Document Type : Original Article
Highlights
"Paradox" literally means "unbelievable"; And in terms of meaning, it is unbelievable because, according to the definition, it is an argument with apparently true premises, and apparently valid form, which gives an obviously false and sometimes contradictory result. Trying to solve paradoxes has led us to discover very subtle concepts, principles, and demarcations that were completely absent from our minds before facing "Paradox" literally means "unbelievable"; And in terms of meaning, it is unbelievable because, according to the definition, it is an argument with apparently true premises, and apparently valid form, which gives an obviously false and sometimes contradictory result. Trying to solve paradoxes has led us to discover very subtle concepts, principles, and demarcations that were completely absent from our minds before facing paradoxes. In Islamic logic and philosophy, paradoxes are mostly examined under the title of "doubt", because in them claims are defended that are similar to the truth but are actually false. Doubts of absolute annihilation and absolute unknown, the doubt of al-jazr al-asamm, and the doubt of implication are among the most important paradoxes that have been analyzed in this intellectual tradition. Another one of these paradoxes, which in this article we intend to analyze some of its angles, is a question that so-called Abu Saʿīd asked Ibn Sina. The summary of Abu Saʿīd's problem, which I will formulate in detail in the text, is that philosophers rely on the system of Syllogisms in acquiring knowledge, and the foundation of this system is the Barbara, which has a circularity; Because in this mood, the knowledge of the result is dependent on the knowledge of the Major Premiss, while the knowledge of the Major Premiss is also dependent on the knowledge of the result. The summary of Ibn Sina's solution is that if the Major Premiss is inductive, its knowledge is dependent on the knowledge of the result and circularity occurs, but if it is deduction, its knowledge is not dependent on the knowledge of the result and circularity does not arise; And the method of philosophers is deduction, not induction. In another article, I have explained that Avicenna's solution was very important and constructive for the logic of the Islamic period, because it led to the separation of real and external propositions and the inclusion of this separation in Syllogisms. Ibn Sina's answer to Abu Saʿīd's question is a "solution answer", so to speak. But have they given a "contradictory answer" to this issue or can it be given? So far, at least one contradictory answer has been given to Abu Saʿīd's suspicion. This answer, which claims to discover self-refutation in Abu Saʿīd's reason, has been challenged by some researchers. In this essay, I will try to defend this contradictory answer by solving this challenge, and secondly, I will propose another contradictory answer based on the concept of begging the question. Based on Ibn Sina's solution, another criticism can be made on Abu Saʿīd's argument. Almost all the old and new commentators of Aristotle agree with Ross that "we often find in Aristotle a contrast between deduction and induction as two fundamentally different modes of progress in thought - the first from the universal to the particular, and the second from the particular to the universal". Now, pay attention to this statement by Abu Saʿīd, which says that the only way to know the general proposition is to examine the propositions included in it; In other words, the only method of reasoning that gives knowledge is induction. Now the requirement of such a statement is that syllogism is not informative. Therefore, when this statement is placed in Major Premiss, Step II, the premiss of Abu Saʿīd's argument is that syllogism is not informative, while this is also the result of his argument. So his reason only works if its conclusion is presupposed; And this is indeed to beg the question. In other words, the proposition "syllogism does not give knowledge" is true if Abu Saʿīd's five-step argument is true; And this argument is true if the Major Premiss of syllogism II is true; And this Major Premiss is true if we presuppose the statement "syllogism is not informative"- it is to beg the question! One of the other problems that Abu Saʿīd's argument faces is self-refutation, in the sense that in order to negate the theory of syllogism, Abu Saʿīd must accept it. As we have seen, he organizes an argument with the conclusion that syllogism is not informative. But the point of paradox is that if the truth of this result is justified, then the truth of this result is not justified. Because this result is obtained from an argument that uses syllogistic, and specifically Barbara, at least in steps I and II. Therefore, the truth of this result requires the invalidity of its reason, and it also requires its illogicality.
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