchical comparison” (taṭbīq-i rotbī). This method is not limited to comparison; it also reveals deficiencies in each system and suggests ways to improve them internally. The main criterion for ranking philosophical systems is their “most general conceptual principle,” typically their fundamental conception of existence. Its rank is determined by its “ontological scope,” the range of reality the system can theoretically comprehend. Other conceptual and propositional principles also influence the ranking. Hence, “extent of ontological coverage” becomes the key measure, with broader systems ranked higher. The relationship between higher and lower systems is analogous to that of Environment and enclosed. Hierarchical comparison starts with selecting a specific issue, determining each system’s ontological scope, and establishing their rank, a stage called “external critique.” Comparison then proceeds in two ways: ascending or descending. In the ascending method, analysis begins with the lowest-ranked system. The issue is examined, and logical shortcomings are identified through “internal critique.” During or at the end of this process, the weakness of the system in correctly explaining the issue in question in some areas of reality becomes apparent, and it is shown how this weakness stems from some of the system's conceptual and confirmation principles. By modifying or replacing them, the system rises to a higher rank, repeating this process until the highest system is reached. In the descending method, first, the problem is explained at the highest-ranked system, after which corresponding elements are identified in lower-ranked systems for comparison. Mulla Sadra’s treatment of the “three fundamental categories” (al-mavād ath-thulāth) exemplifies the ascending method. He ranks the systems as follows: the “personal unity of existence” (absolute divided existence) at the highest level, “specific gradation” (absolute existence with degrees) at the intermediate level, and the Peripatetic (Mashāʾī) system (concept of existence) at the lowest rank. Sadra begins using Peripatetic terminology but subjects it to internal critique, reconstructing the concepts of necessity, impossibility, and possibility. Necessity (wujūb) is defined as “existent by itself” (bayn bi-nafsihi), affirming existence and correcting logical inconsistencies in the Peripatetic framework. External critique reveals the Peripatetic system’s ontological limitations due to its emphasis on conceptual spaces and essences (māhiyāt). Its threefold division fails to explain the actual existence of the Necessary Being. Sadra replaces these principles with the conceptual principle of “existential truth” and the propositional principle of “primacy of existence in the external world.” The Necessary Being is an entity whose existence derives from its essence, whereas possible beings require something else for realization. This shift from conceptual space to external reality forms the basis of Sadra’s reconstruction and the correct explanation of existence. After analyzing the Peripatetic system and confirming specific gradation, Sadra establishes the “personal unity of existence.” Here, essences are realized through the unfolding of existential truth. Specific gradation acknowledges multiplicity across levels of existence, but personal unity of existence negates external multiplicity, treating all reality as a single being. Possible entities, attributes, and manifestations are aspects of this one being. In the descending method, beings and their multiplicity are compared across the three systems. In the personal unity of existence, the primary principle is “absolute, undivided, unconditional existence,” which is limitless; reality consists of only one being. Multiplicity is explained via “aspect” (shan) and “essential connection” (‘ayn al-rabṭ), showing beings as relational manifestations of the single truth. Variations among beings reflect differences in intensity and weakness in “aspect-being,” arising from successive impositions of limitations. In specific gradation, the principle is “absolute, unconditional existence with degrees.” Its propositional principle, the primacy of existence, affirms unity within multiple levels. Essences exist derivatively (mawjūd bi-tabi‘), realized according to their existential level. Multiplicity arises from variations in existential intensity and imposed limits, with the Necessary Being occupying the limitless highest level. In the Peripatetic system, the conceptual principle is the “concept of existence” in the mind. Reality consists of multiple existents, with unity preserved only in conceptual understanding. Multiplicity is explained through general gradation (taškīk-i ‘āmī), reflecting differences in applying the general concept of existence to particular entities and distinctions in their essential limits. Sadra’s hierarchical comparison demonstrates both the evaluation of systems according to their ontological breadth and their internal reconstruction, whether ascending from simpler frameworks or descending from the most comprehensive. Deficiencies are identified, principles refined, and a coherent system emerges that accounts for both unity and multiplicity, exemplified by Sadra’s personal unity of existence. Thinkers like Corbin argue that the comparative study of philosophies must consider both similarities and differences. Initially, common elements are identified, followed by an exploration of divergences in relation to these shared features. Since all philosophical systems contain universal elements, they can be assessed within a hierarchical framework called “hierarchical comparison” (taṭbīq-i rotbī). This method is not limited to comparison; it also reveals deficiencies in each system and suggests ways to improve them internally. The main criterion for ranking philosophical systems is their “most general conceptual principle,” typically their fundamental conception of existence. Its rank is determined by its “ontological scope,” the range of reality the system can theoretically comprehend. Other conceptual and propositional principles also influence the ranking. Hence, “extent of ontological coverage” becomes the key measure, with broader systems ranked higher. The relationship between higher and lower systems is analogous to that of Environment and enclosed. Hierarchical comparison starts with selecting a specific issue, determining each system’s ontological scope, and establishing their rank, a stage called “external critique.” Comparison then proceeds in two ways: ascending or descending. In the ascending method, analysis begins with the lowest-ranked system. The issue is examined, and logical shortcomings are identified through “internal critique.” During or at the end of this process, the weakness of the system in correctly explaining the issue in question in some areas of reality becomes apparent, and it is shown how this weakness stems from some of the system's conceptual and confirmation principles. By modifying or replacing them, the system rises to a higher rank, repeating this process until the highest system is reached. In the descending method, first, the problem is explained at the highest-ranked system, after which corresponding elements are identified in lower-ranked systems for comparison. Mulla Sadra’s treatment of the “three fundamental categories” (al-mavād ath-thulāth) exemplifies the ascending method. He ranks the systems as follows: the “personal unity of existence” (absolute divided existence) at the highest level, “specific gradation” (absolute existence with degrees) at the intermediate level, and the Peripatetic (Mashāʾī) system (concept of existence) at the lowest rank. Sadra begins using Peripatetic terminology but subjects it to internal critique, reconstructing the concepts of necessity, impossibility, and possibility. Necessity (wujūb) is defined as “existent by itself” (bayn bi-nafsihi), affirming existence and correcting logical inconsistencies in the Peripatetic framework. External critique reveals the Peripatetic system’s ontological limitations due to its emphasis on conceptual spaces and essences (māhiyāt). Its threefold division fails to explain the actual existence of the Necessary Being. Sadra replaces these principles with the conceptual principle of “existential truth” and the propositional principle of “primacy of existence in the external world.” The Necessary Being is an entity whose existence derives from its essence, whereas possible beings require something else for realization. This shift from conceptual space to external reality forms the basis of Sadra’s reconstruction and the correct explanation of existence. After analyzing the Peripatetic system and confirming specific gradation, Sadra establishes the “personal unity of existence.” Here, essences are realized through the unfolding of existential truth. Specific gradation acknowledges multiplicity across levels of existence, but personal unity of existence negates external multiplicity, treating all reality as a single being. Possible entities, attributes, and manifestations are aspects of this one being. In the descending method, beings and their multiplicity are compared across the three systems. In the personal unity of existence, the primary principle is “absolute, undivided, unconditional existence,” which is limitless; reality consists of only one being. Multiplicity is explained via “aspect” (shan) and “essential connection” (‘ayn al-rabṭ), showing beings as relational manifestations of the single truth. Variations among beings reflect differences in intensity and weakness in “aspect-being,” arising from successive impositions of limitations. In specific gradation, the principle is “absolute, unconditional existence with degrees.” Its propositional principle, the primacy of existence, affirms unity within multiple levels. Essences exist derivatively (mawjūd bi-tabi‘), realized according to their existential level. Multiplicity arises from variations in existential intensity and imposed limits, with the Necessary Being occupying the limitless highest level. In the Peripatetic system, the conceptual principle is the “concept of existence” in the mind. Reality consists of multiple existents, with unity preserved only in conceptual understanding. Multiplicity is explained through general gradation (taškīk-i ‘āmī), reflecting differences in applying the general concept of existence to particular entities and distinctions in their essential limits. Sadra’s hierarchical comparison demonstrates both the evaluation of systems according to their ontological breadth and their internal reconstruction, whether ascending from simpler frameworks or descending from the most comprehensive. Deficiencies are identified, principles refined, and a coherent system emerges that accounts for both unity and multiplicity, exemplified by Sadra’s personal unity of existence.

http://www.javidankherad.ir/article_242398_f451b5fec6ff416a28e870fcbe95fb86.pdf

Iranian Institute of Philosophy Sophia Perennis 2251-8932 22 1 2025 05 22 The Possibility of Psychology as a Science in Kant’s Philosophy The Possibility of Psychology as a Science in Kant’s Philosophy 290 319 241829 10.22034/iw.2026.555343.1854 FA Mohammad Hossein Vafaiyan Assistant Professor, Department of Islamic Studies and Humanities, Amir Kabir University 0009-0005-5881-5258 Seyed Mahdiyar Rahimi Master’s student in Counseling, University of Tehran 0009-0002-5087-1982 Journal Article 2025 10 25 More than a century and a half after the establishment of psychology as a science in the nineteenth century, the very nature and possibility of this discipline—aimed at providing a scientific explanation of consciousness or conscious experience—remains a matter of debate among both psychologists and philosophers. The roots of this dispute, which seems to bear within itself a structural crisis in the very domain of its subject matter, lie in the architectural model of cognition that Kant develops in his transcendental philosophy, especially in the Critique of Pure Reason. Kant’s framework appears to render impossible the very notion of psychology as an empirical and experimental science. Yet, the possibility or impossibility of psychology in Kant’s philosophy is by no means self-evident or absolute. The present study seeks to elucidate this issue by examining Kant’s various conceptions of psychology. By distinguishing between the tripartite division of empirical (experimental) psychology, rational psychology, and pragmatic anthropology, the focus will be placed on the first two. The aim is to clarify, as far as possible, the nature of each of these conceptions and the extent to which psychology, as a scientific discipline, can be founded within each. Finally, the paper also considers how psychology, as a concrete and institutionalized science, became possible in the period following Kant. More than a century and a half after the establishment of psychology as a science in the nineteenth century, the very nature and possibility of this discipline—aimed at providing a scientific explanation of consciousness or conscious experience—remains a matter of debate among both psychologists and philosophers. The roots of this dispute, which seems to bear within itself a structural crisis in the very domain of its subject matter, lie in the architectural model of cognition that Kant develops in his transcendental philosophy, especially in the Critique of Pure Reason. Kant’s framework appears to render impossible the very notion of psychology as an empirical and experimental science. Yet, the possibility or impossibility of psychology in Kant’s philosophy is by no means self-evident or absolute. The present study seeks to elucidate this issue by examining Kant’s various conceptions of psychology. By distinguishing between the tripartite division of empirical (experimental) psychology, rational psychology, and pragmatic anthropology, the focus will be placed on the first two. The aim is to clarify, as far as possible, the nature of each of these conceptions and the extent to which psychology, as a scientific discipline, can be founded within each. Finally, the paper also considers how psychology, as a concrete and institutionalized science, became possible in the period following Kant. More than a century and a half after the establishment of psychology as a science in the nineteenth century, the very nature and possibility of this discipline—aimed at providing a scientific explanation of consciousness or conscious experience—remains a matter of debate among both psychologists and philosophers. The roots of this dispute, which seems to bear within itself a structural crisis in the very domain of its subject matter, lie in the architectural model of cognition that Kant develops in his transcendental philosophy, especially in the Critique of Pure Reason. Kant’s framework appears to render impossible the very notion of psychology as an empirical and experimental science. Yet, the possibility or impossibility of psychology in Kant’s philosophy is by no means self-evident or absolute. The present study seeks to elucidate this issue by examining Kant’s various conceptions of psychology. By distinguishing between the tripartite division of empirical (experimental) psychology, rational psychology, and pragmatic anthropology, the focus will be placed on the first two. The aim is to clarify, as far as possible, the nature of each of these conceptions and the extent to which psychology, as a scientific discipline, can be founded within each. Finally, the paper also considers how psychology, as a concrete and institutionalized science, became possible in the period following Kant. More than a century and a half after the establishment of psychology as a science in the nineteenth century, the very nature and possibility of this discipline—aimed at providing a scientific explanation of consciousness or conscious experience—remains a matter of debate among both psychologists and philosophers. The roots of this dispute, which seems to bear within itself a structural crisis in the very domain of its subject matter, lie in the architectural model of cognition that Kant develops in his transcendental philosophy, especially in the Critique of Pure Reason. Kant’s framework appears to render impossible the very notion of psychology as an empirical and experimental science. More than a century and a half after the establishment of psychology as a science in the nineteenth century, the very nature and possibility of this discipline—aimed at providing a scientific explanation of consciousness or conscious experience—remains a matter of debate among both psychologists and philosophers. The roots of this dispute, which seems to bear within itself a structural crisis in the very domain of its subject matter, lie in the architectural model of cognition that Kant develops in his transcendental philosophy, especially in the Critique of Pure Reason. Kant’s framework appears to render impossible the very notion of psychology as an empirical and experimental science. Yet, the possibility or impossibility of psychology in Kant’s philosophy is by no means self-evident or absolute. The present study seeks to elucidate this issue by examining Kant’s various conceptions of psychology. By distinguishing between the tripartite division of empirical (experimental) psychology, rational psychology, and pragmatic anthropology, the focus will be placed on the first two. The aim is to clarify, as far as possible, the nature of each of these conceptions and the extent to which psychology, as a scientific discipline, can be founded within each. Finally, the paper also considers how psychology, as a concrete and institutionalized science, became possible in the period following Kant. More than a century and a half after the establishment of psychology as a science in the nineteenth century, the very nature and possibility of this discipline—aimed at providing a scientific explanation of consciousness or conscious experience—remains a matter of debate among both psychologists and philosophers. The roots of this dispute, which seems to bear within itself a structural crisis in the very domain of its subject matter, lie in the architectural model of cognition that Kant develops in his transcendental philosophy, especially in the Critique of Pure Reason. Kant’s framework appears to render impossible the very notion of psychology as an empirical and experimental science. Yet, the possibility or impossibility of psychology in Kant’s philosophy is by no means self-evident or absolute. The present study seeks to elucidate this issue by examining Kant’s various conceptions of psychology. By distinguishing between the tripartite division of empirical (experimental) psychology, rational psychology, and pragmatic anthropology, the focus will be placed on the first two. The aim is to clarify, as far as possible, the nature of each of these conceptions and the extent to which psychology, as a scientific discipline, can be founded within each. Finally, the paper also considers how psychology, as a concrete and institutionalized science, became possible in the period following Kant. More than a century and a half after the establishment of psychology as a science in the nineteenth century, the very nature and possibility of this discipline—aimed at providing a scientific explanation of consciousness or conscious experience—remains a matter of debate among both psychologists and philosophers. The roots of this dispute, which seems to bear within itself a structural crisis in the very domain of its subject matter, lie in the architectural model of cognition that Kant develops in his transcendental philosophy, especially in the Critique of Pure Reason. Kant’s framework appears to render impossible the very notion of psychology as an empirical and experimental science. Yet, the possibility or impossibility of psychology in Kant’s philosophy is by no means self-evident or absolute. The present study seeks to elucidate this issue by examining Kant’s various conceptions of psychology. By distinguishing between the tripartite division of empirical (experimental) psychology, rational psychology, and pragmatic anthropology, the focus will be placed on the first two. The aim is to clarify, as far as possible, the nature of each of these conceptions and the extent to which psychology, as a scientific discipline, can be founded within each. Finally, the paper also considers how psychology, as a concrete and institutionalized science, became possible in the period following Kant. More than a century and a half after the establishment of psychology as a science in the nineteenth century, the very nature and possibility of this discipline—aimed at providing a scientific explanation of consciousness or conscious experience—remains a matter of debate among both psychologists and philosophers. The roots of this dispute, which seems to bear within itself a structural crisis in the very domain of its subject matter, lie in the architectural model of cognition that Kant develops in his transcendental philosophy, especially in the Critique of Pure Reason. Kant’s framework appears to render impossible the very notion of psychology as an empirical and experimental science.

http://www.javidankherad.ir/article_241829_e7f73a93b7edcc0e428a4d4ca35e806f.pdf