The main foundation of the theoretical mysticism of Ibn Arabi and his followers is the theory of "unity of existence", or more precisely, "unity of being", meaning that there is no other being in the universe except God, and the beings that others consider "other than God" and His creatures are nothing but developments and determinations of God's essence, meaning that it is God who has manifested and determined himself in the form of various beings (earth, sky, man, animal, tree, etc.). This theory has its prerequisites and consequences, one of which, according to Ibn Arabi and the believers of his school, is the compulsion of man and the negation of his free will.

One of these requirements is the interpretation of "the monotheism of actions" from the perspective of these mystics, meaning that "since there is no other being other than God, then there is no agent other than God, and the action of every being is, in fact, the action of God, which is "figuratively" attributed to that being and "really" attributed to God." In other words, the result of this interpretation is an "instrumentalist" view of man, meaning that man is only a tool and means in the hands of the true agent, namely God, and he has no choice in performing his actions, and his only role is as a place for the realization of divine actions; that is, the same view that - as Ibn Arabi and his commentators and followers have clarified - the Ash'arites and Jahmiyyah (believers in predestination) have of man, and they consider man to be merely the place of God's actions.

Another requirement of the theory of the "unity of existence" - which can be considered a higher layer of this theory - is that since there is no other being "other than God", then basically there is no human being (or any other being) as "other than God" that we can say is forced or free, and in other words, the discussion of whether or not a human being is forced or free or authorized is from the perspective of "negative to the end of the matter". The present article explains, analyzes and evaluates the aforementioned theories and, by mentioning the statements of Ibn Arabi and his commentators and commentators on these requirements and results, shows that "human agency" has no place in his theoretical system of mysticism and that his school is an example of the theories of "moderate Ash'arite determinism" and rather "absolute Jahmiyyah determinism"; theories that are neither compatible with man's direct knowledge of himself and his circumstances, nor with reason, nature and human conscience. In addition, Ibn Arabi's school of thought on the subject of predestination and choice, both in terms of his instrumentalist view of man (in his interpretation of the monotheism of actions) and in terms of his "negatively considering" "predestination", "delegation" and "choice" in relation to man and other creatures (in his theory of the "unity of being"), contradicts the explicit text of countless verses and hadiths. Also, in the final pages of the article, several important questions that may be raised for the readers of the article have been answered.

The main foundation of the theoretical mysticism of Ibn Arabi and his followers is the theory of "unity of existence", or more precisely, "unity of being", meaning that there is no other being in the universe except God, and the beings that others consider "other than God" and His creatures are nothing but developments and determinations of God's essence, meaning that it is God who has manifested and determined himself in the form of various beings (earth, sky, man, animal, tree, etc.). This theory has its prerequisites and consequences, one of which, according to Ibn Arabi and the believers of his school, is the compulsion of man and the negation of his free will.

One of these requirements is the interpretation of "the monotheism of actions" from the perspective of these mystics, meaning that "since there is no other being other than God, then there is no agent other than God, and the action of every being is, in fact, the action of God, which is "figuratively" attributed to that being and "really" attributed to God." In other words, the result of this interpretation is an "instrumentalist" view of man, meaning that man is only a tool and means in the hands of the true agent, namely God, and he has no choice in performing his actions, and his only role is as a place for the realization of divine actions; that is, the same view that - as Ibn Arabi and his commentators and followers have clarified - the Ash'arites and Jahmiyyah (believers in predestination) have of man, and they consider man to be merely the place of God's actions.