Sophia Perennis

Sophia Perennis

Objectual Understanding, Propositional Understanding and Their Relation

Document Type : Original Article

Author
Aboutorab Yaghmaie
Institute for Science and Technology Studies, Shahid Beheshti University
10.22034/iw.2024.425839.1744
Abstract
The distinction between propositional and objectual understanding is one among others pertaining to understanding. While the object of the former is a fact, the object of the latter is a theory, a system, an entity, a concept, a model, a property, or a collection of phenomena. The question at issue, however, is how these two kinds of understanding are related. Specifically, is the latter reducible to the former? Or is objectual understanding more than and above propositional understanding? In this article, I will first introduce and elaborate on some accounts that support some sort of anti-reductionism. I will then engage with one of the most detailed critiques against anti-reductionism, i.e. Kareem Khalifa’s one, and evaluate its scope of validity. After proposing an account of understanding in which scientific representation plays a key role, I discuss, finally, whether the reductionism within this account is tenable.
Keywords
Propositional Understanding
Objectual Understanding
Reductionism
Scientific Representation
Subjects
Baumberger, C. (2014). Types of understanding: Their nature and their relation to knowledge. Conceptus, 40(98), 67-88.
Baumberger, C., Beisbart, C., & Brun, G. (2016). What is understanding? An overview of recent debates in epistemology and philosophy of science. In S. R. Grimm, C. Baumberger & S. Ammon (Eds.), Explaining understanding: New perspectives from epistemology and philosophy of science (pp. 1-34).
Bondy, A., & Murty, U. S. R. (2011). Graph Theory: Springer London.
Camp, E. (2018). Why maps are not propositional. In A. Grzankowski & M. Montague (Eds.), Non-Propositional Intentionality: Oxford University Press.
de Regt, H. W., & Dieks, D. (2005). A Contextual Approach to Scientific Understanding. Synthese, 144(1), 137-170.
Dellsén, F. (2016). Scientific progress: Knowledge versus understanding. Studies In History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 56, 72-83.
Dellsén, F. (2017). Understanding without Justification or Belief. Ratio, 30(3), 239-254.
DePaul, M., & Grimm, S. (2007). Review Essay: Jonathan Kvanvig’s The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 498–514, 498–514.
Elgin, C. Z. (1996). Considered Judgment: Princeton University Press.
Elgin, C. Z. (2004). True enough. Philosophical Issues, 14(1), 113–131.
Elgin, C. Z. (2007). Understanding and the facts. Philosophical Studies, 132(1), 33 - 42.
Elgin, C. Z. (2017). True Enough: MIT Press.
Frigg, R., & Nguyen, J. (2017). Models and representation. In L. Magnani & T. Bertolotti (Eds.), Springer Handbook of Model-Based Science (pp. 49-102).
Gardiner, G. (2012). Understanding, Integration, and Epistemic Value. Acta Analytica, 27(2), 163-181.
Grimm, S. R. (2006). Is understanding a species of knowledge? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 57(3), 515-535.
Grimm, S. R. (2010). The goal of explanation. Studies In History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 41(4), 337-344.
Grimm, S. R. (2016). "Understanding and Transparency" Explaining understanding: New perspectives from epistemology and philosophy of science: Routledge.
Grzankowski, A. (2013). Non‐Propositional Attitudes. Philosophy Compass, 8(12), 1123-1137.
Hannon, M. (2021). Recent Work in the Epistemology of Understanding. American Philosophical Quarterly, 58(3), 269-290.
Hempel, C. (1965). Aspects of scientific explanation and other essays in the philosophy of science. New York: Free Press.
Hempel, C., & Oppenheim, P. (1948). Studies in the Logic of Explanation. Philosophy of Science, 15, 135-175.
Khalifa, K. (2013). Is understanding explanatory or objectual? Synthese, 190(6), 1153-1171.
Kvanvig, J. (2003). The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding: Cambridge University Press.
Kvanvig, J. (2009a). The Value of Understanding. In A. Haddock, A. Millar & D. Pritchard (Eds.), Epistemic Value (pp. 95-111). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kvanvig, J. (2009b). The Value of Understanding. In A. Haddock, A. Millar & D. Pritchard (Eds.), Epistemic Value (pp. 104-120): Oxford University Press.
Lawler, I., Khalifa, K., & Shech, E. (2022). Scientific Understanding and Representation: Modeling in the Physical Sciences: Routledge.
Morales Carbonell, F. (2023). Compressing Graphs: a Model for the Content of Understanding. Erkenntnis, 1-29.
Strevens, M. (2004). The causal and unification approaches to explanation unified—causally. Noûs, 38(1), 154–176.
Strevens, M. (2013). No understanding without explanation. Studies In History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 44(3), 510-515.
Wilkenfeld, D. (2013). Understanding as representation manipulability. Synthese, 190(6), 997-1016.
Wilkenfeld, D. (2016). Understanding without believing. In S. R. Grimm, C. Baumberger & S. Ammon (Eds.), Explaining understanding (pp. 334-350): Routledge.
Wilkenfeld, D. (2019). Understanding as compression. Philosophical Studies, 176(10), 2807-2831.
Woodward, J. (2003). Making things happen: A theory of causal explanation: Oxford University Press.
Zagzebski, L. (1996). Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry Into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of Knowledge: Cambridge University Press.
Zagzebski, L. (2001). Recovering Understanding. In M. Steup (Ed.), Knowledge, Truth, and Duty: Essays on Epistemic Justification, Responsibility, and Virtue: Oxford University Press.