Extended Abstract

Kant’s discussion of instrumental rationality in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals has drawn significant attention in recent years. According to Kant, selecting appropriate means for an intended end is a practical norm to which rational beings are bound. This article argues that, contrary to Kant’s claim in the Groundwork, instrumental rationality is merely the application of logical rules in practical inferences and cannot be considered a practical norm.

According to Kant, an imperative has two characteristics: (1) it is objective, i.e., it is valid for all rational beings, and (2) it is open to transgression, i.e., it addresses rational beings who, due to inclinations and incentives, are capable of acting contrary to an objective principle. Therefore, to demonstrate the possibility of technical imperatives, Kant must establish both of these features for them. The objectivity of this principle is demonstrated through its analyticity: the principle that “whoever wills an end must also will the necessary means to that end” (the principle of instrumental rationality) is analytic (though its precise formulation requires additional qualifications). To will an end is to consider oneself the cause of realizing that end, which inherently involves willing the means. However, the analyticity of the principle means that it cannot be transgressed.

Some commentators, to address this issue, have treated the principle of instrumental rationality as normative. According to them, “whoever wills an end must also will the necessary means to that end” is not analytic and also incorrect. The analytic principle is rather, “whoever wills an end, insofar as they act rationally, must also will the necessary means to that end.” Agents who are influenced by incentives may fail to act rationally, and thus technical imperatives become possible. However, this interpretation undermines the Kantian account of how the principle of instrumental rationality can influence action. According to this interpretation, an agent who rationally sets an end for themselves may nevertheless fail to act toward achieving that end due to opposing desires. Thus, the principle of instrumental rationality would only influence action if it possesses greater motivational force than these conflicting desires. Yet the strength of the principle relative to other inclinations is a contingent matter. Therefore, it cannot be said that the agent acted from the principle of instrumental rationality itself.

Nevertheless, two challenges remain that seem to necessitate the existence of technical imperatives. The first challenge arises from the observation that violations of the principle of instrumental rationality occur in certain circumstances. In response, it can be argued that these circumstances can be interpreted differently. Often, agents merely wish for an end without genuinely willing it. Furthermore, willing an end always follows a consideration of all the associated costs. An agent may initially will an end but, upon recognizing the costs of achieving it, abandon that will.

The second challenge is that practical inferences regarding instrumental rationality appear to require technical imperatives. To derive willing the means from willing an end and knowing the means necessary to achieve that end, an additional premise seems to be required. However, this interpretation arises from a misunderstanding due to the incorrect formulation of the premises of the inference. Willing is a propositional attitude and should not appear in the content of the premises. When this is clarified, deriving the conclusion requires nothing beyond modus ponens.

The remaining question is: What is the meaning of statements like “If you want E, then you must do A”? At least two distinct interpretations can be considered. These statements can express a factual condition, in which case they are merely theoretical and do not convey any obligation. Alternatively, they may express a logical necessity, in which case they mandate a logical rule. For this interpretation to hold, logical rules must be normative. In this sense, these statements can be considered imperatives because they pertain to logic, not to practical rationality.

In Kant’s works after the Groundwork, the rules of instrumental rationality are treated as merely theoretical. The best explanation for Kant’s shift in position is that the classification of imperatives in the Groundwork is provisional and not a fully developed theory of practical rationality in general.