Abstract

In the philosophical corpus of Allameh Tabataba'i, the "Principle of Reality" (Aṣl al-Wāqi‘iyyah) serves as the fundamental point of departure for philosophy. However, the succinctness of Tabataba'i's exposition, coupled with divergent readings of this principle, has led to numerous misunderstandings. Employing an analytical and text-based methodology, this article demonstrates that, first, the inception of philosophy is grounded in the acceptance of three self-evident premises: (1) reality exists; (2) cognition of this reality is, in principle, possible; and (3) there is a possibility of error in this cognition. Second, the Principle of Reality possesses conceptual nuances and dimensions that substantiate the necessity of philosophical inquiry. The subject of this principle is absolute and unconditioned by any restriction; it constitutes acquired knowledge (al-‘ilm al-ḥuṣūlī), refutes the very "possibility" of sophistry (radical skepticism), and is understood in terms of common predication (al-ḥaml al-shā’i‘) and as an a priori proposition. Furthermore, this principle both secures the subject matter of philosophy and, while retaining its status as a foundational assertive principle (mabda’ taṣdīqī), constitutes a philosophical proposition in its own right. Third, the mere "possibility" of error—rather than its "actuality"—in cognizing reality is sufficient to fulfill Tabataba'i’s philosophical objective, notwithstanding the varied formulations employed to express it. Each of these premises and their corollaries has given rise to alternative readings incompatible with Tabataba'i’s foundational framework; through an examination of these views, this paper articulates a critique of such rival interpretations.

Keywords: Principle of Reality, Possibility of Sophistry, Possibility of Error, Acquired Knowledge (al-‘ilm al-ḥuṣūlī), Allameh Tabataba'i.