This study examines how the Imaginal World (ʿālam al-mithāl) has entered contemporary film and image theories through the work of Henry Corbin. The central question is: when Illuminationist concepts are introduced into modern conceptual frameworks, what aspects of their ontological and Illuminationist foundations are preserved, and what is lost? In other words, is this transfer merely an expansion of the influence of Islamic philosophy, or does it also entail a transformation in the original meaning of these concepts? The study aims to critically analyze three prominent readings of the Imaginal World in contemporary film theory in order to show to what extent each remains faithful to the ontological status of the Imaginal World, and at what point each falls into the immanentization of this concept. The research method is descriptive-analytical, based on a comparative study of the works of Christian Jambet, Laura U. Marks, and Joan Copjec, with a focus on their primary texts in philosophy, film, and psychoanalysis. The findings reveal that all three thinkers, despite being influenced by Corbin, engage with Illuminationist concepts in distinct ways: Jambet remains more faithful than the others to preserving the link between the Imaginal World, light, and the sacred, regarding cinema as a site for the manifestation of truth; Marks, inspired by Mullā Ṣadrā, relocates the Imaginal World to the domains of perception, politics, and technology, consciously proposing the possibility of an immanent reading of it; and Copjec, while influenced by Corbin, interprets the Imaginal World as a structural gap within reality, redefining its ontological and sacred foundation. The study concludes that although these readings have opened important capacities for film analysis, they have in many cases led to a displacement of Illuminationist foundations, employing the language and structure of Illuminationism without accepting its metaphysical basis. Therefore, a dialogue between the Imaginal World and film theory can only remain aligned with Illuminationist philosophy if its ontological status is preserved and the concept is not reduced to an aesthetic or psychological metaphor.