More than a century and a half after the establishment of psychology as a science in the nineteenth century, the very nature and possibility of this discipline—aimed at providing a scientific explanation of consciousness or conscious experience—remains a matter of debate among both psychologists and philosophers. The roots of this dispute, which seems to bear within itself a structural crisis in the very domain of its subject matter, lie in the architectural model of cognition that Kant develops in his transcendental philosophy, especially in the Critique of Pure Reason. Kant’s framework appears to render impossible the very notion of psychology as an empirical and experimental science. Yet, the possibility or impossibility of psychology in Kant’s philosophy is by no means self-evident or absolute. The present study seeks to elucidate this issue by examining Kant’s various conceptions of psychology. By distinguishing between the tripartite division of empirical (experimental) psychology, rational psychology, and pragmatic anthropology, the focus will be placed on the first two. The aim is to clarify, as far as possible, the nature of each of these conceptions and the extent to which psychology, as a scientific discipline, can be founded within each. Finally, the paper also considers how psychology, as a concrete and institutionalized science, became possible in the period following Kant.

More than a century and a half after the establishment of psychology as a science in the nineteenth century, the very nature and possibility of this discipline—aimed at providing a scientific explanation of consciousness or conscious experience—remains a matter of debate among both psychologists and philosophers. The roots of this dispute, which seems to bear within itself a structural crisis in the very domain of its subject matter, lie in the architectural model of cognition that Kant develops in his transcendental philosophy, especially in the Critique of Pure Reason. Kant’s framework appears to render impossible the very notion of psychology as an empirical and experimental science. Yet, the possibility or impossibility of psychology in Kant’s philosophy is by no means self-evident or absolute. The present study seeks to elucidate this issue by examining Kant’s various conceptions of psychology. By distinguishing between the tripartite division of empirical (experimental) psychology, rational psychology, and pragmatic anthropology, the focus will be placed on the first two. The aim is to clarify, as far as possible, the nature of each of these conceptions and the extent to which psychology, as a scientific discipline, can be founded within each. Finally, the paper also considers how psychology, as a concrete and institutionalized science, became possible in the period following Kant.

More than a century and a half after the establishment of psychology as a science in the nineteenth century, the very nature and possibility of this discipline—aimed at providing a scientific explanation of consciousness or conscious experience—remains a matter of debate among both psychologists and philosophers. The roots of this dispute, which seems to bear within itself a structural crisis in the very domain of its subject matter, lie in the architectural model of cognition that Kant develops in his transcendental philosophy, especially in the Critique of Pure Reason. Kant’s framework appears to render impossible the very notion of psychology as an empirical and experimental science. Yet, the possibility or impossibility of psychology in Kant’s philosophy is by no means self-evident or absolute. The present study seeks to elucidate this issue by examining Kant’s various conceptions of psychology. By distinguishing between the tripartite division of empirical (experimental) psychology, rational psychology, and pragmatic anthropology, the focus will be placed on the first two. The aim is to clarify, as far as possible, the nature of each of these conceptions and the extent to which psychology, as a scientific discipline, can be founded within each. Finally, the paper also considers how psychology, as a concrete and institutionalized science, became possible in the period following Kant.

More than a century and a half after the establishment of psychology as a science in the nineteenth century, the very nature and possibility of this discipline—aimed at providing a scientific explanation of consciousness or conscious experience—remains a matter of debate among both psychologists and philosophers. The roots of this dispute, which seems to bear within itself a structural crisis in the very domain of its subject matter, lie in the architectural model of cognition that Kant develops in his transcendental philosophy, especially in the Critique of Pure Reason. Kant’s framework appears to render impossible the very notion of psychology as an empirical and experimental science.