In Islamic philosophical tradition prior to the modern period, epistemological discussions were not treated separately from metaphysical inquiries. This reality highlights the necessity of research and extraction of Islamic philosophers’ views on epistemology and its relationship with their ontological stances. Accordingly, this research, driven by the concern to understand the historical development of the ontology of cognitive states in the Islamic philosophical tradition, examines various dimensions of the problem of the existential reality of perceptions and its evolution in the thought of three foundational philosophers: Ibn Sīnā, Suhrawardī, and Mullā Ṣadrā. To this end, by situating a phenomenological analysis of cognition within the framework of each philosopher’s metaphysical system, their conception of the cognitive subject and the foundation of their epistemological system is inferred. Since in Islamic philosophy epistemology is grounded in ontology, evolution in the ontology of cognitive states occurs when a philosopher establishes a fundamental difference from his predecessors concerning the existential grounds and phenomenological characteristics of perception. Such shifts in principles and characteristics lead to transformations in explaining the cognitive process and the nature of the subject.



Ibn Sīnā is an essentialist, advocating the necessity of a generic unity between the perceiver and the perceived. Suhrawardī, moving beyond essentialism and the necessity of generic unity, introduces the notion of the ishrāqī relation . Mullā Ṣadrā, based on his novel principles, offers a fresh reading of essentialism and generic unity. The soul (nafs) is consistently the perceiver, yet it is explained diversely: from an Avicennan perspective, the soul is like a mirror for the manifestation of cognitive states; from Suhrawardī’s viewpoint, the soul is akin to vision, possessing an eye-like identity that observes the worlds; and in accordance with Ṣadr al-Muta’allihīn’s thought, the soul is a re-creator, reconstructing the external world within the inner world.

In Islamic philosophical tradition prior to the modern period, epistemological discussions were not treated separately from metaphysical inquiries. This reality highlights the necessity of research and extraction of Islamic philosophers’ views on epistemology and its relationship with their ontological stances. Accordingly, this research, driven by the concern to understand the historical development of the ontology of cognitive states in the Islamic philosophical tradition, examines various dimensions of the problem of the existential reality of perceptions and its evolution in the thought of three foundational philosophers: Ibn Sīnā, Suhrawardī, and Mullā Ṣadrā. To this end, by situating a phenomenological analysis of cognition within the framework of each philosopher’s metaphysical system, their conception of the cognitive subject and the foundation of their epistemological system is inferred. Since in Islamic philosophy epistemology is grounded in ontology, evolution in the ontology of cognitive states occurs when a philosopher establishes a fundamental difference from his predecessors concerning the existential grounds and phenomenological characteristics of perception. Such shifts in principles and characteristics lead to transformations in explaining the cognitive process and the nature of the subject.



Ibn Sīnā is an essentialist, advocating the necessity of a generic unity between the perceiver and the perceived. Suhrawardī, moving beyond essentialism and the necessity of generic unity, introduces the notion of the ishrāqī relation . Mullā Ṣadrā, based on his novel principles, offers a fresh reading of essentialism and generic unity. The soul (nafs) is consistently the perceiver, yet it is explained diversely: from an Avicennan perspective, the soul is like a mirror for the manifestation of cognitive states; from Suhrawardī’s viewpoint, the soul is akin to vision, possessing an eye-like identity that observes the worlds; and in accordance with Ṣadr al-Muta’allihīn’s thought, the soul is a re-creator, reconstructing the external world within the inner world.

Ibn Sīnā is an essentialist, advocating the necessity of a generic unity between the perceiver and the perceived. Suhrawardī, moving beyond essentialism and the necessity of generic unity, introduces the notion of the ishrāqī relation . Mullā Ṣadrā, based on his novel principles, offers a fresh reading of essentialism and generic unity. The soul (nafs) is consistently the perceiver, yet it is explained diversely: from an Avicennan perspective, the soul is like a mirror for the manifestation of cognitive states; from Suhrawardī’s viewpoint, the soul is akin to vision, possessing an eye-like identity that observes the worlds; and in accordance with Ṣadr al-Muta’allihīn’s thought, the soul is a re-creator, reconstructing the external world within the inner world.