Extended Abstract

Agnostics hold that epistemic judgment about the existence of God ought to be suspended. This epistemic–theological school comprises diverse forms; depending on the scope of applicability among individuals, some thinkers regard this injunction as binding on all epistemic agents (strong agnosticism), while others reject such all-encompassing application and deny a singular rule for every agent (weak agnosticism). Thus, weak agnosticism entails that an epistemic agent is permitted to remain without a conclusive judgment concerning God’s existence. Two main reasons can be advanced in defense of this perspective:

1. Defense Based on the Epistemic Situation

Given the epistemic situation and the diversity of conditions and capacities among epistemic agents, and the influence of these attributes on their awareness of evidence and its weighting, their divergent judgments—including remaining agnostic about God’s existence—are justified. By acknowledging the variation in epistemic situation, this justification remains acceptable as long as an individual has observed the ethics of belief and fulfilled his epistemic duties. Since the aim of knowledge is to attain truth—and truth is defined as something independent of the epistemic agents—we must, as far as possible, put in place guidelines to guard against subjective and personal influences. However, we cannot require epistemic agents to perform beyond their capacities, and epistemic errors occur abundantly in the process of acquiring knowledge. Now, if an individual’s epistemic situation is not adequate, he should not take a position either for or against a matter simply because they lack evidence; rather, epistemic suspension of judgment is the correct stance. In light of the discussions raised in the debate over the existence of God, if God exists, factors such as sin may have affected the individual’s epistemic disposition, leaving them unable to secure evidence in God’s favor; or if God does not exist, the individual—driven by a psychological need for a transcendent being, by wishful thinking, or by a psychological need not to know—may be unable to properly grasp reasons against God’s existence. These are possibilities and circumstances that compromise one’s cognitive capacities and create situations in which the individual cannot form a sound epistemic judgment; accordingly, epistemic suspension of judgment is a justified and reasonable option for them. (Morris, 1986)

2. Defense Based on the Principle of Epistemic Conservatism

According to one reading of the principle of epistemic conservatism (that a person may continue to believe a proposition as long as they have not found any reason to reject it), an individual’s internal reasons are sufficient to legitimate the ongoing persistence of their belief; hence, someone who get agnostic is, in principle and to the extent of that belief, justified in maintaining it. However, limiting this principle solely to internal reasons faces difficulties, and therefore it cannot serve as a solid foundation for weak agnosticism. Graham Oppy, drawing on Gilbert Harman’s epistemic principle and an internalist account of the justification required for belief, seeks to defend weak agnosticism. On his reading, the sufficiency of an individual’s internal reasons to justify their belief—and the prima facie entitlement to continue holding it so long as no defeating reason appears—serves as the major premise, while the person’s agnostic stance functions as the minor premise and a concrete instance of this rule. Oppy regards this epistemic principle as closely akin to the theistic claim that religious belief can be properly basic and non-inferentially justified, and he argues that anyone who accepts it thereby renders agnosticism a defensible position. On Oppy’s interpretation, individuals are entitled to consider their ongoing commitment epistemically justified based on their own internal reasons. These internal reasons sometimes support theism or atheism and sometimes warrant an epistemic suspension of judgment; according to the stated principle, all such responses are both permissible and justified for those who embrace them. It may happen that someone fails to reach a determinate conclusion about God’s existence—regardless of which factors produce that result—but because their personal reasons are epistemically sufficient for them, this agnostic position is recognized as legitimate. (Oppy, 1994, p. 161)