In this article, we aim to shed new light on the methodology of Illuminationist philosophy, focusing on some of the principles and rules that are specific to this school of thought.

Suhrawardi (1154–1191) dedicates the first part of his Hikmat al-Ishraq to logic, offering innovative discussions that challenge certain tenets of traditional logic. In the other sections of this book and in some of his illuminationistic writings, he introduces principles and rules that could be considered relevant to logic. The main root of the differences with traditional logic lies in Suhrawardi’s methodology, which we will argue is essentially different from that of the Peripatetic school. In this paper, we discuss that Suhrawardi developed a subjectivist philosophy, which we will characterize as radical rationalism. Suhrawardi’s specific arguments in his illuminationist philosophy align with a logic that supports this subjectivist approach. In this regard, we observe interesting similarities with intuitionist logic and its philosophical foundations, particularly the anti-realist view of logic.



The structure of the paper is as follows:



In the first half of the paper, we discuss the thesis that both aforementioned views are based on a subjectivist approach. In the second half, we will analyze some of the most significant of the similarities between the two on a case-by-case basis.

Section 1 highlights the methodological originality of illuminationism, emphasizing that it is a rationalist and subjectivist philosophy. This makes it radically different from the common philosophical tradition of the time, although Suhrawardi’s approach is not without predecessors. Some commentators see illuminationism’s differentia in its mystical orientation. Therefore, our discussion of the methodological priority of consciousness in illuminationism, in accordance with a new trend in Suhrawardi scholarship, is to contribute to debates on the proper interpretation of Suhrawardi’s work. The focus of our discussion is on the implications of the aforementioned approach for epistemology and, consequently, the status of logic.

Section 2 begins with a brief introduction to intuitionism. I then discuss the philosophical foundations of this approach, developing an interpretation that demonstrates how the formal differences between intuitionistic and classical logic reflect certain philosophical and epistemological characteristics. This demonstrates the proper sense of anti-realism attributed to intuitionism. Understood as a methodological orientation, this anti-realism is clearly akin to Suhrawardi’s philosophy of consciousness.

In section 3, I list some of the specific rules and logical remarks of illuminationism, and then in the following section, on the basis of the foundational affinities discussed, I compare them with their counterparts in intuitionistic logic.

The issues raised and discussed in this article are as follows: 1- 'knowledge by presence' in illuminationism corresponds to 'intuition' in Brouwer's intuitionist philosophy. Also, logic is related to acquired science and has no application in presential knowledge, just as according to Brouwer's view, primary intuition is speechless, and mathematics, as a science built from intuition, is independent of logic. 2- The concept of 'rational i’tibar' in Suhrawardi's view, which concerns philosophical concepts such as existence, unity, possibility, attributes and numbers, is similar to the concept of 'transcendental' in the Kantian or, more precisely, Husserlian sense. For Suhrawardi, categories’ being i’tibar-i aqli also indicates that the mind (aql) is active in articulating objects, just as Brouwer considers the “creating subject” to be constructive, not merely a discoverer (of mathematics, in particular). 3- The peripatetic theory of definition is based on the idea that meanings in the external world are composed of genus and species that exist independently of the mind. This view is akin to the image theory of meaning and is based on a methodological realism. Suhrawardi's denial of the peripatetic theory of definition, that they are essentially combination of genus and species, is akin to anti-realism as in Brouwer's intuitionism. 4. Suhrawardi's considerations in the field of logic may be related to the use of logic in the Illuminationist approach, rather than to the formal structure of logic, which in the latter case, as some contemporary logicians have shown, would present problems. These considerations would be similar to those that exist in intuitionism regarding the use of existential propositions or negative propositions, without the aforementioned considerations demandig the elimination of these propositional forms from the formal structure of logic. This approach is consistent with the general view of Illuminationist philosophy as well as intuitionism in restricting the dominion of formal logic.