The most fundamental issue in Islamic philosophy—given the breadth of its implications—is the manner in which the objectivity of things is realized. The present study investigates this issue within the philosophical system of Mir Dāmād in order to clarify his position, the criticisms that have been raised against it, and the manner in which he defends his view. Employing a descriptive-analytical method, the study first explicates Mir Dāmād’s thesis and then analyzes his arguments. It demonstrates that by distinguishing between objective being and relational being, he rejects the objectivity of both with respect to the Necessary being as well as possible beings.

Mir Dāmād denies the objectivity of objective being on the grounds that it entails both the inversion of predication and the necessitation of all creatures; the former contradicts what is self-evident and leads to sophistry, while the latter conflicts with multiple principles, including the temporal origination and contingency of created beings (Lahiji 2012, 134). In refuting relational being, he points to consequences such as the collapse of simple whetherness, the reduction of concrete reality to a mere concept (Mir Dāmād 1995a, 37), and the resulting infinite regress (Mir Dāmād 2012, 255).

His approach to the Necessary being and to possible beings, however, is not uniform. Drawing on the doctrine of the Natural universal, Mir Dāmād affirms the objectivity of quiddity in possible beings (Mir Dāmād 2012, 77), whereas in the Necessary being he denies even the objectivity of quiddity. His arguments for rejecting the objectivity of quiddity in the Necessary being are grounded in certain characteristics of quiddity that cannot be applied to the Necessary being—such as the possibility of multiplicity, the lack of self-individuation, the need for an agent or individuator, and the entailment of contingency.

Mir Dāmād regards the essence of the Necessary being as a core unknown, accessible only through demonstrative proof. Neither conceptual knowledge nor intuitive knowledge can grant comprehensive cognition of Him. He considers this view consistent with the teachings reported from the Imams (peace be upon them), who cautioned against both symbolism and agnosticism (Mir Dāmād 1989, 50).

The final section reviews several criticisms raised by some of Mir Dāmād’s students and commentators—such as Mullā Ṣadrā and Āghājānī. One major objection concerns the principle of “proportionality” (sanḵiyyat), which is taken to undermine the very foundations of Mir Dāmād’s thesis. Moreover, the rejection of the objectivity of objective being is challenged through both affirmative and negative arguments. The affirmative critique cites various proofs, such as the assertion that all beings exist by “being”—that is, possess being in actuality (Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī 2009, 134; Āghājānī Astarābādī, n.d., 122). The negative critique challenges Mir Dāmād’s claim that the consequence of accepting objective being is the necessitation of all entities, arguing that this conflicts with their essential poverty (Lahiji 2012, 134; Āghājānī Astarābādī, n.d., 123).

Regarding relational being, critics argue that if being were identical to the essence of a thing, none of the difficulties Mir Dāmād mentions would arise. In response, Mir Dāmād maintains that the difference between the Necessary being and possible beings can be justified only if their objectivity is not taken to be of a single kind. Thus, the intended meaning of proportionality is similarity in essence and attributes, not identity in objectivity. Moreover, he argues that the realization of possible beings does not require a conditional mode; rather, a mere causative mode suffices. Consequently, one cannot infer the necessity of the realization of being merely by positing a conditioned mode of existence. By critiquing this reasoning and other arguments offered for the necessary realization of existence, Mir Dāmād undermines the foundations of responses that attempted to refute his arguments against relational being, for all such responses presuppose that being is identical to the essence of a thing—an assumption he rejects by denying objective being.

Finally, he dismisses the critics’ objections regarding the impossibility of objective being, insisting that poverty cannot be conceived as intrinsic to a thing’s essence; need becomes meaningful only in relation to that which a thing lacks.

In this way, Mir Dāmād’s claim regarding the impossibility of the objective realization of existence—whether in its attributed (mawṣūfī) or qualificational (waṣfī) mode—is established and affirmed in an absolute manner with respect to both the Necessary being and contingent beings.