ABSTRACT

This study, drawing on original mystical and theological texts, examines Ibn Arabi’s perspective on the issue of predestination (jabr) and free will (ikhtiyar) and compares it with the view of the Ash‘arites. Findings indicate that Islamic mysticism (‘irfan), based on its mystical foundations, offers a distinct analysis of the issue of predestination and free will, which cannot be found within any of the prevalent theological schools such as the Ash‘arites and Mu‘tazilites. By critiquing the Ash‘arite theory of acquisition (kasb), Ibn Arabi demonstrates the independence of mysticism from Ash‘arism. He also considers the Mu‘tazilite theory of delegation (tafwīḍ) to be incorrect. Ultimately, he presents the theory of ‘amr bayn al-amrayn’ (a matter between two matters) through a mystical interpretation. According to this, human action possesses two aspects: existential (wujūdī) and determinative (ta‘yīnī), and is simultaneously ascribed to God (in terms of existence) and to the human (in terms of determination). Thus, Ibn Arabi resolves the issue of predestination and free will without leaning towards absolute predestination or absolute delegation.

Keywords: Ibn Arabi, Ash‘arites, Predestination and Free Will, Acquisition, Delegation, Amr bayn al-amrayn.

Introduction Introduction

Within the realm of Islamic thought, the issue of predestination and free will is one of the most fundamental and challenging theological, philosophical, and mystical discussions. This issue is not confined merely to the domain of abstract theorizing and has fateful consequences in the spheres of faith, morality, and the spiritual path of the individual. In the tradition of Islamic theology, the Ash‘arites, by centering the oneness of divine acts (tawḥīd al-af‘āl), have inclined towards a form of determinism, while the Mu‘tazilites, emphasizing divine justice, have allowed for a broad scope for human free will and action. Imami theologians have also transcended this dichotomy by proposing the theory of ‘amr bayn al-amrayn’.

Islamic mysticism, however, with its distinct foundations and premises, adopts a different approach to this issue. Nevertheless, sometimes due to an incomplete understanding of mysticism or viewing it from a non-mystical perspective, this approach is measured against theological frameworks, and the resulting conclusions are attributed to the mystics. In this theology-centric view, mysticism is often analyzed and evaluated with an Ash‘arite background, and mystics are considered followers of the Ash‘arites. Whereas neither does mysticism accept such a connection and influence from theology, nor do the mystics themselves believe in such a background or linkage. They consider themselves independent in providing any theory, including the issue of predestination and free will.

This study, employing a comparative-analytical method, seeks to compare Ibn Arabi's mystical view on the issue of predestination and free will with the Ash‘arite theory of ‘kasb’ and reveal the fundamental distinctions between these two approaches. The aim is to show that Ibn Arabi is not only not a follower of theological schools (especially Ash‘arism), but by transcending the Ash‘arite-Mu‘tazilite dichotomies, he redefines and resolves the issue in light of his own specific principles. Accordingly, he deems the Ash‘arite ‘kasb’ and the Mu‘tazilite ‘tafwīḍ’ incorrect and himself adheres to a third position (amr bayn al-amrayn).

Numerous studies have examined Ibn Arabi's views thus far, but few have relied on his coherent intellectual system, and a systematic comparison between his view and the Ash‘arite theory of ‘kasb’ has not been conducted. This research gap has impacted both the understanding of the epistemological distinctions between mysticism and theology and the precise explanation of Ibn Arabi's position regarding human free will. Therefore, a comparative examination of this view, based on mystical and theological foundations, is considered a scientific and necessary research. In the course of the present study, by analyzing Ibn Arabi's viewpoint, an attempt is made to answer the following questions:

On which overarching mystical principles is Ibn Arabi's theory of predestination and free will based? What fundamental differences does this theory have with the Ash‘arite theory of ‘kasb’? How does Ibn Arabi, relying on his mystical principles, present the theory of ‘amr bayn al-amrayn’ as an alternative to absolute predestination and absolute delegation?



The following responses can be considered for the aforementioned questions:

Ibn al-ʿArabī’s theory of predestination and free will is built upon the mystical foundations of "the creation of humankind in the image of the Real (al-Ḥaqq)," "the dependency of knowledge on the known object," "the perpetual renewal of similitudes (tajaddud al-amthāl)," "the personal unity of existence (waḥdat shakhṣiyyat al-wujūd)," and "the particular aspect (al-wajh al-khāṣ)." This theory differs fundamentally from the theory of acquisition (kasb) in matters concerning innate human will, the influence of divine power on acts, the dual-aspect nature of acts, and divine agency within creaturely agency. By rejecting both absolute determinism (jabr muṭlaq) and absolute delegation (tafwīḍ muṭlaq), Ibn al-ʿArabī regards both God (al-Ḥaqq) and the servant (al-ʿabd) as simultaneous agents of the act, with each influencing the act in a distinct respect—existential (wujūdī) and determinate (taʿyīnī).