The role of givenness in early Heidegger’s perspective

Document Type : Original Article


Department of Philosophy, Iranian Institut of Philosophy, Tehran, Iran.



Martin Heidegger's philosophical inquiry following World War I centers around the profound question, "Is there something given?" This question emerges as a pivotal juncture in the development of phenomenology. The specific perspective from which Heidegger poses the problem of givenness leads to a complex set of philosophical dilemmas, ultimately challenging the prevailing conceptions of philosophy as a science of objects or epistemology.
In this article, we explore first the significance of the early Heidegger's inquiry into the question of givenness, scrutinize his critique of Kantian notions of givenness, and ultimately elucidate what the authentic content of "it gives/es gibt" can be from Heidegger’s perspective in phenomenology. In fact, we will unravel the intricate layers that encompass the question of givenness as envisioned by Heidegger, which forms the foundation of his phenomenological endeavor.


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